Sensible Gun Safety

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WaffleTwineFaceoff
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Re: Sensible Gun Safety

Post by WaffleTwineFaceoff »

Seacoaster(1) wrote: Sat Jun 15, 2024 7:53 am This issue -- the meaning of the Second Amendment in personal gun ownership terms, and the ability then of governments to regulate firearms -- was decided by votes, not reasoning, in District of Columbia v. Heller. It is still worthwhile to go back and read Scalia's decision for the majority, locating in this strange text a personal right to gun ownership, and John Paul's Stevens's dissent, reviewing the Second Amendment's text and finding that "when each word in the text is given full effect, the Amendment is most naturally read to secure to the people a right to use and possess arms in conjunction with service in a well-regulated militia."

https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federa ... on-1962736 (Stevens, dissenting).

On the language and the (especially, perhaps) history underlying the Amendment, Stevens pretty much wins the day. But Scalia had the votes (Scalia, Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito). It is still a worthwhile read for anyone interested in some of the reasons for our gun violence problems today.

Whatever room Scalia may have tried to leave for governmental gun regulation was carefully and deliberately narrowed by the Court majority's decision in NY State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, in which, fourteen years after Heller, the majority adopted a new standard against which nearly all gun-regulation is evaluated:

"To justify its regulation, the government may not simply posit that the regulation promotes an important interest. Rather, the government must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Only if a firearm regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition may a court conclude that the individual’s conduct falls outside the Second Amendment’s unqualified command.”

This tossed the government's ability to regulate gun type, use and ownership into the relative vagaries of historical interpretation. Heller was used in Bruen to simply state that the text is no longer even the starting point; the current majority moved the analysis further away from text and into determination of difficult historical events and reasoning. The result is that the Second Amendment in some respects is the most absolute of constitutional mandates now, without much of the balancing against other societal interests, which we see in the jurisprudence of other contemporaneously adopted Amendments, like the First Amendment. And so, we have gunmen visiting our churches and movie theatres and colleges and elementary schools and grocery stores and office spaces, with recourse only against that shooter, and not the underlying issue of gun ownership -- government efforts to regulate and protect are now functionally cut off.

The currently pending (argued and awaiting decision) Rahimi case will tell us how far the historical test, above, will go.
The Rahimi case will be so interesting. The government chose a reprehensible human being that 99.9% of us feel should be behind bars for a very long time, as the person to test the waters on prohibitive persons rights and legalities. The main point as I see it is that a person like Rahimi shouldn't be out on bail based on what he is accused of, and if he is found not guilty, then we can discuss rights. That harkens back to a fairly vigorous and respectful skirmish here I was involved in many months ago regarding bail/no bail issues when it comes to patently dangerous repeat offenders being let out on bail before trial (in that particular instance for a murder spree).

Rahimi nuances are well explored by the youtube channel of Mark Smith, Four Boxes Diner, in case one is interested. I found his explication to be very helpful.
The only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it. John Stuart Mill On Liberty 1859
DMac
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Re: Sensible Gun Safety

Post by DMac »

WaffleTwineFaceoff wrote: Sat Jun 15, 2024 7:31 am
DMac wrote: Sat Jun 15, 2024 6:58 am
WaffleTwineFaceoff wrote: Fri Jun 14, 2024 9:17 pm
cradleandshoot wrote: Fri Jun 14, 2024 5:02 pm
Seacoaster(1) wrote: Fri Jun 14, 2024 12:11 pm
WaffleTwineFaceoff wrote: Fri Jun 14, 2024 11:52 am This isn't about militias (or mass public shooters). The case was about the overreach of the ATF in making a defacto law. That's the job of congress.

The vast majority of rifle owners know bump stocks are a bit of a clown accessory. They decrease accuracy. The thing they don't do is make a semiautomatic rifle into a machine gun.

It is notable that the three dissenting judges in their opinion went on record 1) calling semiautomatic rifles in common use, and 2) not utilizing the term "assault rifle". If you are an anti-gun politician, lobbyist, or person (to each their own, based on your own research, beliefs, and understanding of the contentious issues at hand), you will not be pleased with the ammunition their dissent admissions and wording will likely provide upcoming cases regarding 2A issues which are coming before the Supreme Court.

We await the Rahimi case, which anyone who wants to get geeky about can get a good background on the YouTube video channel of Mark Smith of Four Boxes Diner, which is problematic due to the venal, irresponsible scumbag that is Rahimi being the crash test dummy for the ruling in question.

Finally, if interested in a good book, David Yamane's "Gun Curious - A Liberal Professor's Surprising Journey Inside America's Gun Culture" is out and provides a balanced, reasoned, and "anti partisan politics" take on many of the most contentious issues of America's ongoing gun debates. A breezy and illuminating read from an intelligent sociology professor coming to the issues from "outside the box". Imho.

Be well.

You’re the second person to suggest the Yamane book. I’ll check it out. Thanks.

From Alito's concurrence:

"There is a simple remedy for the disparate treatment of bumpstocks and machineguns. Congress can amend the law -- and perhaps would have done so already had ATF stuck with its earlier interpretation."

