OK. I skimmed the DC NG JAG's 36 pg memo. Excerpted below are key portions which illustrate the unwieldy, overly-politicized decision-making chain for an unplanned, impromptu deployment of the DC NG. There were elected & appointed political officials (DC Mayor & SecArmy) running around like headless chickens & playing the ultimate telephone game. All too concerned with the political blowback from any decision made, rather than briefing each other on what was needed & what could be done.
That's why these plans are best made in advance & if they must be impromptu, must be de-politicized. The threat by the Mayor to call a press conf to inform the public that DoD refused to deploy the NG blew things up. That prompted Sec McCarthy to go to the Mayor to prevent her threatened press conf, then to do the press conf with her, all delaying the approval of the impromptu "plan" by the SecDef, who says he had already delegated the approval, not needing to see a "plan".
I'm not sure either version is 100% accurate when you have so many people trying to recall who said what/when, during a panicked, sometimes contentious conference call. Threat's like the Mayor to go on tv did not help, whether or not she made that threat or one of her staff made the threat. That's what's called "rolling a sweat grenade" into the middle of a tactical planning session.
I'm not sure we'll ever get a 100% accurate account. Here are the key portions, imho :
https://www.politico.com/f/?id=0000017d ... da79e90000
At roughly 2:30PM on January 6, 2021, Dr. Christopher Rodriguez, Director of the District of Columbia Homeland Security and Emergency
Management Agency (DCHSEMA) established a telephone bridge and invited MG Walker, Secretary of the Army, Ryan McCarthy, MPD Chief Robert Contee, USCP Chief Steve Sund, D.C. Deputy Mayor Dr. Roger Mitchell and U.S. Secret Service Uniformed Division Chief Thomas Sullivan to join. Conference call participants were informed that Secretary McCarthy was not available for the conference call as he had gone to see the Acting Secretary of Defense.
McCarthy did not participate in the call. However, Lieutenant General Walter Piatt, Director of
the Army Staff and Lieutenant General Charles Flynn, the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff for
Operations, were both on the call. As was Colonel John Lubas, Executive Officer to the
Secretary of the Army. Additionally, Brigadier General Aaron Dean, the Adjutant General of the
D.C. National Guard, Colonel Earl Matthews, Staff Judge Advocate of the D.C. National Guard,
Command Sergeant Major Michael Brooks, the DCNG Senior Enlisted Advisor, and 1St
Lieutenant Timothy Nick, MG Walker’s aide-de-camp, all joined MG Walker in his office at the
D.C. Armory for this 2:30 p.m. conference call.
During the 2:30PM conference call, Chief Sund of the USCP pleaded for the immediate
support of the D.C. National Guard at the U.S. Capitol as the security perimeter at the Capitol
was being breached at that very moment. Chief Contee reinforced Chief Sund’s request. Chief
Contee asked Chief Sund aloud if he was requesting immediate D.C. National Guard support at
the Capitol. Chief Sund replied “Yes”. Chief Contee then asked LTG Piatt if the D.C. Guard
would be sent to the Capitol. LTG Piatt stated that it would not be his best military advice to
recommend to the Secretary of the Army that the D.C. National Guard be allowed to deploy to
the Capitol at that time. LTG Piatt stated that the presence of uniformed military personnel
could inflame the situation and that the police were best suited to handle the situation. Both
LTGs Piatt and Flynn stated that the optics of having uniformed military personnel deployed to
the U.S. Capitol would not be good.
Chief Contee then stated that he would inform the Mayor (D.C. Mayor Muriel Bowser)
that the Army was refusing to send the National Guard to the Capitol and that he would ask her
to convene a press conference to make this refusal known. LTG Piatt then asked Chief Contee to
please not do this. Piatt stated that the request for Guard presence was not being refused and he
had no power to deny or approve the request, only that he would not recommend approval to his
civilian leadership. Piatt and Flynn recommended that Contee identify locations away from the
Capitol where D.C. National Guard personnel could relieve MPD personnel of traffic duties,
allowing more MPD personnel to surge to the Capitol. LTG Flynn also stated that the best use of
D.C. National Guard personnel would be to free up MPD personnel by performing non-law
enforcement traffic duties away from the Capitol. LTGs Piatt and Flynn recommended the D.C.
National Guard develop a plan to support MPD at locations other than the Capitol. The
telephone call that began at 2:30PM ended at approximately 2:55PM. LTG Flynn then directed
that a secure video conference bridge be established between the Army Staff and the D.C.
National Guard Leadership.
At approximately 3:05PM, MG Walker joined from his office the secure videoconference
hosted by LTG Charles Flynn. Present with MG Walker were BG Dean, COL Matthews, 1LT
Nick and CSM Brooks. This secure video teleconference would be continuous until around
5:15PM. Personnel in this teleconference included LTG Piatt, LTG Flynn, later General James
McConville, Chief of Staff of the Army, LTG Leslie Smith, Inspector General of the Army, BG
Matthew D. Smith, Mr. Casey Wardynski, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and
Reserve Affairs, Wardynski’s deputy, Mr. Marshall Williams, and numerous others who joined
5and left the call as necessary. This teleconference was used to share information that was
received from various sources by the D.C. National Guard or Army leadership. Army leaders on
the call provided a situational update to GEN McConville. During this call, at 5:08PM, GEN
McConville informed MG Walker and his leadership team that the Secretary of Defense had
authorized the D.C. National Guard to deploy to the Capitol in support of the USCP.
The most glaring deficiencies and outright falsehoods in the DoDIG report relate to events which
transpired after Secretary McCarthy traveled to MPD headquarters at 3:48PM to meet with
Mayor Bowser and Chief Contee. The purpose of the meeting was ostensibly to reassure Mayor
Bowser that DCNG support had not been previously refused and was imminent, and to initiate a
plan for the DCNG’s eventual insertion into the Capitol.
