NCAA reorg imminent

[Wheels]

FSU acted like an agent floating rumors about their client receiving interest from multiple teams with the hopes that one team would start bidding. The old Drew Rosenhaus "create demand" for you client tactic. Look at the noise FSU made about looking to join the SEC or B1G. The minute UW and UO announced for the B1G, things on the FSU front went radio silent. Funny enough, Clemson was really quiet throughout, weren't they? Just lumped in with FSU.

Now the SEC has said they're not interested in expansion. FSU has nowhere to go and has the August 15 deadline to announce a departure. It turns out to nowhere. They're stuck in the ACC at least until the B1G and B12 deals expire in 2030 because that's the next opportunity for conferences to negotiate media rights, which is when these realignment episodes kick off (OU/UT and USC/UCLA all announced as conference media rights were nearing ends).

The article in The Athletic today about the similarities between the SWC and P12 dying was a good read. Over the next 6 years, FSU will see themselves fall several hundreds of millions of dollars in cumulative resources behind any team from the B1G (except UW/UO) and SEC. Of course, in 2030, who knows what the media landscape will look like; and conferences might all be up a creek (except, ironically, the ACC with their 2036 media rights expiration!).

[Farfromgeneva]

As I’ve suggested before this is all fluid and will change again before my kids are in college but it’s all been run post financial crisis like. A SoftBank fueled startup where the 28-32 yr olds think the business development function is raising money and they’ve dreamed up some TAM to justify growing into profitability by making it up on volume and hoping to have a monopoly. I’d bet you could see the curve in cable and media since 2010 and it would highly correlate with CFB growth.

For example because I’m sure they’ll bug out but it makes no sense for Rutgers games to care about any of this as they’ve been irrelevant in FB and BB for basically 50yrs or longer. Yet they piss money away chasing the pink dragon as everyone else’s expense.

https://econofact.org/who-wins-with-col ... 8f20257ee-

A combination of factors have contributed to generating revenues in the billions of dollars for some college sports. Football is the highest grossing sport by far. Men’s basketball, which brings the NCAA around one billion in revenues during March Madness, is second. Over the past forty years, several factors have increased opportunities to make money from college sports. The 1984 Supreme Court ruling on NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma validated a competitive market for college sports television rights (see here). Football has benefited enormously from the growth of television sports with the emergence of ESPN, cable sports, and regional sports channels in the 1980s; video replay technology in the 1990s and 2000s; and the introduction of streaming in the past 10 years (listen here). Moreover, the increase in college enrollment has expanded the potential audience and many U.S. universities and the NCAA have been willing participants in the commercialization of big-time college sports.
Even as commercial revenue streams have grown for top-billing football and men’s basketball, athletic expenditures exceed revenues at the vast majority of schools. In 2019, only 25 of 130 schools in the high-grossing Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) whose members are large, mostly public universities (with some exceptions such as Notre Dame, Northwestern, and Stanford) reported positive net revenues (see here). In fact, the median athletic program in FBS in 2019 (the last pre-pandemic year) had an operating deficit of $18.8 million. The same was true in the other two Division I subdivisions: among the 125 schools of the Football Championship Subdivision (FCS) the median program ran a deficit of $14.3 million, and in DI without football (94 schools) it was of $14.4 million. Large and persistent athletic department deficits lead schools to increase student athletic fees (many exceed $1000 per student yearly) and contribute to increases in tuition. As the cost of attending college rises, so does student debt which reached a record of over $1.6 trillion in the United States in 2021.
Athletic departments are embedded in much larger non-profit institutions so their incentives and accounting are different from most businesses and professional sports. Athletic departments do not have stockholders who demand bottom-line profits; instead they have stakeholders (boosters, alumni, students, administrators) who demand victories. Since players cannot be paid by the school, schools compete for players by employing famous coaches, building fancy facilities, providing perks such as unlimited “educationally-tethered” benefits, and awards of up to $5,980 for maintaining a C grade point average. As a result, athletic directors deploy funds to promote more victories and athletic departments run at substantial losses. It is possible that participating in big-time Division I sports also brings colleges returns beyond those captured by traditional revenue streams including boosting the image of the school, increasing student applications and enrollment, and increasing alumni donations. However, research finds the effect of participating in high-profile athletic contests on private donations range from no impact to a modest increase, or negative impacts when a team performs poorly (see here). Increases in donations to programs that compete in football bowls tend to be irregular and directed to athletic departments and may not provide as much benefit to the university overall. Any such donations are included in the reported athletic department’s revenues. Competition in high-profile sports can boost a university’s image but it can also expose it to negative publicity from coverage of cheating scandals and other negative news. And while there is uneven evidence that football and basketball wins increase the quantity of applications to Division I schools, the effect is relatively modest and short-lived.

