LaxPower Back-Up Stick

Our man with the Anti-ISIS Coalition portfolio, Amb Jim Jeffrey, is doing good work on Syria.
He is a worthy successor to Brett McGurk in that critical post.

I had the privilege of drinking his booze at a dinner he hosted for our wardroom, on a port visit to Tunisia, in 1982, where he was the Charge' d'Affaires & acting Ambassador. Former Army infantryman. Great guy who graciously tolerated a bunch of rowdy sailors.

https://www.defenseone.com/politics/201 ... ys/158097/

A report estimating the group’s current strength released by the Institute for the Study of War this week claimed that “ISIS likely has the capability to seize another major urban center in Iraq or Syria.”

Jeffrey called the estimate “bu!!sh!t.” ..

Fred Kaplan on Iran

A woeful sign of the Trump administration’s bankrupt foreign policies is that, in the dispute with Iran over the Obama-era nuclear deal, the Iranians are in the right and the United States is in the wrong—politically, diplomatically, and even legally.

I take no joy in reporting this, as the ruling regime in Tehran ranks among the world’s most detestable and oppressive. It’s a sad day when the American president and his top officials outdo the mullahs in mendacity.

The current dispute concerns Iran’s recent breach of two provisions of the deal—exceeding the limits, first, on how much nuclear fuel it can stockpile, then on the degree to which it can enrich uranium.

U.S. officials say that the moves put Iran on a path toward resuming a nuclear-weapons program, a path that the accord—formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—blocked in several ways. Technically, the officials are right. But a few things are worth noting.

First, and most obviously (though it’s surprising how few news stories mention this up high, if at all), Iran was not the first country to breach the deal’s terms. In May 2018, President Donald Trump withdrew the U.S. from the deal, for no good reason other than he didn’t like it, despite the fact that international inspectors had repeatedly attested that the Iranians were in compliance with its terms. Then Trump not only re-imposed economic sanctions, which had been lifted with the signing of the deal, but also imposed “secondary sanctions” on any country that did business with Iran—even the five powers (Britain, France, Russia, China, Germany, along with the European Union) that had co-signed it.

Second, even in its (quite delayed) response to Trump’s withdrawal, Iran did not violate the accord. Paragraph 36 of the JCPOA states that if one signatory of the pact believes that some others “were not meeting their commitments” under the deal, then, after certain meetings and consultations, it would have “grounds to cease performing its commitments.”

It’s an open and shut case. By pulling out of the deal and re-imposing sanctions, Trump announced that the United States would no longer meet its commitments. By falling under Trump’s secondary sanctions, despite efforts to avoid them, the European countries reluctantly did the same. And so, under the terms of the deal, Iran no longer has an obligation to meet its commitments.

Third, Trump was in violation of the deal well before he withdrew from it. As far back as July 2017, at his first G-20 summit, Trump pressured allied leaders to stop doing business with Iran. This pressure was a direct violation of Paragraph 29 of the accord, which states that the U.S. and the other signatories

will refrain from any policy specifically intended to directly and adversely affect the normalization of trade and economic relations with Iran inconsistent with the commitments not to undermine the successful implementation of the JCPOA.

Even before the G-20 meeting, going back to the start of his presidency, Trump’s frequent threats to pull out of the deal marked a violation of Paragraph 29, as U.S. and European firms hesitated to get involved in “the normalization of trade and economic relations with Iran,” fearing that a U.S. withdrawal—and the resumption of sanctions—would force them to shut down their investments, losing them money.

Fourth, leveling secondary sanctions against other countries doing business with Iran is a violation of the spirit, and possibly the letter, of international law. It is permissible and even proper to punish countries or companies that violate sanctions imposed by, say, a U.N. Security Council resolution. But the JCPOA is a Security Council resolution—No. 2231—enshrined as international law in July 2015, around the same time the U.S. and the other five countries signed it as a multinational deal with Iran.

In other words, Trump is using U.S. economic power—specifically, the primacy of the dollar in global finance—to bully U.S. allies into breaking international law. This is tantamount to banditry, and if the Europeans or Chinese ever displace the dollar’s primacy with their own currency, historians may date their desire to do so to their frustration over Trump’s Iran policy.

It’s a sad day when the American president and his top officials outdo the mullahs in mendacity.
Fifth, by citing Iran’s breaches as a national security threat, Trump and his team are, ironically, admitting that signing the deal was—and preserving it would be—a national security benefit. Trump has long lambasted the JCPOA as “the worst deal in history.” If this claim were true, then Iran’s breach of the deal would be inconsequential. What could be worse than abiding by the worst deal in history? It is worth noting that Trump’s former national security team—Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, and national security adviser H.R. McMaster—all advised him to stick with the agreement as a net benefit to U.S. security. So did all of the allied leaders and many military and intelligence officers in Israel, despite their distrust of Iran.

