Israel and West Bank Settlements

[lagerhead]

Does anybody have an answer for why they feel that Iran stands to benefit from any of this?

You mean other than preventing (for now) the normalization of diplomatic relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, mostly likely followed by normalization with other Arab nations?

Ya know, that’s kind of a big thing … arguably bigger than the Camp David Peace Accords.

Such a normalization of diplomatic relations would have basically united Israel and much of the Arab world against their common adversary … Iran.

You don’t think preventing that, even temporarily, is a benefit to Iran?





DocBarrister

Chaos and instability

[a fan]

Iran is, so far, the only clear winner from this horrible war.

Russia

... certainly a nice diversion. US republiCONs, certainly a nice diversion from the "stupid house republiCON" media story. You can think of a lot of people who will win something. People want to go with external conspiracy theories, when there is enough going on, on the ground in Israel to explain it. Hamas did not want Israel and Saudis to make friends any more than Iran did. It was bad news for them with or without the Iranians.

Most probable role Iran is playing, is the same as the US, supplying weapons and money. Hamas didn't need any help with strategy or tactics planning -- they are the experts on their home ground. Bibi and his buddies will be short term winners, they are getting what they want -- having their military cut free to slaughter Palestinians and diverts from his legal problems and push back on the domestic front. Personally Bibi has got to feel better about his current position, compared to last week.

Not sure Russia comes out a winner in this. Wouldn’t be surprised to see a bipartisan package emerge in the Senate that combines military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine and Israel in a single bill.

DocBarrister

... hopefully that is the way it plays out.

Anything that pulls Ukraine out of headlines in the US and EU helps his cause. So does instability.

[jhu72]

Benjamin Netanyahu failed Israel. ... and in my opinion feels just dandy about it.

[old salt]

Read my other posts today in this thread on this topic, cradle. I already addressed why it's not terribly likely that Iran was directly involved, green lit etc...but yes, possible.

Iran is Shia and are deeply in bed therefore with Hezbollah, but not with Hamas which is Sunni. And Hezbollah does not appear to have been privy to this massive attack, wasn't prepared to take part, etc. That doesn't mean they don't have any relationship, but it's an uneasy, enemy of my enemy sort of relationship.

Of course, it's possible. So, I'm not "sure" of anything re who funded and helped organize and green lit this attack. And I never claimed to be "sure".

However, makes more sense that Qatar and Egypt were the primary sources of weapons for Hamas, though some may well be Iranian made. They DO fund Hamas.

And there's a decent chance that Russia has had a hand in all this too. They don't care about Shia v Sunni, their objectives are different.

The 2 best intel services in the world were taken by surprise, but you're darn sure that Iran was just a spectator. okie doke.

Neither Egypt nor Qatar stand to benefit from this.

[old salt]

If cradle's gonna try the Iran card, he should also take a look at this:

Donald Trump's Israel Intel Leak Under Scrutiny After Hamas Attack

...but wait. That Blame Trump article tells us -- Iran, the Gulf nation that is a fierce adversary of Israel and has long supported Hamas.
That can't be. Iran is just an innocent spectator.

...& 6 years ago, Trump told the Russians how to defeat the Iron Dome ?
Hamas & Hezbollah have learned from experience -- overwhelm it with dumb rockets, then used precision guided missiles.
Because of the longer ranges involved in Ukraine, it's not working that well for the Russians.

[Brooklyn]

Does anybody have an answer for why they feel that Iran stands to benefit from any of this?

You mean other than preventing (for now) the normalization of diplomatic relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, mostly likely followed by normalization with other Arab nations?

Ya know, that’s kind of a big thing … arguably bigger than the Camp David Peace Accords.

Such a normalization of diplomatic relations would have basically united Israel and much of the Arab world against their common adversary … Iran.
You don’t think preventing that, even temporarily, is a benefit to Iran?


DocBarrister

Saudi Arabia and Iran have sought normalization since earlier this year:


From normalization to non-aggression: The next step in Iran-Saudi ties



https://www.mei.edu/publications/normal ... saudi-ties


The groundbreaking March 2023 normalization deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran could potentially reshape the political landscape of the Middle East. It has already paved the way for de-securitization and the resumption of diplomatic relations. Normalization has created positive sentiment on both sides, and a flurry of ideas have been proposed to expand bilateral ties.

However, critical security issues remain unresolved, casting doubt on the long-term sustainability of the process. These dilemmas raise questions such as whether non-security cooperation alone can ensure the durability of normalization in the face of persistent challenges in both sides’ security policies. What measures and mechanisms should be introduced to mitigate security tensions that may resurface again? It is worth noting that the normalization statement and diplomatic sources offer few answers to these pressing questions.

The current political opening provides a fragile and narrow window of opportunity to establish mechanisms that can address both sides’ security concerns. The focus in the short term should be on shaping new norms of conduct by stopping both sides from using their capabilities against the other rather than demands to disarm or make significant changes in military-security strategies. This requires building a new legal basis that can guarantee long-term mutual implementation of the agreement.

Capitalizing on this rare opportunity, Riyadh and Tehran should move forward to finalize a comprehensive non-aggression pact as the foundation for their future security relations, stopping any subversion or military aggression, and creating a de-escalatory mechanism in the event of a crisis.

Making sense of a non-aggression pact

A total of 137 non-aggression pacts have signed between former rivals across the globe. Not all of these were successful, but overall, they have contributed to stabilizing the early stages of normalization when mistrust is greatest. Such pacts facilitate the transition from rivalry to cooperation when parties are not ready to agree on politically costly and risky concessions, like disarmament or arms reduction. A non-aggression treaty prohibits the use of any measures of subversion and aggression, while allowing both sides to retain their deterrence models.

Subversion includes any act that incites, aggravates, or creates dissension within another state with the aim of destabilizing or overthrowing the regime. Any non-conventional measures, such as intelligence and clandestine operations, media, and disinformation campaigns, would be included in this definition — for example, intervention in a country’s internal affairs for ideological or security reasons, including under the umbrella of “protecting ethnic rights” or “ensuring freedom of religious rights.” This is critical as both Arab minorities in Iran and Shiite populations in Saudi Arabia have been subject to subversion in the past under similar pretexts.

Aggression, by contrast, involves the use of armed force or any military means by a state, a group of states, or a state-sponsored armed group against the sovereignty, political independence, and territorial integrity of another state. A ban should also cover the use of nonviolent military means and hybrid operations. The use of state-backed proxies, including any member of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” network, and clandestine operations as a means of operating below the threshold of armed conflict should be ceased as well. A non-aggression pact would not demand the revision of regional security assistance policies, but it would prohibit the use of these assets against the other side.

Such an approach, inclusive in its definition of aggression, would guarantee that every means and tool that might harm state security and national integrity would fall under the scope of the treaty. But at the same time, it would avoid limiting national defense strategies, thereby minimizing the political and security costs. Indeed, a non-aggression pact is not a defensive, offensive, or consultative alliance and does not require cooperation in the event of conflict. It is also not a disarmament treaty that seeks to reduce certain capabilities in the parties’ arsenals, either conventional or asymmetric.

The pact would only limit the use of military-security means to resolve disputes and gain political leverage. It would add a legal commitment to an existing political agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran, making a return to the sort of hostile actions carried out by both states between 2016 and 2021 costly.