[Essexfenwick]

The B1G is pretty well organized. A union of large public research flagships for the most part. The schools are peers with similar needs and goals. The ACC and Big 12 are the islands of misfit toys.

[Typical Lax Dad]

As I’ve suggested before this is all fluid and will change again before my kids are in college but it’s all been run post financial crisis like. A SoftBank fueled startup where the 28-32 yr olds think the business development function is raising money and they’ve dreamed up some TAM to justify growing into profitability by making it up on volume and hoping to have a monopoly. I’d bet you could see the curve in cable and media since 2010 and it would highly correlate with CFB growth.

For example because I’m sure they’ll bug out but it makes no sense for Rutgers games to care about any of this as they’ve been irrelevant in FB and BB for basically 50yrs or longer. Yet they tick money away chasing the pink dragon as everyone else’s expense.

https://econofact.org/who-wins-with-col ... 8f20257ee-

A combination of factors have contributed to generating revenues in the billions of dollars for some college sports. Football is the highest grossing sport by far. Men’s basketball, which brings the NCAA around one billion in revenues during March Madness, is second. Over the past forty years, several factors have increased opportunities to make money from college sports. The 1984 Supreme Court ruling on NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma validated a competitive market for college sports television rights (see here). Football has benefited enormously from the growth of television sports with the emergence of ESPN, cable sports, and regional sports channels in the 1980s; video replay technology in the 1990s and 2000s; and the introduction of streaming in the past 10 years (listen here). Moreover, the increase in college enrollment has expanded the potential audience and many U.S. universities and the NCAA have been willing participants in the commercialization of big-time college sports.
Even as commercial revenue streams have grown for top-billing football and men’s basketball, athletic expenditures exceed revenues at the vast majority of schools. In 2019, only 25 of 130 schools in the high-grossing Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) whose members are large, mostly public universities (with some exceptions such as Notre Dame, Northwestern, and Stanford) reported positive net revenues (see here). In fact, the median athletic program in FBS in 2019 (the last pre-pandemic year) had an operating deficit of $18.8 million. The same was true in the other two Division I subdivisions: among the 125 schools of the Football Championship Subdivision (FCS) the median program ran a deficit of $14.3 million, and in DI without football (94 schools) it was of $14.4 million. Large and persistent athletic department deficits lead schools to increase student athletic fees (many exceed $1000 per student yearly) and contribute to increases in tuition. As the cost of attending college rises, so does student debt which reached a record of over $1.6 trillion in the United States in 2021.
Athletic departments are embedded in much larger non-profit institutions so their incentives and accounting are different from most businesses and professional sports. Athletic departments do not have stockholders who demand bottom-line profits; instead they have stakeholders (boosters, alumni, students, administrators) who demand victories. Since players cannot be paid by the school, schools compete for players by employing famous coaches, building fancy facilities, providing perks such as unlimited “educationally-tethered” benefits, and awards of up to $5,980 for maintaining a C grade point average. As a result, athletic directors deploy funds to promote more victories and athletic departments run at substantial losses. It is possible that participating in big-time Division I sports also brings colleges returns beyond those captured by traditional revenue streams including boosting the image of the school, increasing student applications and enrollment, and increasing alumni donations. However, research finds the effect of participating in high-profile athletic contests on private donations range from no impact to a modest increase, or negative impacts when a team performs poorly (see here). Increases in donations to programs that compete in football bowls tend to be irregular and directed to athletic departments and may not provide as much benefit to the university overall. Any such donations are included in the reported athletic department’s revenues. Competition in high-profile sports can boost a university’s image but it can also expose it to negative publicity from coverage of cheating scandals and other negative news. And while there is uneven evidence that football and basketball wins increase the quantity of applications to Division I schools, the effect is relatively modest and short-lived.

I would let the air out of the balloon.

[Farfromgeneva]

As I’ve suggested before this is all fluid and will change again before my kids are in college but it’s all been run post financial crisis like. A SoftBank fueled startup where the 28-32 yr olds think the business development function is raising money and they’ve dreamed up some TAM to justify growing into profitability by making it up on volume and hoping to have a monopoly. I’d bet you could see the curve in cable and media since 2010 and it would highly correlate with CFB growth.