Finally, however one views Iran’s recent steps, they do not put the Islamic Republic much closer to building an atom bomb. The JCPOA restricted Iran’s uranium-enrichment to a level of 3.67 percent purity. “Weapons-grade” uranium is defined as an enrichment level of 90 percent purity—though once a lab hits 20 percent, the remaining enrichment can take place fairly quickly. It will take the Iranians a long time even to hit 20 percent. It will also take them a long time to amass and stockpile enough nuclear fuel to make a bomb since, under the JCPOA, it exported 98 percent of its low-enriched uranium to Russia, dismantled two-thirds of its centrifuges, and poured cement over the core of its plutonium reactor at Arak.

In other words, there is time to draw Iran back into compliance with the deal—but the United States has to get back into compliance, too.

The problem is that both countries are playing a dangerous game. Trump may have believed that his “maximum pressure” campaign would compel Iran to negotiate a “better” deal. It has, instead, stiffened the resolve of Iran’s hard-liners. (Trump’s original set of advisers told him that there was no plausible better deal. His current advisers, notably Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and national security adviser John Bolton, say otherwise, mainly because they don’t want a deal at all; they want regime change in Tehran.) Meanwhile, the Iranians seem to think that breaching the limits will compel the Europeans to cut a separate deal and break away from Washington. They might not realize the extent to which European commercial and financial enterprises are tied to the dollar.

The nuclear strategist Herman Kahn once likened a certain sort of crisis to a game of highway chicken, in which one driver visibly throws his steering wheel out the window, forcing the other, more responsible driver to veer off the road. But what if both drivers are too stubborn to cede the game? Or what if they don’t see the steering wheel flying out the window, or understand its implications? Or what if one driver or the other is egged on by shotgun-passengers who think they’d survive the crash?

A scenario of this sort is unfolding before our eyes. Someone has to step in and stop the drivers, or block the road.

A scenario of this sort is unfolding before our eyes. Someone has to step in and stop the drivers, or block the road.

Macron to the rescue !

EZ Pass or toll booth in the Strait of Hormuz :

https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/poli ... d=22670555

Iran is planning to charge foreign ships a toll in exchange for "protection" across the Strait of Hormuz, a key trade route and a flashpoint in the escalating dispute between the United States and the Islamic Republic.

A member of the Iranian Parliament's presidium said foreign commercial entities should compensate Iran as "the true provider of security in the region and international waters," according to the state-run Tasnim News Agency. Amirhossein Qazizadeh Hashemi claimed ships enter Iranian waters on their way through the strait and should therefore pay a toll.

That assertion doesn't jibe with clearly defined international agreements, former Navy officer Thomas Callender says.
"There's no question whatsoever about the rights of commercial vessels and tankers transiting the Strait of Hormuz and that they have this right to transit unimpeded," Callender, a senior fellow for defense programs at the Heritage Foundation, told the Washington Examiner.

"To be trying to charge essentially tax to pass through this is a form of extortion."

Pathetic

US could use F-35 parts manufacturing contracts to entice new customers.

https://www.csis.org/analysis/coup-proo ... d=22670555

Coup-proofing? Making Sense of Turkey’s S-400 Decision

On July 12, Turkey received the first elements of the S-400, a fourth-generation surface-to-air Russian missile system. Few recent weapon sales have been as geopolitically charged as this one. U.S. officials have threatened both military and economic sanctions should Turkey acquire the Russian system.

The S-400 announcement follows several previous tenders in which Turkey considered but ultimately did not buy the U.S. Patriot, the Chinese HQ-9, and the French SAMP/T. The arrival of the S-400 follows significant political turmoil in Turkey, most notably the shootdown of a Russian jet in 2015, the failed coup attempt of July 15, 2016—exactly three years ago today—and a new strategic partnership between Erdogan and President Vladimir Putin.

Stated U.S. concerns about the deal have primarily centered on the threat to the advanced F-35 tactical aircraft Turkey was slated to acquire. Most of the time, the F-35 flies with an exaggerated radar signature so that anyone observing it will not see its true signature. Turkish operation of the two systems together—and more specifically, when it is in stealth mode—would allow the S-400 to acquire intimate knowledge of the F-35’s radar signature. Such insights would almost immediately find its way back to Russia, and the capability of F-35s around the world could thereby be degraded. The location of the Russian sensors on the territory of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ally also provides a more forward-based position from which to observe other NATO aircraft and military exercises.

Analysts have struggled to explain Turkey’s air defense actions. Western officials and analysts alike have gone, as it were, through four of the five stages of grief: denial that Turkey would go through with a seemingly inexplicable decision, anger at the repercussions for the NATO alliance and threats to withdraw F-35 participation, bargaining with renewed offers for the Patriot, and now depression over the forthcoming deployment.