A non-aggression pact is a good starting point for normalization between rivals when mistrust is rampant, there are huge challenges to boosting ties, and the probability of future hostilities seems relatively high. It is a rather low-cost political choice to create a solid security foundation and signal to the world that normalization is not just a temporary agreement.

What makes a non-aggression pact important now?

There are several interlinked reasons why normalization is shaky and requires mechanisms to sustain it. A formal non-aggression pact is among the tools that helps to protect normalization from various external and internal spoilers. It suits the transition between rivalry and cooperation when both systemic and external factors may work to undermine the normalization.

First, a non-aggression pact can be a way to further strengthen the political-security dimension of normalization, which is likely to remain the major focus for now. Despite a flurry of ideas, there are few chances that Riyadh and Tehran could strengthen ties through non-security areas, such as trade, economic cooperation, and cultural exchange, in the short term. Under heavy U.S. sanctions, the Islamic Republic urgently needs economic cooperation and sees normalization with its neighbors as a way to escape its current economic crisis. Riyadh has other thoughts though and reports indicate that it has no intention of seeking “exemptions” from U.S. sanctions. For the kingdom, providing major economic concessions to Iran when no strategic shift in its nuclear and regional policies has occurred would cost it the leverage it has over Tehran. Thus, it is unlikely that non-security areas can serve as the basis to make normalization sustainable.

Second, a non-aggression pact is a solution to the lack of proper legal and institutional foundations for normalization. The legal status and implementation of the General Agreement for Cooperation signed in 1998 and the subsequent security cooperation agreement signed in 2001 that are referred to as the basis for the recent rapprochement are uncertain. Even if these previous agreements start to be fully implemented, the scope of neither agreement covers the sort of security problems the two states have experienced in recent decades. For example, the 2001 security agreement is limited in scope to cooperation on anti-terrorism, organized crime, smuggling, and social crimes. By contrast, it is the unprecedented militarization of relations and hard security threats that are at the core of recent tensions. Thus, it is not clear how the 2001 agreement can be a reliable foundation for a new round of normalization.

Third, a non-aggression pact would help to reduce the negative impacts of U.S.-Iran and U.S.-Israel tensions on Saudi-Iranian normalization. Saudi Arabia’s position in any hypothetical military escalation remains a critical point of contention. For years, Tehran, given Riyadh’s support to Saddam Hussein during his attack on Iran, believed that Saudi Arabia would assist a possible U.S. or Israeli military operation inside Iran. Thus, the question of how much access to critical assets Saudi Arabia will give to U.S. forces in a war remains central to Saudi-Iranian normalization. This comes at a time when the issue of access to regional partners’ critical assets is becoming increasingly important for Washington as Central Command’s (CENTCOM) dynamic force employment approach is being implemented. However, Saudi Arabia’s support for Washington, such as providing bases, overflight permission, and other forms of assistance in pressuring Iran, is likely to prompt retaliatory action from Tehran. The Islamic Republic may choose to inflict costs on Saudi Arabia and the UAE, if its strategic calculus in a changing security environment forces it to do so. Thus, delinking U.S.-Iran and Iran-Israeli tensions from Saudi-Iranian relations remains a grave challenge for Riyadh and Tehran — one with the potential to create new diplomatic and military tensions while also limiting economic ties.

Fourth, the pact provides an opportunity to reduce the formation of new threats when deterrence remains the core feature of both sides’ security strategies. Indeed, there are more continuities than changes in both countries’ security and military strategies. Both sides continue to believe that lasting peace in the region requires strong military capabilities. Iran perceives its nuclear threshold status and short break-out time as a means to extract political leverage and even boost deterrence. There is no debate in Tehran over reviewing its policy of supporting the Axis of Resistance because the network is viewed as a functional element of its military doctrine. Besides, Iran’s missile program is advancing at its normal pace. It is unlikely that any of Iran’s core military capabilities would be affected by normalization with Saudi Arabia simply because, from the Iranian perspective, they target the U.S. and Israel, not Saudi Arabia. At the same time, the kingdom is also building up its military capabilities at a similar pace as before. U.S.-Saudi military cooperation is moving forward, including building integrated air defense systems and drone programs. While Riyadh is looking at Beijing and Moscow to diversify its defense partners, recent U.S.-Saudi discussions over normalization with Israel revealed that the Saudis view stronger military cooperation with the U.S. as an important part of future deterrence. Riyadh’s bid to acquire long-range strike capabilities through missiles, drones, and new fighter jets has no other likely target in the region aside from Iran.

Implementing the pact

Proper implementation of a non-aggression pact requires continuous security consultation, exchange of information, direct communication between the two sides’ military-security sectors, and transparency about the challenging aspects of security policy. On Aug. 16, 2023, Aziz Nasirzadeh, the deputy chief of staff of Iran’s Armed Forces, met Talal al-Otaibi, an aide to the Saudi defense minister, on the sidelines of the 11th Moscow Conference on International Security. As this meeting makes clear, holding direct military talks between two rivals is not a far-fetched idea. Establishing various military confidence-building measures is central to guaranteeing the implementation of the pact. These measures can shape new norms of interaction that gradually reduce mistrust between the two security establishments.

One major step in this process is pre-notification and exchange of information about each other’s motives and intentions for specific actions and military movements, particularly in the Persian Gulf and other contested areas. For example, Iran often justifies seizing foreign ships in retaliation for the U.S. seizure of Iranian assets. Military drills, offensive exercises, and missile tests are part of Tehran’s naval strategy to reinforce deterrence against the U.S., but Tehran ignores the threat signals such actions send across the Persian Gulf.

Similarly, Saudi Arabia’s participation in naval drills, especially with CENTCOM, such as those carried out in March 2023, causes similar irritation in Tehran. On Aug. 29, Riyadh took command of the U.S.-led coalition Combined Task Force 152 and the internationally-led Coalition Task Force Sentinel to protect maritime commerce in and around the Strait of Hormuz. For Tehran, such actions send signals about Riyadh’s true intentions.

Tehran-Riyadh direct engagement about such moves across the Gulf, in Yemen, and in other sensitive conflict zones can clarify intentions, avert miscalculation and unintended escalation, and provide reassurances to the other side. While it is unrealistic to expect either side to overhaul its military strategy, cease military preparation, or end international commitments, the two countries can mitigate threat perceptions and reduce the risks of aggressive response from the other side by establishing pre-notification and briefing mechanisms.

A non-aggression pact can also be the basis for a broader discussion about topics like defense strategies and doctrine. Iran should engage in a dialogue with Saudi Arabia about its nuclear intentions, support for Shiite groups, and missile strategy. Iran’s nuclear program remains a major threat for Saudi Arabia. Tehran is miscalculating if it envisions both a full-scale normalization and a prolonged nuclear escalation. Similarly, Saudi Arabia could also discuss the objectives behind its missile defense program, nuclear policy, and efforts to boost its stand-off capabilities.

At this point, for defense talks to succeed, they should not entail any formal commitment clauses or impose limitations on other side’s policies or military capabilities. Instead, they should aim for a more limited goal: to show goodwill and reduce misperceptions. If continued, these dialogues may eventually lead to a new understanding about the regional balance of offensive and defensive forces, the formation of new codes of conduct for missile tests and deployments, and other military confidence-building measures that reduce the long-term risk of aggression.