For example because I’m sure they’ll bug out but it makes no sense for Rutgers games to care about any of this as they’ve been irrelevant in FB and BB for basically 50yrs or longer. Yet they tick money away chasing the pink dragon as everyone else’s expense.

https://econofact.org/who-wins-with-col ... 8f20257ee-

A combination of factors have contributed to generating revenues in the billions of dollars for some college sports. Football is the highest grossing sport by far. Men’s basketball, which brings the NCAA around one billion in revenues during March Madness, is second. Over the past forty years, several factors have increased opportunities to make money from college sports. The 1984 Supreme Court ruling on NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma validated a competitive market for college sports television rights (see here). Football has benefited enormously from the growth of television sports with the emergence of ESPN, cable sports, and regional sports channels in the 1980s; video replay technology in the 1990s and 2000s; and the introduction of streaming in the past 10 years (listen here). Moreover, the increase in college enrollment has expanded the potential audience and many U.S. universities and the NCAA have been willing participants in the commercialization of big-time college sports.
Even as commercial revenue streams have grown for top-billing football and men’s basketball, athletic expenditures exceed revenues at the vast majority of schools. In 2019, only 25 of 130 schools in the high-grossing Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) whose members are large, mostly public universities (with some exceptions such as Notre Dame, Northwestern, and Stanford) reported positive net revenues (see here). In fact, the median athletic program in FBS in 2019 (the last pre-pandemic year) had an operating deficit of $18.8 million. The same was true in the other two Division I subdivisions: among the 125 schools of the Football Championship Subdivision (FCS) the median program ran a deficit of $14.3 million, and in DI without football (94 schools) it was of $14.4 million. Large and persistent athletic department deficits lead schools to increase student athletic fees (many exceed $1000 per student yearly) and contribute to increases in tuition. As the cost of attending college rises, so does student debt which reached a record of over $1.6 trillion in the United States in 2021.
Athletic departments are embedded in much larger non-profit institutions so their incentives and accounting are different from most businesses and professional sports. Athletic departments do not have stockholders who demand bottom-line profits; instead they have stakeholders (boosters, alumni, students, administrators) who demand victories. Since players cannot be paid by the school, schools compete for players by employing famous coaches, building fancy facilities, providing perks such as unlimited “educationally-tethered” benefits, and awards of up to $5,980 for maintaining a C grade point average. As a result, athletic directors deploy funds to promote more victories and athletic departments run at substantial losses. It is possible that participating in big-time Division I sports also brings colleges returns beyond those captured by traditional revenue streams including boosting the image of the school, increasing student applications and enrollment, and increasing alumni donations. However, research finds the effect of participating in high-profile athletic contests on private donations range from no impact to a modest increase, or negative impacts when a team performs poorly (see here). Increases in donations to programs that compete in football bowls tend to be irregular and directed to athletic departments and may not provide as much benefit to the university overall. Any such donations are included in the reported athletic department’s revenues. Competition in high-profile sports can boost a university’s image but it can also expose it to negative publicity from coverage of cheating scandals and other negative news. And while there is uneven evidence that football and basketball wins increase the quantity of applications to Division I schools, the effect is relatively modest and short-lived.

I would let the air out of the balloon.

Media industry will force that eventually. Along w taxpayers. Median CFB salary is $3.5MM…the Apple offering to PaC12 as I mentioned before was a pretty sober bid. Technology/FAANG won’t be the savior when cable blows itself up. Classic business model change where the new iteration of production or distribution has far lower base margins than the prior iteration. This product is being diluted and transformed at the same time the distribution is rapidly changing.

https://www.wsj.com/sports/football/col ... 2-7b7902a7

[wgdsr]

closing in on witching hour. wen fsu?

[a fan]

As I’ve suggested before this is all fluid and will change again before my kids are in college but it’s all been run post financial crisis like. A SoftBank fueled startup where the 28-32 yr olds think the business development function is raising money and they’ve dreamed up some TAM to justify growing into profitability by making it up on volume and hoping to have a monopoly. I’d bet you could see the curve in cable and media since 2010 and it would highly correlate with CFB growth.