Getting to the acceptance stage requires an appreciation of Turkey’s foreign and domestic political calculations, above all Erdogan’s desire for survival. Analysts have been scratching their heads as to the U.S. failure to dissuade Erdogan, but Occam’s razor may be helpful here. Erdogan may want the S-400 for the exact reason the United States does not want Turkey to have it: precisely because it is built to shoot down the American-made aircraft currently operated by the Turkish Air Force. Both political and military aspects of the S-400 decision make sense inasmuch as Erdogan’s top priority is his own political survival.

Watch the fallout from our decision to cancel F-35 sales to our tenuous ally Turkey.
(imho) It's the right decision, but could have consequences.
Can Trump prevent Senate hawks from throwing fuel on the fire by imposing sanctions for their purchase of Russian S-400's ?
Denying them their F-35's is sufficient punishment (imho). Not worth selling out our Kurdish allies in Syria.
This is an example of Senate wannabes looking in the mirror & fancying themselves as the CinC.
Amb Jim Jeffrey's got his work cut out for him on this one.
...he always seems to draw the sh!t sandwiches.

https://www.usnews.com/news/world-repor ... s-in-syria

I still don't get why we don't bounce them from NATO. Right now. Today.

Buying weapons from the very country NATO is supposed to protect them from.....is one of the dumbest things I've ever heard.

Turkey's not the problem. It's Erdogan. We have greater influence by keeping him inside the tent.
He barely survived a coup & the latest election did not go well for him.
Strategically, Turkey is our most critical NATO ally.

Will Erdogan risk an operation in Syria?

Meanwhile, Pentagon spokesman Cmdr. Sean Robertson told the Kurdistan 24 channel, “Unilateral military action into northeast Syria by any party, particularly as US personnel may be present or in the vicinity, is of grave concern.”

Robertson added, “We would find any such actions unacceptable.”

The possibility that Turkish and American forces may face off in the event of a Turkish incursion has been a concern for some time. Erdogan has made it clear that this would not deter Turkey, although he has also indicated that he does not foresee such a confrontation.

Baburoglu said he believes that the United States would refrain from any direct confrontations with Turkish forces, preferring instead to provide support to the YPG to fight the Turkish army and its Free Syrian Army allies.

Others, however, say that the risk that Turkey may have to confront the United States or other forces from the US-led coalition in Syria cannot be discounted. If that were to happen, they say, it would be an instant game changer for Turkey, not just in Syria but in the eastern Mediterranean too.

Evidently we shot down an Iranian drone.

old salt wrote: ↑Thu Jul 18, 2019 2:23 pm Turkey's not the problem. It's Erdogan. We have greater influence by keeping him inside the tent.
He barely survived a coup & the latest election did not go well for him.
Strategically, Turkey is our most critical NATO ally.

If that's the case, threatening eviction from NATO is quite the shot across the bow, is it not? Start there. That's certainly not asking too much.

a fan wrote: ↑Thu Jul 18, 2019 3:29 pm

old salt wrote: ↑Thu Jul 18, 2019 2:23 pm Turkey's not the problem. It's Erdogan. We have greater influence by keeping him inside the tent.
He barely survived a coup & the latest election did not go well for him.
Strategically, Turkey is our most critical NATO ally.

If that's the case, threatening eviction from NATO is quite the shot across the bow, is it not? Start there. That's certainly not asking too much.

It's not just our call to make. While our other NATO partners support our decision to withhold the F-35 if Turkey gets the S-400, they're a long way from expelling Tuekey.

I understand....I'm not putting this on Trump....I'm putting this on NATO. Or hell, where at the military wonks like VDH calling out this stupidity?

Alliances are tricky things. On balance, we've been fortunate to get as much post Cold War support from NATO as we have -- Turkey included.

Ask & you shall receive : http://victorhanson.com/wordpress/erdog ... ious-ally/
(note the date. You'll love the conclusion )

I did love the conclusion, thanks for that. 2015 piece. Crazy.

VDH helped me out-----NATO bases in Turkey. Didn't occur to me that we still had them.

I did find pundits think the way I do on the matter...editorial board at Bloomberg.

Headline: Turkey Has Abandoned the West. Good Riddance. An increasingly erratic ally is no longer worth the risks.


And in this article i sure as *hit didn't know.....we have nuclear weapons in Turkey? Do I have that right? If so, we're special kind of stupid having them there while Erdogan is in charge.


https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/artic ... d-the-west

Yep. Tac nuc dumb bombs at Incirlik. Cold War legacy, now a bargaining chip.
If we remove them, then US dependents, Erdogan will know we're not kiddin' around.

This is where I get angry at Trump. Why does his tough guy routine stop at places where we could actually use it, and where it would make total sense to use it: e.g. Putin and Erdogan?

...or maybe the tough guy approach would make things worse with those two.
They have home field advantage on the issues under contention.

old salt wrote: ↑Thu Jul 18, 2019 6:31 pm ...or maybe the tough guy approach would make things worse with those two.
They have home field advantage on the issues under contention.

Sigh. You're right. Might make things worse.

When I get frustrated, I have to remember my adage: "there's no such thing as a "right move" in the Middle East for American Presidents".