A non-aggression pact will act as a vehicle for Riyadh and Tehran to establish a joint military commission, helping to institutionalize military-to-military communication in a more routine way. Establishing such contacts will gradually feed into broader confidence-building measures, such as naval visits and joint trainings. In this way a pact could be a first step in overcoming long-lasting threat perceptions by establishing direct communication.

Conclusion

A non-aggression pact is a transition step to help rivals build more cooperative behavior gradually, especially when normalization efforts face multiple challenges, deep mistrust, and serious security concerns. Riyadh and Tehran can reinforce the military-security dimension of their political normalization by signing a non-aggression pact that would help reduce threat perceptions and shape new norms of conduct.

However, it is critical to remember that such a pact will not end the arms race if it is not followed by other complementary mechanisms. North and South Korea signed a pact in 1992 and the U.S. and Russia followed suit that same year. Neither pact ended the arms race or helped reach strategic parity as they failed to build a broader political consensus to end the underlying rivalry. Thus, while important, such pacts are only the first step in a long normalization process.

In the medium term, non-aggression pacts are a useful tool, functioning as a formal commitment that increases the credibility cost of noncompliance, making the resumption of hostilities more costly. They are also important in their signaling function and in building trust for third-party investors and traders. A successful non-aggression pact between Iran and Saudi Arabia can gradually take on a regional nature by promoting similar pacts between Tehran and Abu Dhabi or Manama, feeding into a broader regional reconciliation process.





Diplomatic relations have been restored and embassies have been reopened - this has been Step One. Step two in the normalization process is a possible non-aggression pact. This would likely relieve regional tensions. Ultimately it could possibly lead to easing of economic sanctions against Iran so that it could improve its economy. In view of this you have to wonder why Iran would sabotage the very efforts they have been working at all year long. Because of all this there is just no net benefit to Tehran to foment another regional conflict as it would only lead to further USA created isolation.


Now let's turn this around ~ wouldn't Israel benefit by sabotaging those diplomatic efforts between Iran and the Saudis? Could this "attack" be a false flag operation as conspiracy theorists been saying all other the Internet? I have seen some contentions about the possibility that Israel did not have a security lapse but that it staged this Pearl Harbor type "attack" so as to point the finger at Tehran and to "justify" further USA intervention (maybe even another invasion of Iran) like it did in 1953? Some of these theorists have said this.

Having read Ostrovsky's classic By Way of Deception, this wouldn't surprise me in the least.

[old salt]

The solution is reasonable leaders on both sides, but those leaders don't exist or don't hold power today and haven't for decades!!

The US should prepare to wash it's hands of Israel.

When has the PLO or HAMAS put forward a reasonable leader willing to accept a 2 state solution or anything less than the elimination of Israel?

[jhu72]

The solution is reasonable leaders on both sides, but those leaders don't exist or don't hold power today and haven't for decades!!

The US should prepare to wash it's hands of Israel.

When has the PLO or HAMAS put forward a reasonable leader willing to accept a 2 state solution or anything less than the elimination of Israel?

... sorry to burst your bubble, but Arafat was much more reasonable than you or the right wing war mongers would ever admit. Even you should understand the difference between saying something for domestic consumption and what is said and recognized behind close doors. Then the last Israeli prime minister invested in peace was murdered by Benji's friends.

[old salt]

Arafat was much more reasonable than you or the right wing war mongers would ever admit.

[old salt]

QFP.

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/i ... g-bbe07b25
WSJ NEWS EXCLUSIVE : MIDDLE EAST

Iran Helped Plot Attack on Israel Over Several Weeks
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps gave the final go-ahead last Monday in Beirut
By Summer Said, Benoit Faucon, and Stephen Kalin

DUBAI—Iranian security officials helped plan Hamas’s Saturday surprise attack on Israel and gave the green light for the assault at a meeting in Beirut last Monday, according to senior members of Hamas and Hezbollah, another Iran-backed militant group.

Officers of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps had worked with Hamas since August to devise the air, land and sea incursions—the most significant breach of Israel’s borders since the 1973 Yom Kippur War—those people said.

Details of the operation were refined during several meetings in Beirut attended by IRGC officers and representatives of four Iran-backed militant groups, including Hamas, which holds power in Gaza, and Hezbollah, a Shiite militant group and political faction in Lebanon, they said.

U.S. officials say they haven’t seen evidence of Tehran’s involvement. In an interview with CNN that aired Sunday, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said: “We have not yet seen evidence that Iran directed or was behind this particular attack, but there is certainly a long relationship.”

“We don’t have any information at this time to corroborate this account,” said a U.S. official of the meetings.

A European official and an adviser to the Syrian government, however, gave the same account of Iran’s involvement in the lead-up to the attack as the senior Hamas and Hezbollah members.

Asked about the meetings, Mahmoud Mirdawi, a senior Hamas official, said the group planned the attacks on its own. “This is a Palestinian and Hamas decision,” he said.

A spokesman for Iran’s mission to the United Nations said the Islamic Republic stood in support of Gaza’s actions but didn’t direct them.

“The decisions made by the Palestinian resistance are fiercely autonomous and unwaveringly aligned with the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people,” the spokesman said. “We are not involved in Palestine’s response, as it is taken solely by Palestine itself.”

A direct Iranian role would take Tehran’s long-running conflict with Israel out of the shadows, raising the risk of broader conflict in the Middle East. Senior Israeli security officials have pledged to strike at Iran’s leadership if Tehran is found responsible for killing Israelis.

The IRGC’s broader plan is to create a multi-front threat that can strangle Israel from all sides—Hezbollah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine in the north and Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas in Gaza and the West Bank, according to the senior Hamas and Hezbollah members and an Iranian official.

At least 700 Israelis are confirmed dead, and Saturday’s assault has punctured the country’s aura of invincibility and left Israelis questioning how their vaunted security forces could let this happen.

Israel has blamed Iran, saying it is behind the attacks, if indirectly. ​​ “We know that there were meetings in Syria and in Lebanon with other leaders of the terror armies that surround Israel so obviously it’s easy to understand that they tried to coordinate. The proxies of Iran in our region, they tried to be coordinated as much as possible with Iran,” Israel’s ambassador to the United Nations, Gilad Erdan, said Sunday.

Hamas has publicly acknowledged receiving support from Iran. And on Sunday, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi talked to Palestinian Islamic Jihad leader Ziyad al-Nakhalah and Hamas chief Ismail Haniyeh.

Iran has been setting aside other regional conflicts, such as its open feud with Saudi Arabia in Yemen, to devote the IRGC’s foreign resources toward coordinating, financing and arming militias antagonistic to Israel, including Hamas and Hezbollah, the senior Hamas and Hezbollah members said.

The U.S. and Israel have designated Hamas and Hezbollah as terrorist organizations.

“We are now free to focus on the Zionist entity,” the Iranian official said. “They are now very isolated.”

The strike was intended to hit Israel while it appeared distracted by internal political divisions over Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government. It was also aimed at disrupting accelerating U.S.-brokered talks to normalize relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel that Iran saw as threatening, the senior Hamas and Hezbollah members said.