For example because I’m sure they’ll bug out but it makes no sense for Rutgers games to care about any of this as they’ve been irrelevant in FB and BB for basically 50yrs or longer. Yet they tick money away chasing the pink dragon as everyone else’s expense.

https://econofact.org/who-wins-with-col ... 8f20257ee-

A combination of factors have contributed to generating revenues in the billions of dollars for some college sports. Football is the highest grossing sport by far. Men’s basketball, which brings the NCAA around one billion in revenues during March Madness, is second. Over the past forty years, several factors have increased opportunities to make money from college sports. The 1984 Supreme Court ruling on NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma validated a competitive market for college sports television rights (see here). Football has benefited enormously from the growth of television sports with the emergence of ESPN, cable sports, and regional sports channels in the 1980s; video replay technology in the 1990s and 2000s; and the introduction of streaming in the past 10 years (listen here). Moreover, the increase in college enrollment has expanded the potential audience and many U.S. universities and the NCAA have been willing participants in the commercialization of big-time college sports.
Even as commercial revenue streams have grown for top-billing football and men’s basketball, athletic expenditures exceed revenues at the vast majority of schools. In 2019, only 25 of 130 schools in the high-grossing Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) whose members are large, mostly public universities (with some exceptions such as Notre Dame, Northwestern, and Stanford) reported positive net revenues (see here). In fact, the median athletic program in FBS in 2019 (the last pre-pandemic year) had an operating deficit of $18.8 million. The same was true in the other two Division I subdivisions: among the 125 schools of the Football Championship Subdivision (FCS) the median program ran a deficit of $14.3 million, and in DI without football (94 schools) it was of $14.4 million. Large and persistent athletic department deficits lead schools to increase student athletic fees (many exceed $1000 per student yearly) and contribute to increases in tuition. As the cost of attending college rises, so does student debt which reached a record of over $1.6 trillion in the United States in 2021.
Athletic departments are embedded in much larger non-profit institutions so their incentives and accounting are different from most businesses and professional sports. Athletic departments do not have stockholders who demand bottom-line profits; instead they have stakeholders (boosters, alumni, students, administrators) who demand victories. Since players cannot be paid by the school, schools compete for players by employing famous coaches, building fancy facilities, providing perks such as unlimited “educationally-tethered” benefits, and awards of up to $5,980 for maintaining a C grade point average. As a result, athletic directors deploy funds to promote more victories and athletic departments run at substantial losses. It is possible that participating in big-time Division I sports also brings colleges returns beyond those captured by traditional revenue streams including boosting the image of the school, increasing student applications and enrollment, and increasing alumni donations. However, research finds the effect of participating in high-profile athletic contests on private donations range from no impact to a modest increase, or negative impacts when a team performs poorly (see here). Increases in donations to programs that compete in football bowls tend to be irregular and directed to athletic departments and may not provide as much benefit to the university overall. Any such donations are included in the reported athletic department’s revenues. Competition in high-profile sports can boost a university’s image but it can also expose it to negative publicity from coverage of cheating scandals and other negative news. And while there is uneven evidence that football and basketball wins increase the quantity of applications to Division I schools, the effect is relatively modest and short-lived.

I would let the air out of the balloon.

Media industry will force that eventually. Along w taxpayers. Median CFB salary is $3.5MM…the Apple offering to PaC12 as I mentioned before was a pretty sober bid. Technology/FAANG won’t be the savior when cable blows itself up. Classic business model change where the new iteration of production or distribution has far lower base margins than the prior iteration. This product is being diluted and transformed at the same time the distribution is rapidly changing.

https://www.wsj.com/sports/football/col ... 2-7b7902a7

Don't forget the Federal Government's role. If you want to end this party immediately? As in: overnight?

Get rid of R&D funding to these schools, and end the Federal Student loan program. The money that sports generates is couch change compared with what the Federal Government----taxpayers----throw into these schools, in total.

[ggait]

Interesting and seemingly informed take.

Basically:

(1) ESPN ultimately controls the broadcasting rights granted through the ACC GOR.

(2) That means FSU may not lose their broadcast money as long as FSU heads to an ESPN conference (like the SEC).

(3) There are “compositional” terms that allow ESPN to break the deal with the ACC (and, essentially, break up the ACC) if teams leave the ACC.

(4) FSU would be better off giving notice to the ACC by August 15, 2023 versus August 15, 2024.

(5) There are indications FSU is trying to dissolve the ACC by putting together a coalition of 8 teams. Dissolving the ACC would (a) allow FSU and other ACC schools to leave without paying the exit fee and (b) leave without paying the GOR if they go to an ESPN conference (or at least give the leaving ACC school a chance to renegotiate the broadcast rights with ESPN).

DocBarrister

Well it is 8/15/2023. Crickets from FSU.