So Alito appears to be saying that it is within Congress's power to outlaw bumpstocks and machineguns. If only we had a Congress that functioned to protect ordinary Americans, you know like church-goers, shoppers at WalMart and supermarkets, employees at work, movie-goers, college kids.

And then, to be fair, there is this from Sotomayor:

"Today, the Court puts bump stocks back in civilian hands. To do so, it casts aside Congress's definition of 'machinegun' and seizes upon one that is inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of the statutory text and unsupported by context or purpose. When I see a bird that walks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck, I call that bird a duck. A bump-stock-equipped semiautomatic rifle fires 'automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger.' §5845(b). Because I, like Congress, call that a machinegun, I respectfully dissent."
Isn't that part and parcel what " well regulated " is suppose to mean? I guess the founding fathers were never cognizant of the advances in firearms that might happen in a almost 250 years.Muzzleloaders morphed into AR 15s .
Well regulated at the time of the founding documents meant "In good working order. Disciplined". And the second amendment says "arms", not "firearms". Google the Puckle gun. The advances in firearm technology have no bearing on the right. Any more than the internet, digital media, and social media do related to the first amendment in terms of the quill pen and parchment paper of that era.

And as we all know, any snarky uses of militia in suggesting the second amendment was only a collective right will be referred to detention for a studious and sincere review with Mr. Hand of the founding documents (precursors, documents themselves, and immediate post establishment documents) until clarity is achieved. Modern era post-1970 revisionist second amendment scholarly gymnastics, even by the likes of Warren Burger, will result in further demerits and detention. And missing out on Pheobe Cates getting out of the pool in her red bikini.

The duck analogy above is wishful thinking by someone who's knowledge of semiautomatic firearm mechanics and function could fit on the head of a pin. Lots of emotional responses today in the partisan political dumpster fire that is the American discourse on guns.

David Yamane. Gun curious. Great read.

Enjoy the weekend, gents.
From wiki
The Second Amendment was based partially on the right to keep and bear arms in English common law and was influenced by the English Bill of Rights of 1689. Sir William Blackstone described this right as an auxiliary right, supporting the natural rights of self-defense and resistance to oppression, and the civic duty to act in concert in defense of the state.[12] While both James Monroe and John Adams supported the Constitution being ratified, its most influential framer was James Madison. In Federalist No. 46, Madison wrote how a federal army could be kept in check by the militia, "a standing army ... would be opposed [by] militia." He argued that State governments "would be able to repel the danger" of a federal army, "It may well be doubted, whether a militia thus circumstanced could ever be conquered by such a proportion of regular troops." He contrasted the federal government of the United States to the European kingdoms, which he described as "afraid to trust the people with arms", and assured that "the existence of subordinate governments ... forms a barrier against the enterprises of ambition".[13][14]
I hope Mr. Madison got detention for this.
That Wiki tidbit provides but a few crumbs from the smorgasbord of impassioned debate that surrounded the Bill of Rights and 2A at the time of our founding. The whole shebang is a rather fascinating thing to read, and various scholarly tomes have gathered together and contextualized it all. Having put in the time, and not done any crime, I am comfortable with my takeaways regarding the 2A. And of course I shall respect the opinion of those who might differ in theirs. After all, it's a free country! I think ;)
I wouldn't begin to challenge you on anything 2A, you're obviously well versed whereas I'm your average shmuck who knows essentially jack about it. What I bolded though is what your average gun owning, registered voter, hangs his hat on when it comes to his/her right to bear "arms", you can bet on that (looking for your recommended reading at the library but I don't think they have it).
Typical Lax Dad
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Re: Sensible Gun Safety

Post by Typical Lax Dad »



This is sensible
“You lucky I ain’t read wretched yet!”
SCLaxAttack
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Re: Sensible Gun Safety

Post by SCLaxAttack »

Typical Lax Dad wrote: Sun Jun 16, 2024 10:57 am

This is sensible
I used to look into vehicles being driven with poor skills just to see what type of crazy was at the wheel. Haven't in quite a few years out of concern that guy would be the driver.
Typical Lax Dad
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Re: Sensible Gun Safety

Post by Typical Lax Dad »



😂😂😂😂. Clowns…
“You lucky I ain’t read wretched yet!”
Farfromgeneva
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Re: Sensible Gun Safety

Post by Farfromgeneva »

This is how we should test 2a - Neal Brennan

https://youtu.be/1cDVUlSR7dA?si=lqfyR-2-AW0L63yC
Now I love those cowboys, I love their gold
Love my uncle, God rest his soul
Taught me good, Lord, taught me all I know
Taught me so well, that I grabbed that gold
I left his dead ass there by the side of the road, yeah
PizzaSnake
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Re: Sensible Gun Safety

Post by PizzaSnake »

Typical Lax Dad wrote: Sun Jun 16, 2024 11:53 am

😂😂😂😂. Clowns…
I’m seeing an inverse relationship between ink and intelligence. I bet this costs the county some cash.

I know the job is tough, but where do they find these fcukwits?

And, here it is: Sergeant Buttbrain demoted, Tat the Clown suspended.

“It also says the two of them failed to "Possess the necessary working knowledge of all laws..."