Building on peace deals with Egypt and Jordan, expanding Israeli ties with Gulf Arab states could create a chain of American allies linking three key choke points of global trade—the Suez Canal, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Bab Al Mandeb connecting the Red Sea to the Arabian Sea, said Hussein Ibish, senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington.

“That’s very bad news for Iran,” Ibish said. “If they could do this, the strategic map changes dramatically to Iran’s detriment.”

Leading the effort to wrangle Iran’s foreign proxies under a unified command has been Ismail Qaani, the leader of the IRGC’s international military arm, the Quds Force.

Qaani launched coordination among several militias surrounding Israel in April during a meeting in Lebanon, The Wall Street Journal has reported, where Hamas began working more closely with other groups such as Hezbollah for the first time.

Around that time, Palestinian groups staged a rare set of limited strikes on Israel from Lebanon and Gaza, under the direction of Iran, said the Iranian official. “It was a roaring success,” the official said.

Iran has long backed Hamas but, as a Sunni Muslim group, it had been an outsider among Tehran’s Shia proxies until recent months, when cooperation among the groups accelerated.

Representatives of these groups have met with Quds Force leaders at least biweekly in Lebanon since August to discuss this weekend’s attack on Israel and what happens next, they said. Qaani has attended some of those meetings along with Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah, Islamic Jihad leader al-Nakhalah, and Saleh al-Arouri, Hamas’s military chief, the militant-group members said.

Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian attended at least two of the meetings, they said.

“An attack of such scope could only have happened after months of planning and would not have happened without coordination with Iran,” said Lina Khatib, director of the SOAS Middle East Institute at the University of London. “Hamas, like Hezbollah in Lebanon, does not single-handedly make decisions to engage in war without prior explicit agreement from Iran.”

The Palestinian and Lebanese militias’ ability to coordinate with Iran will be tested in the coming days as Israel’s response comes into focus.

Egypt, which is trying to mediate in the conflict, has warned Israeli officials that a ground invasion into Gaza would trigger a military response from Hezbollah, opening up a second battlefront, people familiar with the matter said. Israel and Hezbollah exchanged fire briefly on Sunday.

Hamas has called on Palestinians in the West Bank and Palestinian citizens of Israel to take up arms and join the fight. There have been limited clashes in the West Bank, but no reports of clashes between Arabs and Jews inside Israel, as happened in May 2021 when Israel and Gaza last engaged in extended combat.

The Iranian official said that if Iran were attacked, it would respond with missile strikes on Israel from Lebanon, Yemen and Iran, and send Iranian fighters into Israel from Syria to attack cities in the north and east of Israel.

Iran’s backing of a coordinated group of Arab militias is ominous for Israel. In previous conflicts, the Soviet Union was the ultimate patron of Israel’s Arab enemies and was always able to pressure them to reach some type of accommodation or recognize a red line, said Bernard Hudson, a former counterterrorism chief for the Central Intelligence Agency.

“The Soviets never considered Israel a permanent foe,” he said. “Iran’s leadership clearly does.”

[DocBarrister]

Iran is, so far, the only clear winner from this horrible war.

Russia

... certainly a nice diversion. US republiCONs, certainly a nice diversion from the "stupid house republiCON" media story. You can think of a lot of people who will win something. People want to go with external conspiracy theories, when there is enough going on, on the ground in Israel to explain it. Hamas did not want Israel and Saudis to make friends any more than Iran did. It was bad news for them with or without the Iranians.

Most probable role Iran is playing, is the same as the US, supplying weapons and money. Hamas didn't need any help with strategy or tactics planning -- they are the experts on their home ground. Bibi and his buddies will be short term winners, they are getting what they want -- having their military cut free to slaughter Palestinians and diverts from his legal problems and push back on the domestic front. Personally Bibi has got to feel better about his current position, compared to last week.

Not sure Russia comes out a winner in this. Wouldn’t be surprised to see a bipartisan package emerge in the Senate that combines military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine and Israel in a single bill.

DocBarrister

... hopefully that is the way it plays out.

WASHINGTON — The Biden administration and key lawmakers in Congress are actively discussing whether aid to Israel could be linked to more funding for Ukraine as a strategy to pass both spending priorities, according to an administration official and two pro-Ukraine Republican lawmakers.

Lawmakers in both parties who support additional aid for Ukraine have suggested the approach as a potential way to secure funding for Kyiv despite opposition from some Republican members in the House and the Senate.

https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white- ... rcna119516

DocBarrister

[DocBarrister]

Does anybody have an answer for why they feel that Iran stands to benefit from any of this?

You mean other than preventing (for now) the normalization of diplomatic relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, mostly likely followed by normalization with other Arab nations?

Ya know, that’s kind of a big thing … arguably bigger than the Camp David Peace Accords.

Such a normalization of diplomatic relations would have basically united Israel and much of the Arab world against their common adversary … Iran.
You don’t think preventing that, even temporarily, is a benefit to Iran?


DocBarrister

Saudi Arabia and Iran have sought normalization since earlier this year:


From normalization to non-aggression: The next step in Iran-Saudi ties



https://www.mei.edu/publications/normal ... saudi-ties


The groundbreaking March 2023 normalization deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran could potentially reshape the political landscape of the Middle East. It has already paved the way for de-securitization and the resumption of diplomatic relations. Normalization has created positive sentiment on both sides, and a flurry of ideas have been proposed to expand bilateral ties.

However, critical security issues remain unresolved, casting doubt on the long-term sustainability of the process. These dilemmas raise questions such as whether non-security cooperation alone can ensure the durability of normalization in the face of persistent challenges in both sides’ security policies. What measures and mechanisms should be introduced to mitigate security tensions that may resurface again? It is worth noting that the normalization statement and diplomatic sources offer few answers to these pressing questions.

The current political opening provides a fragile and narrow window of opportunity to establish mechanisms that can address both sides’ security concerns. The focus in the short term should be on shaping new norms of conduct by stopping both sides from using their capabilities against the other rather than demands to disarm or make significant changes in military-security strategies. This requires building a new legal basis that can guarantee long-term mutual implementation of the agreement.

Capitalizing on this rare opportunity, Riyadh and Tehran should move forward to finalize a comprehensive non-aggression pact as the foundation for their future security relations, stopping any subversion or military aggression, and creating a de-escalatory mechanism in the event of a crisis.

Making sense of a non-aggression pact

A total of 137 non-aggression pacts have signed between former rivals across the globe. Not all of these were successful, but overall, they have contributed to stabilizing the early stages of normalization when mistrust is greatest. Such pacts facilitate the transition from rivalry to cooperation when parties are not ready to agree on politically costly and risky concessions, like disarmament or arms reduction. A non-aggression treaty prohibits the use of any measures of subversion and aggression, while allowing both sides to retain their deterrence models.

Subversion includes any act that incites, aggravates, or creates dissension within another state with the aim of destabilizing or overthrowing the regime. Any non-conventional measures, such as intelligence and clandestine operations, media, and disinformation campaigns, would be included in this definition — for example, intervention in a country’s internal affairs for ideological or security reasons, including under the umbrella of “protecting ethnic rights” or “ensuring freedom of religious rights.” This is critical as both Arab minorities in Iran and Shiite populations in Saudi Arabia have been subject to subversion in the past under similar pretexts.