But Doc still believes the end is nigh.

[wgdsr]

Interesting and seemingly informed take.

Basically:

(1) ESPN ultimately controls the broadcasting rights granted through the ACC GOR.

(2) That means FSU may not lose their broadcast money as long as FSU heads to an ESPN conference (like the SEC).

(3) There are “compositional” terms that allow ESPN to break the deal with the ACC (and, essentially, break up the ACC) if teams leave the ACC.

(4) FSU would be better off giving notice to the ACC by August 15, 2023 versus August 15, 2024.

(5) There are indications FSU is trying to dissolve the ACC by putting together a coalition of 8 teams. Dissolving the ACC would (a) allow FSU and other ACC schools to leave without paying the exit fee and (b) leave without paying the GOR if they go to an ESPN conference (or at least give the leaving ACC school a chance to renegotiate the broadcast rights with ESPN).

DocBarrister

Well it is 8/15/2023. Crickets from FSU.

But Doc still believes the end is nigh.

i can't decide if i'm disappointed fsu didn't show some guts here or impressed they had the discipline to not make a hasty decision before at least getting all their ducks in a row. probably some of both.

of course, no statement from them after carpet bombing the league for a couple weeks is on brand.

[Essexfenwick]

Interesting and seemingly informed take.

Basically:

(1) ESPN ultimately controls the broadcasting rights granted through the ACC GOR.

(2) That means FSU may not lose their broadcast money as long as FSU heads to an ESPN conference (like the SEC).

(3) There are “compositional” terms that allow ESPN to break the deal with the ACC (and, essentially, break up the ACC) if teams leave the ACC.

(4) FSU would be better off giving notice to the ACC by August 15, 2023 versus August 15, 2024.

(5) There are indications FSU is trying to dissolve the ACC by putting together a coalition of 8 teams. Dissolving the ACC would (a) allow FSU and other ACC schools to leave without paying the exit fee and (b) leave without paying the GOR if they go to an ESPN conference (or at least give the leaving ACC school a chance to renegotiate the broadcast rights with ESPN).

DocBarrister

Well it is 8/15/2023. Crickets from FSU.

But Doc still believes the end is nigh.

i can't decide if i'm disappointed fsu didn't show some guts here or impressed they had the discipline to not make a hasty decision before at least getting all their ducks in a row. probably some of both.

of course, no statement from them after carpet bombing the league for a couple weeks is on brand.

Nobody wants the ACC teams. They lose money for members

[wgdsr]

Interesting and seemingly informed take.

Basically:

(1) ESPN ultimately controls the broadcasting rights granted through the ACC GOR.

(2) That means FSU may not lose their broadcast money as long as FSU heads to an ESPN conference (like the SEC).

(3) There are “compositional” terms that allow ESPN to break the deal with the ACC (and, essentially, break up the ACC) if teams leave the ACC.

(4) FSU would be better off giving notice to the ACC by August 15, 2023 versus August 15, 2024.

(5) There are indications FSU is trying to dissolve the ACC by putting together a coalition of 8 teams. Dissolving the ACC would (a) allow FSU and other ACC schools to leave without paying the exit fee and (b) leave without paying the GOR if they go to an ESPN conference (or at least give the leaving ACC school a chance to renegotiate the broadcast rights with ESPN).

DocBarrister

Well it is 8/15/2023. Crickets from FSU.

But Doc still believes the end is nigh.

i can't decide if i'm disappointed fsu didn't show some guts here or impressed they had the discipline to not make a hasty decision before at least getting all their ducks in a row. probably some of both.

of course, no statement from them after carpet bombing the league for a couple weeks is on brand.

Nobody wants the ACC teams. They lose money for members

trolling doesn't make it true.

[JoeMauer89]

Doc on vacation? Very quiet around these parts.

Joe

[laxpert]

Have the odds for expansion of DI lacrosse gone from extremely slim to possible contraction?
Does it make sense to carry the NCAA minimum number of teams, which I believe is 15, to control costs and travel concerns associated with these Super Conferences.

[ggait]

Doc on vacation? Very quiet around these parts.

Joe

Some tea leaves suggesting that the zombie ACC might end up taking Cal and Stanford after all...

Saw a great line about FSU the other day:

"FSU has nowhere to go and no way to get there."

[Farfromgeneva]

Interesting and seemingly informed take.

Basically:

(1) ESPN ultimately controls the broadcasting rights granted through the ACC GOR.

(2) That means FSU may not lose their broadcast money as long as FSU heads to an ESPN conference (like the SEC).