The Sheriff disciplined the Deputy and Sergeant, demoting him. He refuses to do an interview to discuss the matter.”

https://mycbs4.com/news/local/report-sa ... ful-search
"There is nothing more difficult and more dangerous to carry through than initiating changes. One makes enemies of those who prospered under the old order, and only lukewarm support from those who would prosper under the new."
Farfromgeneva
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Re: Sensible Gun Safety

Post by Farfromgeneva »

PizzaSnake wrote: Sun Jun 16, 2024 8:18 pm
Typical Lax Dad wrote: Sun Jun 16, 2024 11:53 am

😂😂😂😂. Clowns…
I’m seeing an inverse relationship between ink and intelligence. I bet this costs the county some cash.

I know the job is tough, but where do they find these fcukwits?

And, here it is: Sergeant Buttbrain demoted, Tat the Clown suspended.

“It also says the two of them failed to "Possess the necessary working knowledge of all laws..."

The Sheriff disciplined the Deputy and Sergeant, demoting him. He refuses to do an interview to discuss the matter.”

https://mycbs4.com/news/local/report-sa ... ful-search
Look for crew cuts, confidence that masks fear and sunglasses backwards on the back of the neck that are linear task driven thinkers you can under train and presume they’ll do the right thing.

You were asking for instructions to find them, right?
Now I love those cowboys, I love their gold
Love my uncle, God rest his soul
Taught me good, Lord, taught me all I know
Taught me so well, that I grabbed that gold
I left his dead ass there by the side of the road, yeah
Seacoaster(1)
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Re: Sensible Gun Safety

Post by Seacoaster(1) »

The Court -- 8-1, Thomas the lone dissenter -- upholds the constitutionality of a federal law that bans the possession of a gun by someone who has been the subject of a domestic violent restraining order.

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/2 ... 5_8o6b.pdf

Barrett concurrence is interesting.

Thomas's dissent looks in vain for a wife-beater who, in 1772 or so, may have had his right to hang on to his flintlock revoked by civil authorities. So, having found nothing (and found that ancient surety laws were used in olden days), he says Rahimi gets his gun back.

Thomas:

When considering whether a modern regulation is consistent with historical regulations and thus overcomes the presumption against firearms restrictions, our precedents “point toward at least two metrics [of comparison]: how and why the regulations burden a law-abiding citizen’s right to armed self-defense.” A historical law must satisfy both considerations to serve as a comparator. While a historical law need not be a “historical twin,” it must be “well-established and representative” to serve as a historical analogue.

The Government fails to carry its burden of proving that §922(g)(8) is “consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Despite canvassing laws before, during, and after our Nation’s founding, the Government does not identify even a single regulation with an analogous burden and justification.

Section 922(g)(8) addresses a societal problem—the risk of interpersonal violence—“that has persisted since the 18th century,” yet was addressed “through [the] materially different means” of surety laws. Id., at 26. Surety laws were, in a nutshell, a fine on certain behavior. If a person threatened someone in his community, he was given the choice to either keep the peace or forfeit a sum of money. Surety laws thus shared the same justification as §922(g)(8), but they imposed a far less onerous burden. The Government has not shown that §922(g)(8)’s more severe approach is consistent with our historical tradition of firearm regulation."
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WaffleTwineFaceoff
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Re: Sensible Gun Safety

Post by WaffleTwineFaceoff »

Rahimi decision has three important components.

1) Rahimi was a known scumbag, a clear danger, received due process, and was as 99% of thinking citizens might conclude deserving of a temporary removal of his gun ownership rights until a final disposition in his case could occur. All well and good, and the partizan political gun debate pendulum swings left for a "W" after last week's bump stock "L". Both sides have their moments to cope, and moments to crow.

The two additional aspects of the Rahimi decision that were written into the decision are notable:

2a) the Supreme Court continues (Gorsuch concurrence) in the decision "we do not decide today whether the government may disarm a person without a judicial finding that he poses a 'credible threat' to another's physical safety. And 2b) We do not resolve whether the government may disarm an individual permanently.

3) Kavanaugh concurrence: "Deciding constitutional cases in a still developing area of this Court's jurisprudence can sometimes be difficult. But that is not a permission slip for a judge to let constitutional analysis morph into policy preferences under the guise of a balancing test that churns out the judge's own policy beliefs".

So as jurisprudence travels down the road toward Red Flag law cage fights, there is a lot to be determined.

My issue with Red Flag laws, as stated in previous posts on this thread, is 1) the ex-parte part which is a component of many such laws (someone can be red flagged and not have any knowledge of that until there is a knock on their door, and no due process rights until after the fact), and 2) the no consequences for punitive and inappropriate use of red flag reporting which is well documented having been done by bitter exes, angry neighbors who have had a dispute, or persons who just don't like guns and gun owners, legal and law abiding be damned.

The final issue with Red (and yellow) Flag laws is how they've failed to be implemented correctly in the instances when 99% would agree "hey, this is a great time to throw a red flag!". Uvalde, Parkland, Maine, Sandy Hook were all glaring examples of mass public shootings where the warning sirens and bells were blaring in the days, weeks, months, and even years before the day of, and nothing was done.