Aggression, by contrast, involves the use of armed force or any military means by a state, a group of states, or a state-sponsored armed group against the sovereignty, political independence, and territorial integrity of another state. A ban should also cover the use of nonviolent military means and hybrid operations. The use of state-backed proxies, including any member of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” network, and clandestine operations as a means of operating below the threshold of armed conflict should be ceased as well. A non-aggression pact would not demand the revision of regional security assistance policies, but it would prohibit the use of these assets against the other side.

Such an approach, inclusive in its definition of aggression, would guarantee that every means and tool that might harm state security and national integrity would fall under the scope of the treaty. But at the same time, it would avoid limiting national defense strategies, thereby minimizing the political and security costs. Indeed, a non-aggression pact is not a defensive, offensive, or consultative alliance and does not require cooperation in the event of conflict. It is also not a disarmament treaty that seeks to reduce certain capabilities in the parties’ arsenals, either conventional or asymmetric.

The pact would only limit the use of military-security means to resolve disputes and gain political leverage. It would add a legal commitment to an existing political agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran, making a return to the sort of hostile actions carried out by both states between 2016 and 2021 costly.

A non-aggression pact is a good starting point for normalization between rivals when mistrust is rampant, there are huge challenges to boosting ties, and the probability of future hostilities seems relatively high. It is a rather low-cost political choice to create a solid security foundation and signal to the world that normalization is not just a temporary agreement.

What makes a non-aggression pact important now?

There are several interlinked reasons why normalization is shaky and requires mechanisms to sustain it. A formal non-aggression pact is among the tools that helps to protect normalization from various external and internal spoilers. It suits the transition between rivalry and cooperation when both systemic and external factors may work to undermine the normalization.

First, a non-aggression pact can be a way to further strengthen the political-security dimension of normalization, which is likely to remain the major focus for now. Despite a flurry of ideas, there are few chances that Riyadh and Tehran could strengthen ties through non-security areas, such as trade, economic cooperation, and cultural exchange, in the short term. Under heavy U.S. sanctions, the Islamic Republic urgently needs economic cooperation and sees normalization with its neighbors as a way to escape its current economic crisis. Riyadh has other thoughts though and reports indicate that it has no intention of seeking “exemptions” from U.S. sanctions. For the kingdom, providing major economic concessions to Iran when no strategic shift in its nuclear and regional policies has occurred would cost it the leverage it has over Tehran. Thus, it is unlikely that non-security areas can serve as the basis to make normalization sustainable.

Second, a non-aggression pact is a solution to the lack of proper legal and institutional foundations for normalization. The legal status and implementation of the General Agreement for Cooperation signed in 1998 and the subsequent security cooperation agreement signed in 2001 that are referred to as the basis for the recent rapprochement are uncertain. Even if these previous agreements start to be fully implemented, the scope of neither agreement covers the sort of security problems the two states have experienced in recent decades. For example, the 2001 security agreement is limited in scope to cooperation on anti-terrorism, organized crime, smuggling, and social crimes. By contrast, it is the unprecedented militarization of relations and hard security threats that are at the core of recent tensions. Thus, it is not clear how the 2001 agreement can be a reliable foundation for a new round of normalization.

Third, a non-aggression pact would help to reduce the negative impacts of U.S.-Iran and U.S.-Israel tensions on Saudi-Iranian normalization. Saudi Arabia’s position in any hypothetical military escalation remains a critical point of contention. For years, Tehran, given Riyadh’s support to Saddam Hussein during his attack on Iran, believed that Saudi Arabia would assist a possible U.S. or Israeli military operation inside Iran. Thus, the question of how much access to critical assets Saudi Arabia will give to U.S. forces in a war remains central to Saudi-Iranian normalization. This comes at a time when the issue of access to regional partners’ critical assets is becoming increasingly important for Washington as Central Command’s (CENTCOM) dynamic force employment approach is being implemented. However, Saudi Arabia’s support for Washington, such as providing bases, overflight permission, and other forms of assistance in pressuring Iran, is likely to prompt retaliatory action from Tehran. The Islamic Republic may choose to inflict costs on Saudi Arabia and the UAE, if its strategic calculus in a changing security environment forces it to do so. Thus, delinking U.S.-Iran and Iran-Israeli tensions from Saudi-Iranian relations remains a grave challenge for Riyadh and Tehran — one with the potential to create new diplomatic and military tensions while also limiting economic ties.

Fourth, the pact provides an opportunity to reduce the formation of new threats when deterrence remains the core feature of both sides’ security strategies. Indeed, there are more continuities than changes in both countries’ security and military strategies. Both sides continue to believe that lasting peace in the region requires strong military capabilities. Iran perceives its nuclear threshold status and short break-out time as a means to extract political leverage and even boost deterrence. There is no debate in Tehran over reviewing its policy of supporting the Axis of Resistance because the network is viewed as a functional element of its military doctrine. Besides, Iran’s missile program is advancing at its normal pace. It is unlikely that any of Iran’s core military capabilities would be affected by normalization with Saudi Arabia simply because, from the Iranian perspective, they target the U.S. and Israel, not Saudi Arabia. At the same time, the kingdom is also building up its military capabilities at a similar pace as before. U.S.-Saudi military cooperation is moving forward, including building integrated air defense systems and drone programs. While Riyadh is looking at Beijing and Moscow to diversify its defense partners, recent U.S.-Saudi discussions over normalization with Israel revealed that the Saudis view stronger military cooperation with the U.S. as an important part of future deterrence. Riyadh’s bid to acquire long-range strike capabilities through missiles, drones, and new fighter jets has no other likely target in the region aside from Iran.

Implementing the pact

Proper implementation of a non-aggression pact requires continuous security consultation, exchange of information, direct communication between the two sides’ military-security sectors, and transparency about the challenging aspects of security policy. On Aug. 16, 2023, Aziz Nasirzadeh, the deputy chief of staff of Iran’s Armed Forces, met Talal al-Otaibi, an aide to the Saudi defense minister, on the sidelines of the 11th Moscow Conference on International Security. As this meeting makes clear, holding direct military talks between two rivals is not a far-fetched idea. Establishing various military confidence-building measures is central to guaranteeing the implementation of the pact. These measures can shape new norms of interaction that gradually reduce mistrust between the two security establishments.

One major step in this process is pre-notification and exchange of information about each other’s motives and intentions for specific actions and military movements, particularly in the Persian Gulf and other contested areas. For example, Iran often justifies seizing foreign ships in retaliation for the U.S. seizure of Iranian assets. Military drills, offensive exercises, and missile tests are part of Tehran’s naval strategy to reinforce deterrence against the U.S., but Tehran ignores the threat signals such actions send across the Persian Gulf.

Similarly, Saudi Arabia’s participation in naval drills, especially with CENTCOM, such as those carried out in March 2023, causes similar irritation in Tehran. On Aug. 29, Riyadh took command of the U.S.-led coalition Combined Task Force 152 and the internationally-led Coalition Task Force Sentinel to protect maritime commerce in and around the Strait of Hormuz. For Tehran, such actions send signals about Riyadh’s true intentions.