The entire “planning narrative” created by BG LaNeve (and LTG Piatt) to justify the delay and
inaction of Army civilian leadership between 3:04PM and 5:08PM ...is that, at 3:04PM,
Acting Secretary Miller approved the mobilization of the DCNG
(which Miller may have interpreted as granting McCarthy permission to send DCNG personnel
immediately to the Capitol to support USCP), however McCarthy wanted to see a plan, and to
brief it to Miller and have Miller approve the plan before sending DCNG personnel to the
Capitol. Under this narrative, MG Walker was either unable or unwilling to develop a workable
plan, so Secretary McCarthy took it upon himself to travel to MPD headquarters, to confer with
Mayor Bowser and Chief Contee and to, with their help, personally develop a plan for the
employment of the DCNG at the Capitol in support of USCP. The report alleges, based on the
statements of anonymous witnesses, “Secretary McCarthy, Mayor Bowser, Chief Contee and
others present drafted a detailed plan that identified where DCNG personnel would go, the route
they would take, whom they would support, who was in charge, and who the key leaders were.”
This detailed plan was developed between the time that McCarthy arrived at MPD HQ at
4:05PM (or 4:10PM according to the DoD publicly released timeline) and the time McCarthy
briefed the plan to Miller and CJCS Milley at 4:30PM. This plan for the deployment of DCNG
personnel to the Capitol was developed without any input or participation from DCNG leaders.
LaNeve claims the detailed plan took 20 minutes to construct, according to the DoDIG report.
Miller approved the detailed plan in 2 minutes, at 4:32PM, during his call with McCarthy and
Chairman Mark Milley. McCarthy then called MG Walker at 4:35PM to provide the detailed
plan to Walker and to direct Walker to deploy all available forces to the Capitol immediately.
During the 4:35 call between McCarthy and MG Walker, McCarthy delivered his detailed plan
including a link-up point and the names of federal contacts that DCNG personnel should engage
at the Capitol. The call between McCarthy and Walker evidently lasted less than 5 minutes
because McCarthy then jumped on a 4:40PM telephone call with Governor Larry Hogan of
Maryland. It is unclear how long McCarthy’s call with Governor Hogan lasted. One glaring
omission from the DoDIG report is that between 4:30 and 5:00 p.m., before DCNG personnel
had deployed to the Capitol, McCarthy spent nearly 20 minutes in a live nationally televised
press conference with Mayor Bowser and Chief Contee.
...It is unclear why McCarthy needed to participate in this live press event with the Capitol
not yet secured and with DCNG forces not yet deployed there... The press conference with
McCarthy was at least 17 minutes in length (likely longer) and there is actual video footage
of the event.
Conclusion
Given the glaring deficiencies with respect to the DoD IG investigation, and given that his name
was unfairly besmirched, MG Walker requests an independent review of the investigative
findings of the DoDIG report and most importantly, the Army Report that was created at LTG
Piatt’s direction should be publicly released, independently reviewed and substantiated. The
timeline the Army produced should be carefully scrubbed for accuracy. Evidence of the actually
planning activities of the Army Staff, and especially of the G3/5/7/ under BG LaNeve and LTG
Flynn should be reviewed. What planning and coordination did these individuals actually
conduct? How did this planning enable DCNG to support the U.S. Capitol Police on 6 June after
the Capitol had been breached? What evidence is there of the planning and support the Army
Staff provided to DCNG after the Capitol’s breach and before DCNG deployed to the Capitol
after 5PM on January 6, 2021.
Unanswered Questions
Did Miller believe that he had authorized the actual deployment of the DCNG to the Capitol so
that McCarthy’s decision to seek his concurrence of a deployment plan was not required?
Where was Ryan McCarthy on the afternoon of 6 January, what is his personal timeline?
Where did Secretary McCarthy call MG Walker from at 3:05PM, 4:35PM and 5:00PM?
What phones were used to call Acting Secretary Miller and MG Walker?
Where is the plan that Secretary McCarthy generated with the Mayor?
Why didn’t McCarthy and or LaNeve invite DCNG participation in the planning that occurred at
MPD?
Who conveyed the plan (any plan) to DCNG?
Where is the plan? Why wasn’t it implemented on 6 January?
Were congressional leaders and the press mislead by being told that the DCNG was mobilized
(with an inference that the DCNG had been approved to come to the Capitol)?
What kind of operation are Troy O’Donnell and Marguerite C. Garrison running, what is their
agenda?
The apparent point of this memo is to restore the good name of MG Walker.
On Jan 6, he was the Commander of the DC NG. Despite the besmirchment of his good name, Speaker Pelosi chose him as the new House Sergeant at Arms.
I would include the following unanswered questions for MG Walker :
-- what was he doing on Jan 6 ? The memo implies that he was in the DC NG Armory, participating in the initial conference call & the follow on video conference. That gave him immediate access to Mayor Bowser, Chief Contee, & LTG Piatt. Did he use that access to inform them of what the DC NG was prepared to do, lay out their standing plan for riot response, assuage their concerns & forcefully advocate for the immediate deployment of his unit.
If he did, he was not effective. If he did not, why not ? Did he ever speak with Army Sec McCarthy on Jan 6 ? If not, what was he doing on Jan 6, fielding calls from members of Congress & staff ?
The protest memo from his DC NG JAG leaves the impression that MG Walker was passive & out of the decision making loop.
What was he doing to hasten the order to deploy his unit ? Who was he communicating with ? Did he confer with the Mayor ?