Rahimi lost. The guy in my opinion should not even been granted bail after his last violent and reckless act. But as 2) & 3) above show, there is a whole lot of ground to cover to "get it right" moving forward. Interest balancing is a slippery slope that needs careful monitoring. It would be nice if Red Flag laws could incorporate a checks and balances approach legally, with severe penalties to lawyers, law enforcement, and citizens who utilize them in a frivolous, toxic, or punitive manner.

And ex parte needs to be eliminated completely, imho.

Just my .02
The only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it. John Stuart Mill On Liberty 1859
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cradleandshoot
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Re: Sensible Gun Safety

Post by cradleandshoot »

WaffleTwineFaceoff wrote: Fri Jun 21, 2024 11:43 am Rahimi decision has three important components.

1) Rahimi was a known scumbag, a clear danger, received due process, and was as 99% of thinking citizens might conclude deserving of a temporary removal of his gun ownership rights until a final disposition in his case could occur. All well and good, and the partizan political gun debate pendulum swings left for a "W" after last week's bump stock "L". Both sides have their moments to cope, and moments to crow.

The two additional aspects of the Rahimi decision that were written into the decision are notable:

2a) the Supreme Court continues (Gorsuch concurrence) in the decision "we do not decide today whether the government may disarm a person without a judicial finding that he poses a 'credible threat' to another's physical safety. And 2b) We do not resolve whether the government may disarm an individual permanently.

3) Kavanaugh concurrence: "Deciding constitutional cases in a still developing area of this Court's jurisprudence can sometimes be difficult. But that is not a permission slip for a judge to let constitutional analysis morph into policy preferences under the guise of a balancing test that churns out the judge's own policy beliefs".

So as jurisprudence travels down the road toward Red Flag law cage fights, there is a lot to be determined.

My issue with Red Flag laws, as stated in previous posts on this thread, is 1) the ex-parte part which is a component of many such laws (someone can be red flagged and not have any knowledge of that until there is a knock on their door, and no due process rights until after the fact), and 2) the no consequences for punitive and inappropriate use of red flag reporting which is well documented having been done by bitter exes, angry neighbors who have had a dispute, or persons who just don't like guns and gun owners, legal and law abiding be damned.

The final issue with Red (and yellow) Flag laws is how they've failed to be implemented correctly in the instances when 99% would agree "hey, this is a great time to throw a red flag!". Uvalde, Parkland, Maine, Sandy Hook were all glaring examples of mass public shootings where the warning sirens and bells were blaring in the days, weeks, months, and even years before the day of, and nothing was done.

Rahimi lost. The guy in my opinion should not even been granted bail after his last violent and reckless act. But as 2) & 3) above show, there is a whole lot of ground to cover to "get it right" moving forward. Interest balancing is a slippery slope that needs careful monitoring. It would be nice if Red Flag laws could incorporate a checks and balances approach legally, with severe penalties to lawyers, law enforcement, and citizens who utilize them in a frivolous, toxic, or punitive manner.

And ex parte needs to be eliminated completely, imho.

Just my .02
IMO the SCOTUS got it right today. It does not diffuse the issue of Red Flag laws and how it effects HIPPA. Your doctor/ patient privacy rights are supposed to be a vital cog in the patient trusting his/her physician. That being said it is not unreasonable to disallow a person with psych issues or threats against a family member to be temporarily denied access to a firearm. The operative word being temporary. Once your 2nd amendment rights have been taken away how do you get them back? Say for example you love duck hunting. How do you prove your right to sit in a blind with your retriever and hunt ducks?
I use to be a people person until people ruined that for me.
Seacoaster(1)
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Re: Sensible Gun Safety

Post by Seacoaster(1) »

Barrett, concurring, seems to be messaging to Thomas that the simplistic Bruen analysis he advocates in his dissent is not satisfactory to her:

"Despite its unqualified text, the Second Amendment is not absolute. It codified a pre-existing right, and preexisting limits on that right are part and parcel of it. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, 595, 627 (2008). Those limits define the scope of “the right to bear arms” as it was originally understood; to identify them, courts must examine our “historical tradition of firearm regulation.” New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U. S. 1, 17, 19 (2022). That evidence marks where the right stops and the State’s authority to regulate begins. A regulation is constitutional only if the government affirmatively proves that it is “consistent with the Second Amendment’s text and historical understanding.” Id., at 26. Because the Court has taken an originalist approach to the Second Amendment, it is worth pausing to identify the basic premises of originalism. The theory is built on two core principles: that the meaning of constitutional text is fixed at the time of its ratification and that the “discoverable historical meaning . . . has legal significance and is authoritative in most circumstances.” K. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82 Ford. L. Rev. 375, 378 (2013) (Whittington). Ratification is a democratic act that renders constitutional text part of our fundamental law, see Arts. V, VII, and that text “remains law until law-fully altered,” S. Sachs, Originalism: Standard and Procedure, 135 Harv. L. Rev. 777, 782 (2022). So for an originalist, the history that matters most is the history surrounding the ratification of the text; that backdrop illuminates the meaning of the enacted law. History (or tradition) that long postdates ratification does not serve that function. To be sure, postenactment history can be an important tool. For example, it can “reinforce our understanding of the Constitution’s original meaning”; “liquidate ambiguous constitutional provisions”; provide persuasive evidence of the original meaning; and, if stare decisis applies, control the outcome. See Vidal v. Elster, 602 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2024) (BARRETT, J., concurring in part) (slip op., at 13–14). But generally speaking, the use of postenactment history requires some justification other than originalism simpliciter.