Tehran-Riyadh direct engagement about such moves across the Gulf, in Yemen, and in other sensitive conflict zones can clarify intentions, avert miscalculation and unintended escalation, and provide reassurances to the other side. While it is unrealistic to expect either side to overhaul its military strategy, cease military preparation, or end international commitments, the two countries can mitigate threat perceptions and reduce the risks of aggressive response from the other side by establishing pre-notification and briefing mechanisms.

A non-aggression pact can also be the basis for a broader discussion about topics like defense strategies and doctrine. Iran should engage in a dialogue with Saudi Arabia about its nuclear intentions, support for Shiite groups, and missile strategy. Iran’s nuclear program remains a major threat for Saudi Arabia. Tehran is miscalculating if it envisions both a full-scale normalization and a prolonged nuclear escalation. Similarly, Saudi Arabia could also discuss the objectives behind its missile defense program, nuclear policy, and efforts to boost its stand-off capabilities.

At this point, for defense talks to succeed, they should not entail any formal commitment clauses or impose limitations on other side’s policies or military capabilities. Instead, they should aim for a more limited goal: to show goodwill and reduce misperceptions. If continued, these dialogues may eventually lead to a new understanding about the regional balance of offensive and defensive forces, the formation of new codes of conduct for missile tests and deployments, and other military confidence-building measures that reduce the long-term risk of aggression.

A non-aggression pact will act as a vehicle for Riyadh and Tehran to establish a joint military commission, helping to institutionalize military-to-military communication in a more routine way. Establishing such contacts will gradually feed into broader confidence-building measures, such as naval visits and joint trainings. In this way a pact could be a first step in overcoming long-lasting threat perceptions by establishing direct communication.

Conclusion

A non-aggression pact is a transition step to help rivals build more cooperative behavior gradually, especially when normalization efforts face multiple challenges, deep mistrust, and serious security concerns. Riyadh and Tehran can reinforce the military-security dimension of their political normalization by signing a non-aggression pact that would help reduce threat perceptions and shape new norms of conduct.

However, it is critical to remember that such a pact will not end the arms race if it is not followed by other complementary mechanisms. North and South Korea signed a pact in 1992 and the U.S. and Russia followed suit that same year. Neither pact ended the arms race or helped reach strategic parity as they failed to build a broader political consensus to end the underlying rivalry. Thus, while important, such pacts are only the first step in a long normalization process.

In the medium term, non-aggression pacts are a useful tool, functioning as a formal commitment that increases the credibility cost of noncompliance, making the resumption of hostilities more costly. They are also important in their signaling function and in building trust for third-party investors and traders. A successful non-aggression pact between Iran and Saudi Arabia can gradually take on a regional nature by promoting similar pacts between Tehran and Abu Dhabi or Manama, feeding into a broader regional reconciliation process.





Diplomatic relations have been restored and embassies have been reopened - this has been Step One. Step two in the normalization process is a possible non-aggression pact. This would likely relieve regional tensions. Ultimately it could possibly lead to easing of economic sanctions against Iran so that it could improve its economy. In view of this you have to wonder why Iran would sabotage the very efforts they have been working at all year long. Because of all this there is just no net benefit to Tehran to foment another regional conflict as it would only lead to further USA created isolation.


Now let's turn this around ~ wouldn't Israel benefit by sabotaging those diplomatic efforts between Iran and the Saudis? Could this "attack" be a false flag operation as conspiracy theorists been saying all other the Internet? I have seen some contentions about the possibility that Israel did not have a security lapse but that it staged this Pearl Harbor type "attack" so as to point the finger at Tehran and to "justify" further USA intervention (maybe even another invasion of Iran) like it did in 1953? Some of these theorists have said this.

Having read Ostrovsky's classic By Way of Deception, this wouldn't surprise me in the least.

A reality check:

Driving Saudi interest in restoring relations with Israel is its historical distrust of Iran, which it blamed for the attacks on its oil facilities in 2019. The recent reopening of embassies has not mitigated this distrust, which was made evident last Monday when the Saudi soccer team Al-Ittihad traveled to Isfahan to face the Iranian team Sepahan in an Asian Champions League match. The visitors left the stadium without playing when they discovered at the entrance to the field three busts of Qasem Soleimani, a Revolutionary Guard general assassinated by the U.S. in Baghdad. For the Iranians, he is a hero, but for the Saudis, he is a terrorist. Saudi Arabia saw the presence of the busts as a provocation.



https://english.elpais.com/internationa ... utType=amp

DocBarrister

[NattyBohChamps04]

If cradle's gonna try the Iran card, he should also take a look at this:

Donald Trump's Israel Intel Leak Under Scrutiny After Hamas Attack

...but wait. That Blame Trump article tells us -- Iran, the Gulf nation that is a fierce adversary of Israel and has long supported Hamas.
That can't be. Iran is just an innocent spectator.

...& 6 years ago, Trump told the Russians how to defeat the Iron Dome ?
Hamas & Hezbollah have learned from experience -- overwhelm it with dumb rockets, then used precision guided missiles.
Because of the longer ranges involved in Ukraine, it's not working that well for the Russians.

So you agree the whole Iran thing is idiotic.

[old salt]

If cradle's gonna try the Iran card, he should also take a look at this:

Donald Trump's Israel Intel Leak Under Scrutiny After Hamas Attack

...but wait. That Blame Trump article tells us -- Iran, the Gulf nation that is a fierce adversary of Israel and has long supported Hamas.
That can't be. Iran is just an innocent spectator.

...& 6 years ago, Trump told the Russians how to defeat the Iron Dome ?
Hamas & Hezbollah have learned from experience -- overwhelm it with dumb rockets, then used precision guided missiles.
Because of the longer ranges involved in Ukraine, it's not working that well for the Russians.

So you agree the whole Iran thing is idiotic.

Yeah. It's just a Zionist plot by Jared & his fellow travelers at the WSJ.

[NattyBohChamps04]

If cradle's gonna try the Iran card, he should also take a look at this:

Donald Trump's Israel Intel Leak Under Scrutiny After Hamas Attack

...but wait. That Blame Trump article tells us -- Iran, the Gulf nation that is a fierce adversary of Israel and has long supported Hamas.
That can't be. Iran is just an innocent spectator.

...& 6 years ago, Trump told the Russians how to defeat the Iron Dome ?
Hamas & Hezbollah have learned from experience -- overwhelm it with dumb rockets, then used precision guided missiles.
Because of the longer ranges involved in Ukraine, it's not working that well for the Russians.

So you agree the whole Iran thing is idiotic.

Yeah. It's just a Zionist plot by Jared & his fellow travelers at the WSJ.

You'd think Israel would have fired up the space lasers by now. Much more precise.

[DocBarrister]

The solution is reasonable leaders on both sides, but those leaders don't exist or don't hold power today and haven't for decades!!

The US should prepare to wash it's hands of Israel.

When has the PLO or HAMAS put forward a reasonable leader willing to accept a 2 state solution or anything less than the elimination of Israel?

Former Israeli PM Ehud Barak and President Bill Clinton offered Arafat the best deal the Palestinians will ever get on the table. Arafat turned down the two-state deal because he didn’t want to be remembered as the Palestinian leader who gave up the right of return and East Jerusalem.