(3) There are “compositional” terms that allow ESPN to break the deal with the ACC (and, essentially, break up the ACC) if teams leave the ACC.

(4) FSU would be better off giving notice to the ACC by August 15, 2023 versus August 15, 2024.

(5) There are indications FSU is trying to dissolve the ACC by putting together a coalition of 8 teams. Dissolving the ACC would (a) allow FSU and other ACC schools to leave without paying the exit fee and (b) leave without paying the GOR if they go to an ESPN conference (or at least give the leaving ACC school a chance to renegotiate the broadcast rights with ESPN).

DocBarrister

Well it is 8/15/2023. Crickets from FSU.

But Doc still believes the end is nigh.

i can't decide if i'm disappointed fsu didn't show some guts here or impressed they had the discipline to not make a hasty decision before at least getting all their ducks in a row. probably some of both.

of course, no statement from them after carpet bombing the league for a couple weeks is on brand.

Nobody wants the ACC teams. They lose money for members

trolling doesn't make it true.

In his world it does. Regardless of pseudonym.

[Farfromgeneva]

Have the odds for expansion of DI lacrosse gone from extremely slim to possible contraction?
Does it make sense to carry the NCAA minimum number of teams, which I believe is 15, to control costs and travel concerns associated with these Super Conferences.

Contraction is probably likely on mens side. They can’t skirt title 9 yet.

[wgdsr]

Have the odds for expansion of DI lacrosse gone from extremely slim to possible contraction?
Does it make sense to carry the NCAA minimum number of teams, which I believe is 15, to control costs and travel concerns associated with these Super Conferences.

if anyone in a superconference uses controlling travel expenses as an excuse to cut programs, it is just that... an excuse. more likely if anything like that occurs, it will be as a result of:
a) fiscal mismanagement
and
b) keeping up with joneses in a desperate attempt to play with the big boys with ever more $$ on hand.
looking at you, rutgers.

to wit: ucla went to their board of regents with an outline of increased costs related to travel and pegged it at $4.5 - 6 m.

from media/conference revenue alone, their increased take is supposed to explode from maybe about $20s to 30 m up to 70+ and climbing as early as their 1st year in the b1g. so that's decent coverage, and having fewer trips from eastern schools out west than vice versa in the pan-continental conferences would make this seem like a rounding error.

consider also that more recent estimates for what the expanded cfp is gonna rake in its next contracts (2024 and 2026) is going to go from the former $470+ m annual 4 team deal from espn to what is likely a 2 handle no later than 2026. i dunno what chunk of that pie gets distributed to an individual school in a p4, but let's just say i'm long public surprise on upside to the cash that'll be flowing to superconference schools from the cfp in the next several years. they will be swimming in it.

it's possible even a mismanaged entity like ucla won't be able to spend $$ fast enough. so if they throw out the travel canard, you'll know they just want to spend nfl dough on their football team.

[mdk01]

Have the odds for expansion of DI lacrosse gone from extremely slim to possible contraction?
Does it make sense to carry the NCAA minimum number of teams, which I believe is 15, to control costs and travel concerns associated with these Super Conferences.

Contraction is probably likely on mens side. They can’t skirt title 9 yet.

But if the cuts resulted in BOTH fewer teams and fewer scholies for men wouldn't Title IX apply as well?

[Essexfenwick]

Have the odds for expansion of DI lacrosse gone from extremely slim to possible contraction?
Does it make sense to carry the NCAA minimum number of teams, which I believe is 15, to control costs and travel concerns associated with these Super Conferences.

Contraction is probably likely on mens side. They can’t skirt title 9 yet.

If half the football players identify as female and get paid more to close the income gap … watch out.

[Farfromgeneva]

Have the odds for expansion of DI lacrosse gone from extremely slim to possible contraction?
Does it make sense to carry the NCAA minimum number of teams, which I believe is 15, to control costs and travel concerns associated with these Super Conferences.

Contraction is probably likely on mens side. They can’t skirt title 9 yet.

But if the cuts resulted in BOTH fewer teams and fewer scholies for men wouldn't Title IX apply as well?

85 scholarships and 70% of the budget in $ goes to FB with no women’s offset. They could drop other men’s sports. Eventually it ends up with CFB somehow peeling off and licensing the college brands and some shared services with a kick in from the NFL and lower media dollars in my view but that’s 10-20yrs out. Sort of like CRE stress is rolling slower because of long term leases at old rates.