In Bruen, the Court took history beyond the founding era, considering gun regulations that spanned the 19th century. 597 U. S., at 50–70. I expressed reservations about the scope of that inquiry but concluded that the timing question did not matter to Bruen’s holding. Id., at 81–83 (concurring opinion). It bears emphasis, however, that my questions were about the time period relevant to discerning the Second Amendment’s original meaning—for instance, what is the post-1791 cutoff for discerning how the Second Amendment was originally understood? Id., at 82 (“How long after ratification may subsequent practice illuminate original public meaning?”). My doubts were not about whether “tradition,” standing alone, is dispositive. Id., at 83 (“[T]oday’s decision should not be understood to endorse freewheeling reliance on historical practice from the mid-to-late 19th century to establish the original meaning of the Bill of Rights”). As I have explained elsewhere, evidence of “tradition” unmoored from original meaning is not binding law. Vidal, 602 U. S., at ___–___ (BARRETT, J., concurring in part) (slip op., at 13–15). And scattered cases or regulations pulled from history may have little bearing on the meaning of the text. Samia v. United States, 599 U. S. 635, 656–657 (2023) (BARRETT, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).

“Original history”—i.e., the generally dispositive kind— plays two roles in the Second Amendment context. It elucidates how contemporaries understood the text—for example, the meaning of the phrase “bear Arms.” See Heller, 554 U. S., at 582–592. It also plays the more complicated role of determining the scope of the pre-existing right that the people enshrined in our fundamental law.* In Rahimi’s case, the Court uses history in this latter way. Call this “original contours” history: It looks at historical gun regulations to identify the contours of the right.

Courts have struggled with this use of history in the wake of Bruen. One difficulty is a level of generality problem: Must the government produce a founding-era relative of the challenged regulation—if not a twin, a cousin? Or do founding-era gun regulations yield concrete principles that mark the borders of the right?

Many courts, including the Fifth Circuit, have understood Bruen to require the former, narrower approach. But Bruen emphasized that “analogical reasoning” is not a “regulatory straightjacket.” 597 U. S., at 30. To be consistent with historical limits, a challenged regulation need not be an updated model of a historical counterpart. Besides, imposing a test that demands overly specific analogues has serious problems. To name two: It forces 21st-century regulations to follow late-18th-century policy choices, giving us “a law trapped in amber.” Ante, at 7. And it assumes that founding-era legislatures maximally exercised their power to regulate, thereby adopting a “use it or lose it” view of legislative authority. Such assumptions are flawed, and originalism does not require them.

“Analogical reasoning” under Bruen demands a wider lens: Historical regulations reveal a principle, not a mold. See, e.g., 597 U. S., at 28–29 (explaining that the Amendment does not apply only to the catalogue of arms that existed in the 18th century, but rather to all weapons satisfying the “general definition” of “bearable arms” (emphasis added)); id., at 30–31 (discussing the “‘sensitive places’” principle that limits the right to public carry); cf. Vidal, 602 U. S., at ___–___ (BARRETT, J., concurring in part) (slip op., at 7–9); Whittington 386 (“The insight to be gleaned is not the authoritative status of the expected application, but the apparent rule at play given that such an application is expected to follow from it”).

To be sure, a court must be careful not to read a principle at such a high level of generality that it waters down the right. Pulling principle from precedent, whether case law or history, is a standard feature of legal reasoning, and reasonable minds sometimes disagree about how broad or narrow the controlling principle should be. Here, though, the Court settles on just the right level of generality: “Since the founding, our Nation’s firearm laws have included provisions preventing individuals who threaten physical harm to others from misusing firearms.” Ante, at 5; see also Kanter v. Barr, 919 F. 3d 437, 451, 464– 465 (CA7 2019) (Barrett, J., dissenting) (“History is consistent with common sense: it demonstrates that legislatures have the power to prohibit dangerous people from possessing guns”). Section 922(g)(8)(C)(i) fits well within that principle; therefore, Rahimi’s facial challenge fails. Harder level-of-generality problems can await another day."
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cradleandshoot
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Re: Sensible Gun Safety

Post by cradleandshoot »

Seacoaster(1) wrote: Fri Jun 21, 2024 1:28 pm Barrett, concurring, seems to be messaging to Thomas that the simplistic Bruen analysis he advocates in his dissent is not satisfactory to her:

"Despite its unqualified text, the Second Amendment is not absolute. It codified a pre-existing right, and preexisting limits on that right are part and parcel of it. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, 595, 627 (2008). Those limits define the scope of “the right to bear arms” as it was originally understood; to identify them, courts must examine our “historical tradition of firearm regulation.” New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U. S. 1, 17, 19 (2022). That evidence marks where the right stops and the State’s authority to regulate begins. A regulation is constitutional only if the government affirmatively proves that it is “consistent with the Second Amendment’s text and historical understanding.” Id., at 26. Because the Court has taken an originalist approach to the Second Amendment, it is worth pausing to identify the basic premises of originalism. The theory is built on two core principles: that the meaning of constitutional text is fixed at the time of its ratification and that the “discoverable historical meaning . . . has legal significance and is authoritative in most circumstances.” K. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82 Ford. L. Rev. 375, 378 (2013) (Whittington). Ratification is a democratic act that renders constitutional text part of our fundamental law, see Arts. V, VII, and that text “remains law until law-fully altered,” S. Sachs, Originalism: Standard and Procedure, 135 Harv. L. Rev. 777, 782 (2022). So for an originalist, the history that matters most is the history surrounding the ratification of the text; that backdrop illuminates the meaning of the enacted law. History (or tradition) that long postdates ratification does not serve that function. To be sure, postenactment history can be an important tool. For example, it can “reinforce our understanding of the Constitution’s original meaning”; “liquidate ambiguous constitutional provisions”; provide persuasive evidence of the original meaning; and, if stare decisis applies, control the outcome. See Vidal v. Elster, 602 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2024) (BARRETT, J., concurring in part) (slip op., at 13–14). But generally speaking, the use of postenactment history requires some justification other than originalism simpliciter.

In Bruen, the Court took history beyond the founding era, considering gun regulations that spanned the 19th century. 597 U. S., at 50–70. I expressed reservations about the scope of that inquiry but concluded that the timing question did not matter to Bruen’s holding. Id., at 81–83 (concurring opinion). It bears emphasis, however, that my questions were about the time period relevant to discerning the Second Amendment’s original meaning—for instance, what is the post-1791 cutoff for discerning how the Second Amendment was originally understood? Id., at 82 (“How long after ratification may subsequent practice illuminate original public meaning?”). My doubts were not about whether “tradition,” standing alone, is dispositive. Id., at 83 (“[T]oday’s decision should not be understood to endorse freewheeling reliance on historical practice from the mid-to-late 19th century to establish the original meaning of the Bill of Rights”). As I have explained elsewhere, evidence of “tradition” unmoored from original meaning is not binding law. Vidal, 602 U. S., at ___–___ (BARRETT, J., concurring in part) (slip op., at 13–15). And scattered cases or regulations pulled from history may have little bearing on the meaning of the text. Samia v. United States, 599 U. S. 635, 656–657 (2023) (BARRETT, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).

“Original history”—i.e., the generally dispositive kind— plays two roles in the Second Amendment context. It elucidates how contemporaries understood the text—for example, the meaning of the phrase “bear Arms.” See Heller, 554 U. S., at 582–592. It also plays the more complicated role of determining the scope of the pre-existing right that the people enshrined in our fundamental law.* In Rahimi’s case, the Court uses history in this latter way. Call this “original contours” history: It looks at historical gun regulations to identify the contours of the right.

Courts have struggled with this use of history in the wake of Bruen. One difficulty is a level of generality problem: Must the government produce a founding-era relative of the challenged regulation—if not a twin, a cousin? Or do founding-era gun regulations yield concrete principles that mark the borders of the right?

Many courts, including the Fifth Circuit, have understood Bruen to require the former, narrower approach. But Bruen emphasized that “analogical reasoning” is not a “regulatory straightjacket.” 597 U. S., at 30. To be consistent with historical limits, a challenged regulation need not be an updated model of a historical counterpart. Besides, imposing a test that demands overly specific analogues has serious problems. To name two: It forces 21st-century regulations to follow late-18th-century policy choices, giving us “a law trapped in amber.” Ante, at 7. And it assumes that founding-era legislatures maximally exercised their power to regulate, thereby adopting a “use it or lose it” view of legislative authority. Such assumptions are flawed, and originalism does not require them.

“Analogical reasoning” under Bruen demands a wider lens: Historical regulations reveal a principle, not a mold. See, e.g., 597 U. S., at 28–29 (explaining that the Amendment does not apply only to the catalogue of arms that existed in the 18th century, but rather to all weapons satisfying the “general definition” of “bearable arms” (emphasis added)); id., at 30–31 (discussing the “‘sensitive places’” principle that limits the right to public carry); cf. Vidal, 602 U. S., at ___–___ (BARRETT, J., concurring in part) (slip op., at 7–9); Whittington 386 (“The insight to be gleaned is not the authoritative status of the expected application, but the apparent rule at play given that such an application is expected to follow from it”).