Arafat’s catastrophic decision has resulted in this … I am now convinced that the Palestinians will never have their own state. And frankly, the world has moved beyond the Palestinians, even their brethren in the Arab world. Israel is far more important to the Arab nations than the Palestinians will ever be again. Indeed, the Palestinian people are more isolated than ever … and the Arab world treats them more as a nuisance and afterthought. What a tragedy … all brought on by the Palestinians’ incompetent and corrupt leaders.

The time for the Palestinians is over … this abomination of an attack by Hamas is the end of the Palestinian quest for their own nation.

DocBarrister

[Brooklyn]

A reality check:

Driving Saudi interest in restoring relations with Israel is its historical distrust of Iran, which it blamed for the attacks on its oil facilities in 2019. The recent reopening of embassies has not mitigated this distrust, which was made evident last Monday when the Saudi soccer team Al-Ittihad traveled to Isfahan to face the Iranian team Sepahan in an Asian Champions League match. The visitors left the stadium without playing when they discovered at the entrance to the field three busts of Qasem Soleimani, a Revolutionary Guard general assassinated by the U.S. in Baghdad. For the Iranians, he is a hero, but for the Saudis, he is a terrorist. Saudi Arabia saw the presence of the busts as a provocation.



https://english.elpais.com/internationa ... utType=amp

DocBarrister

Those events took place four years. The diplomatic efforts I described took place only a couple of months ago.





As for any hope of a deal between Israel and Saudis, that is "off the table":


''Potentially historic deal to normalize Saudi-Israel relations is ‘off the table’ after this weekend’s 9/11-scale attack, top political analyst says''


https://finance.yahoo.com/news/potentia ... 27759.html


The escalating events in Israel this weekend will have cascading effects on its foreign policy and, in turn, the entire Middle East. The Israeli government had previously been talking with Saudi Arabia about normalizing diplomatic relations. The deal would have been a historic achievement by two of the region’s major power players, both American allies, after decades of estrangement that bordered on hostility.

However, after Hamas’s recent terrorist attacks and Israel’s subsequent declaration of war, that agreement “is for now off the table,” according to Ian Bremmer, president and founder of the geopolitical consulting firm Eurasia Group.

Bremmer called these attacks “Israel’s 9/11” because they came as a surprise and targeted civilians. They were also “the first attacks deep into Israel,” he said. Because of the unprecedented national security crisis, Israel and Saudi Arabia will be forced to reconsider, and “that would leave the Palestinians diplomatically more isolated than they [have] ever been,” Bremmer wrote in an analyst note on Monday.

Since the start of the war there is no official word from Israel or Saudi Arabia about the status of their talks, which the U.S. is helping to mediate.

Saudi Arabia issued a statement on Saturday, the day Hamas fighters entered Israel, killing civilians and taking others hostage, in which it called for an end to further escalation and blamed Israel’s policies. “The Kingdom recalls its repeated warnings of the dangers of the explosion of the situation as a result of the continued occupation,” Saudi Arabia’s foreign ministry posted on X, formerly Twitter.

The statement, which offered little support for Israel, drew criticism from U.S. foreign policy officials. Sen. Lindsey Graham reportedly spoke to a senior Saudi official, telling him, “If you want a normal relationship with the United States, this is not a normal statement,” the New York Times reported. Graham also reportedly admonished Saudi Arabia for being in “the cheering section” for Hamas and Iran’s Lebanese proxy group, Hezbollah, which the U.S. and Saudi Arabia both designate a terrorist organization.

There may have been a different intended audience for the statement, according to Bernard Haykel, a professor of Middle East studies at Princeton University and among the world’s leading experts on Saudi Arabia. “The Saudi statement was intended to save face in the Arab and Islamic world in which the Palestinian cause remains important,” he told Fortune.

During the Trump administration, the U.S. helped broker the Abraham Accords, which established diplomatic ties between Israel and the Gulf States of Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. Israel later signed agreements with Muslim countries Morocco and Sudan. Despite being announced with great fanfare, including the Arab countries that had previously been hostile to Israel, Arab citizens across the Middle East were less enthused by the deals. Nearly a year after the Abraham Accords were signed, the Washington Post termed them an “afterthought” in the region’s geopolitics.

Bremmer says the latest escalation would make it unpalatable for Israel and Saudi Arabia to pursue a deal. “The Saudi foreign ministry condemned the attacks but also said Israel was responsible for them, because of their historic treatment of Palestinians (a statement echoed by a number of…governments in the region) that makes opening diplomacy impossible for both countries,” Bremmer wrote in the same note.

So far, Saudi Arabia is waiting to see how the war between Hamas and Israel unfolds before resuming talks, the New York Times reported. Saudi Arabia is likely waiting to see if large numbers of Palestinian civilians die, which might turn public sentiment in the Arab world against Israel.

“If Israel’s retaliation leads to many tens of thousands of Palestinian deaths, then Saudi will have a hard time justifying a peace with Israel,” Haykel said.

Efforts to stop that deal could have been an impetus for the surprise attack on Saturday. “It’s too early to tell, but Hamas/Iran did these attacks in part to stymie the normalization process,” Haykel said. Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been geopolitical rivals in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia’s decision to normalize relations with Israel has likely made Iran especially uneasy about its role in the region. The Wall Street Journal reported that the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps signed off on the attack, citing senior sources with Hamas and Hezbollah. Earlier, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said the U.S. had “not yet seen” intelligence confirming any involvement by Iran.

Saudi Arabia is also in the midst of negotiating a defense treaty with the U.S., which may be imperiled as well, Bremmer adds, casting even further uncertainty on the kingdom’s foreign policy. The war in Gaza “makes it harder for the United States to support near-term improvement of Saudi relations, including the civilian nuclear deal and alliance upgrade, which in this environment would now be soundly condemned by Congress,” he said.

[Brooklyn]

Here is the real cause of this conflict:



Jewish Voice for Peace: The Root of Violence Is Oppression (of Palestinians)


https://www.antiwar.com/blog/2023/10/09 ... ppression/



Right now, Palestinians, Israelis and all of us with family on the ground are terrified for loved ones. We grieve the lives of those already lost and remain committed to a future where every life is precious, and all people live in freedom and safety.

Following 16 years of Israeli military blockade, Palestinian fighters from Gaza launched an unprecedented assault, in which hundreds of Israelis were killed and wounded, and civilians kidnapped. The Israeli government declared war, launching airstrikes, killing hundreds of Palestinians and wounding thousands, bombing residential buildings and threatening to commit war crimes against besieged Palestinians in Gaza.


The Israeli government may have just declared war, but its war on Palestinians started over 75 years ago. Israeli apartheid and occupation — and United States complicity in that oppression — are the source of all this violence. Reality is shaped by when you start the clock.

For the past year, the most racist, fundamentalist, far-right government in Israeli history has ruthlessly escalated its military occupation over Palestinians in the name of Jewish supremacy with violent expulsions and home demolitions, mass killings, military raids on refugee camps, unrelenting siege and daily humiliation. In recent weeks, Israeli forces repeatedly stormed the holiest Muslim sites in Jerusalem.

For 16 years, the Israeli government has suffocated Palestinians in Gaza under a draconian air, sea and land military blockade, imprisoning and starving two million people and denying them medical aid. The Israeli government routinely massacres Palestinians in Gaza; ten-year-olds who live in Gaza have already been traumatized by seven major bombing campaigns in their short lives.