To be sure, a court must be careful not to read a principle at such a high level of generality that it waters down the right. Pulling principle from precedent, whether case law or history, is a standard feature of legal reasoning, and reasonable minds sometimes disagree about how broad or narrow the controlling principle should be. Here, though, the Court settles on just the right level of generality: “Since the founding, our Nation’s firearm laws have included provisions preventing individuals who threaten physical harm to others from misusing firearms.” Ante, at 5; see also Kanter v. Barr, 919 F. 3d 437, 451, 464– 465 (CA7 2019) (Barrett, J., dissenting) (“History is consistent with common sense: it demonstrates that legislatures have the power to prohibit dangerous people from possessing guns”). Section 922(g)(8)(C)(i) fits well within that principle; therefore, Rahimi’s facial challenge fails. Harder level-of-generality problems can await another day."
Back up the legal bus counselor. I thought Barrett was one of the bad justices? Your not implying here that she used judicial prudence are you? I'm guessing the even the blind squirrel finds an acorn now and again rule comes into play.
I use to be a people person until people ruined that for me.
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Re: Sensible Gun Safety

Post by Typical Lax Dad »

“You lucky I ain’t read wretched yet!”
DMac
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Re: Sensible Gun Safety

Post by DMac »

Meh, just part of the goings on when all have the right to be "armed" and your militia's armed to the hilt.
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Re: Sensible Gun Safety

Post by Typical Lax Dad »

DMac wrote: Fri Jun 21, 2024 9:06 pm Meh, just part of the goings on when all have the right to be "armed" and your militia's armed to the hilt.
Yep. Just another Friday.
“You lucky I ain’t read wretched yet!”
Seacoaster(1)
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Re: Sensible Gun Safety

Post by Seacoaster(1) »

cradleandshoot wrote: Fri Jun 21, 2024 3:21 pm
Seacoaster(1) wrote: Fri Jun 21, 2024 1:28 pm Barrett, concurring, seems to be messaging to Thomas that the simplistic Bruen analysis he advocates in his dissent is not satisfactory to her:

"Despite its unqualified text, the Second Amendment is not absolute. It codified a pre-existing right, and preexisting limits on that right are part and parcel of it. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, 595, 627 (2008). Those limits define the scope of “the right to bear arms” as it was originally understood; to identify them, courts must examine our “historical tradition of firearm regulation.” New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U. S. 1, 17, 19 (2022). That evidence marks where the right stops and the State’s authority to regulate begins. A regulation is constitutional only if the government affirmatively proves that it is “consistent with the Second Amendment’s text and historical understanding.” Id., at 26. Because the Court has taken an originalist approach to the Second Amendment, it is worth pausing to identify the basic premises of originalism. The theory is built on two core principles: that the meaning of constitutional text is fixed at the time of its ratification and that the “discoverable historical meaning . . . has legal significance and is authoritative in most circumstances.” K. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82 Ford. L. Rev. 375, 378 (2013) (Whittington). Ratification is a democratic act that renders constitutional text part of our fundamental law, see Arts. V, VII, and that text “remains law until law-fully altered,” S. Sachs, Originalism: Standard and Procedure, 135 Harv. L. Rev. 777, 782 (2022). So for an originalist, the history that matters most is the history surrounding the ratification of the text; that backdrop illuminates the meaning of the enacted law. History (or tradition) that long postdates ratification does not serve that function. To be sure, postenactment history can be an important tool. For example, it can “reinforce our understanding of the Constitution’s original meaning”; “liquidate ambiguous constitutional provisions”; provide persuasive evidence of the original meaning; and, if stare decisis applies, control the outcome. See Vidal v. Elster, 602 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2024) (BARRETT, J., concurring in part) (slip op., at 13–14). But generally speaking, the use of postenactment history requires some justification other than originalism simpliciter.

In Bruen, the Court took history beyond the founding era, considering gun regulations that spanned the 19th century. 597 U. S., at 50–70. I expressed reservations about the scope of that inquiry but concluded that the timing question did not matter to Bruen’s holding. Id., at 81–83 (concurring opinion). It bears emphasis, however, that my questions were about the time period relevant to discerning the Second Amendment’s original meaning—for instance, what is the post-1791 cutoff for discerning how the Second Amendment was originally understood? Id., at 82 (“How long after ratification may subsequent practice illuminate original public meaning?”). My doubts were not about whether “tradition,” standing alone, is dispositive. Id., at 83 (“[T]oday’s decision should not be understood to endorse freewheeling reliance on historical practice from the mid-to-late 19th century to establish the original meaning of the Bill of Rights”). As I have explained elsewhere, evidence of “tradition” unmoored from original meaning is not binding law. Vidal, 602 U. S., at ___–___ (BARRETT, J., concurring in part) (slip op., at 13–15). And scattered cases or regulations pulled from history may have little bearing on the meaning of the text. Samia v. United States, 599 U. S. 635, 656–657 (2023) (BARRETT, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).

“Original history”—i.e., the generally dispositive kind— plays two roles in the Second Amendment context. It elucidates how contemporaries understood the text—for example, the meaning of the phrase “bear Arms.” See Heller, 554 U. S., at 582–592. It also plays the more complicated role of determining the scope of the pre-existing right that the people enshrined in our fundamental law.* In Rahimi’s case, the Court uses history in this latter way. Call this “original contours” history: It looks at historical gun regulations to identify the contours of the right.

Courts have struggled with this use of history in the wake of Bruen. One difficulty is a level of generality problem: Must the government produce a founding-era relative of the challenged regulation—if not a twin, a cousin? Or do founding-era gun regulations yield concrete principles that mark the borders of the right?