For 75 years, the Israeli government has maintained a military occupation over Palestinians, operating an apartheid regime. Palestinian children are dragged from their beds in pre-dawn raids by Israeli soldiers and held without charge in Israeli military prisons. Palestinians homes are torched by mobs of Israeli settlers, or destroyed by the Israeli army. Entire Palestinian villages are forced to flee, abandoning the homes and orchards and land that were in their family for generations.

The bloodshed of today and the past 75 years traces back directly to U.S. complicity in the oppression and horror caused by Israel’s military occupation. The U.S. government consistently enables Israeli violence and bears blame for this moment. The unchecked military funding, diplomatic cover, and billions of dollars of private money flowing from the U.S. enables and empowers Israel’s apartheid regime. Those who continue calling for “ironclad” U.S. support for the Israeli military are only paving the path to more violence.

From the U.S., there are no sidelines. We will uproot complicity where we are: we demand that the U.S. government immediately take steps to withdraw military funding to Israel and to hold the Israeli government accountable for its gross violations of human rights and war crimes against Palestinians. We commit to escalating our campaigns for boycott, divestment and sanctions to end the billions pouring into the Israeli war machine from corporations and private foundations.

Inevitably, oppressed people everywhere will seek — and gain — their freedom. We all deserve liberation, safety, and equality. The only way to get there is by uprooting the sources of the violence, beginning with our own government’s complicity.




Only a bigoted hate filled Islamophobe will attempt to deny these truths.

[old salt]

Watch Qatar as they offer to broker a release of the hostages to see if they really are trying to promote peace & reconciliation between the Palestinians & Israelis. They were the closest thing we had to an honest broker with the Taliban. They still host a key US air base & command center. The Trump Admin helped broker their reconciliation with Bahrain, the UAE & the Saudis.

I don't know about this author, his credibility or biases, but he does provide some useful history & info.
It was authored 8 mos ago & seems prescient.
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2023/02/03/ ... d-reality/
Sultan Al-Khulaifi, February 3rd, 2023
Qatar’s Relations with Hamas: Misconceptions and Reality

The rule of Hamas in Gaza and its role in the Palestinian arena represents a dilemma for the Arab states. On the one hand, it is seen as legitimate actor among Palestinian factions and by the Arab masses and on other hand, it is considered a terrorist organisation by the US, EU and other actors. Qatar’s relationship with Hamas has been subjected to misinformation and mis-categorisation that connects Qatar to the axis of resistance comprised of Iran, Syria and its proxies and accuses Qatar of supporting terrorism financially. Yet, the latter would put Qatar undoubtedly under the sanctions of the US Treasury. Thus, it is important to ask: What role Qatar plays in Gaza and what are the parameters of its relationship with Hamas?

Qatar’s expanded role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict came after Hamas won the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections. This victory surprised the Bush Administration which pushed Fatah to run in the elections, whilst Qatar reportedly encouraged Hamas upon an American request to participate the elections. Following the victory, Hamas was shunned and its government was not recognised internationally unless it accepted the Quartet conditions. Qatar tried to mediate between Hamas and Fatah in 2006 but failed due to the extreme difference in positions between the two parties.

After Hamas took over the strip in 2007, Israel imposed a blockade on Gaza and cut it off from any connection with the outside world – rendering it an open air prison. The blockade was intended to overthrow Hamas’s rule, but it was not successful. And with Hamas’s inability to provide services for the people of Gaza, tensions rose with Israel. The latter launched Operation Cast Lead which massacred Gazans but failed to destroy Hamas. Qatar called for an end to the blockade and tried to rally the Arab league to present a unified Arab position to the international community, but Arab divisions were too great to be bridged. At the same time, Qatar closed the Israeli trade office which was a symbol of normalisation during the peace process in the nineties.

Nonetheless, Qatar tried to support the humanitarian situation in Gaza following the war in 2009. It offered to reopen the Israeli trade office in exchange for Israel allowing Qatari aid to flow to Gaza to rebuild the Gaza Strip, an offer rejected by Israel. Following the Arab Spring and the new political order in Egypt, the Emir of Qatar visited in Gaza in 2012 with the aim of breaking the blockade of Gaza. In the visit, he offered a 400 million $ grant to rebuild Gaza. To provide a transparent mechanism for the flow of aid to Gaza, Qatar coordinates with UN organisations on the ground to facilitate the dispatching of aid to the people of Gaza.

Qatar treats Hamas as a reality on the ground that cannot be circumvented. Qatar has notified US officials that they do not support Hamas but has called for engagement between Hamas and Fatah. Qatar’s official position is aligned with the Arab initiative that calls for a two-state solution. Former British Prime Minister and Quartet Envoy has said, that world powers were wrong to boycott Hamas after its electoral win in 2006.

Following Israel’s understanding that it cannot get rid of Hamas and that it was necessary to maintain calm between the two sides, Israel began to rely on Qatari aid to calm the situation in Gaza. Qatar’s aim is to provide humanitarian support and offer hope for the besieged people of Gaza. In the absence of any actor willing to bear the costs of supporting Gaza, Qatar appeared to be in the position to assume the role of aid provider and mediator in the relations between Hamas and Israel. Its hosting of the Hamas political office in 2012 after the movement left its offices in Gaza, was a calculated move to provide a venue for mediation and dialogue in Doha between Hamas officials and foreign dignitaries. This culminated in a newly developed and much moderate Hamas declaration in 2017 that opened the door for Hama’s acceptance of a two-state solution, even on a temporary basis.

Qatar’s relationship with Hamas is based on three foundations. First, Qatar’s support for the Palestinian cause and the objective of reaching a two-state solution that ends the injustices faced by the Palestinian people. Second, Qatar’s role as a mediator, which gives it the space to speak to different actors in the region, regardless of their positions to facilitate dialogue and preserve the stability of the regional order. Third, the humanitarian catastrophe faced by the people of Gaza, which prompts Qatar to play a leading role in ending it. These 3 foundations explain Qatar’s actions towards Gaza and in its dealings with Hamas, and therefore refute any connection between Qatar and the funding of terrorism and puts Qatar’s policy in perspective.

About the author : Sultan Al-Khulaifi is a PhD student in Politics at the University of Glasgow. He is interested in researching the developments of Qatari foreign policy and the Arab regional order.

[Farfromgeneva]

If cradle's gonna try the Iran card, he should also take a look at this:

Donald Trump's Israel Intel Leak Under Scrutiny After Hamas Attack

...but wait. That Blame Trump article tells us -- Iran, the Gulf nation that is a fierce adversary of Israel and has long supported Hamas.
That can't be. Iran is just an innocent spectator.

...& 6 years ago, Trump told the Russians how to defeat the Iron Dome ?
Hamas & Hezbollah have learned from experience -- overwhelm it with dumb rockets, then used precision guided missiles.
Because of the longer ranges involved in Ukraine, it's not working that well for the Russians.

So you agree the whole Iran thing is idiotic.

Yeah. It's just a Zionist plot by Jared & his fellow travelers at the WSJ.

You'd think Israel would have fired up the space lasers by now. Much more precise.

It’s fueled by gold and they’re conserving their reserve.