Many courts, including the Fifth Circuit, have understood Bruen to require the former, narrower approach. But Bruen emphasized that “analogical reasoning” is not a “regulatory straightjacket.” 597 U. S., at 30. To be consistent with historical limits, a challenged regulation need not be an updated model of a historical counterpart. Besides, imposing a test that demands overly specific analogues has serious problems. To name two: It forces 21st-century regulations to follow late-18th-century policy choices, giving us “a law trapped in amber.” Ante, at 7. And it assumes that founding-era legislatures maximally exercised their power to regulate, thereby adopting a “use it or lose it” view of legislative authority. Such assumptions are flawed, and originalism does not require them.

“Analogical reasoning” under Bruen demands a wider lens: Historical regulations reveal a principle, not a mold. See, e.g., 597 U. S., at 28–29 (explaining that the Amendment does not apply only to the catalogue of arms that existed in the 18th century, but rather to all weapons satisfying the “general definition” of “bearable arms” (emphasis added)); id., at 30–31 (discussing the “‘sensitive places’” principle that limits the right to public carry); cf. Vidal, 602 U. S., at ___–___ (BARRETT, J., concurring in part) (slip op., at 7–9); Whittington 386 (“The insight to be gleaned is not the authoritative status of the expected application, but the apparent rule at play given that such an application is expected to follow from it”).

To be sure, a court must be careful not to read a principle at such a high level of generality that it waters down the right. Pulling principle from precedent, whether case law or history, is a standard feature of legal reasoning, and reasonable minds sometimes disagree about how broad or narrow the controlling principle should be. Here, though, the Court settles on just the right level of generality: “Since the founding, our Nation’s firearm laws have included provisions preventing individuals who threaten physical harm to others from misusing firearms.” Ante, at 5; see also Kanter v. Barr, 919 F. 3d 437, 451, 464– 465 (CA7 2019) (Barrett, J., dissenting) (“History is consistent with common sense: it demonstrates that legislatures have the power to prohibit dangerous people from possessing guns”). Section 922(g)(8)(C)(i) fits well within that principle; therefore, Rahimi’s facial challenge fails. Harder level-of-generality problems can await another day."
Back up the legal bus counselor. I thought Barrett was one of the bad justices? Your not implying here that she used judicial prudence are you? I'm guessing the even the blind squirrel finds an acorn now and again rule comes into play.
I posted Barrett's concurring opinion because it's interesting -- not because I agree with her on most things -- and a big issue with her, one on which she has invested a lot of time and thinking.

Again, here she says: “Analogical reasoning” under Bruen demands a wider lens: Historical regulations reveal a principle, not a mold." She seems to me to be pulling the reins on the new regime's buggy (or Thomas's plush motorhome). If you read the concurrences of Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, and compare them with Thomas's dissent, it is pretty interesting. Seems to me that a lot of the gun regulation/gun rights issues are still to be hashed out.
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cradleandshoot
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Re: Sensible Gun Safety

Post by cradleandshoot »

Seacoaster(1) wrote: Sat Jun 22, 2024 6:50 am
cradleandshoot wrote: Fri Jun 21, 2024 3:21 pm
Seacoaster(1) wrote: Fri Jun 21, 2024 1:28 pm Barrett, concurring, seems to be messaging to Thomas that the simplistic Bruen analysis he advocates in his dissent is not satisfactory to her:

"Despite its unqualified text, the Second Amendment is not absolute. It codified a pre-existing right, and preexisting limits on that right are part and parcel of it. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, 595, 627 (2008). Those limits define the scope of “the right to bear arms” as it was originally understood; to identify them, courts must examine our “historical tradition of firearm regulation.” New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U. S. 1, 17, 19 (2022). That evidence marks where the right stops and the State’s authority to regulate begins. A regulation is constitutional only if the government affirmatively proves that it is “consistent with the Second Amendment’s text and historical understanding.” Id., at 26. Because the Court has taken an originalist approach to the Second Amendment, it is worth pausing to identify the basic premises of originalism. The theory is built on two core principles: that the meaning of constitutional text is fixed at the time of its ratification and that the “discoverable historical meaning . . . has legal significance and is authoritative in most circumstances.” K. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82 Ford. L. Rev. 375, 378 (2013) (Whittington). Ratification is a democratic act that renders constitutional text part of our fundamental law, see Arts. V, VII, and that text “remains law until law-fully altered,” S. Sachs, Originalism: Standard and Procedure, 135 Harv. L. Rev. 777, 782 (2022). So for an originalist, the history that matters most is the history surrounding the ratification of the text; that backdrop illuminates the meaning of the enacted law. History (or tradition) that long postdates ratification does not serve that function. To be sure, postenactment history can be an important tool. For example, it can “reinforce our understanding of the Constitution’s original meaning”; “liquidate ambiguous constitutional provisions”; provide persuasive evidence of the original meaning; and, if stare decisis applies, control the outcome. See Vidal v. Elster, 602 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2024) (BARRETT, J., concurring in part) (slip op., at 13–14). But generally speaking, the use of postenactment history requires some justification other than originalism simpliciter.

In Bruen, the Court took history beyond the founding era, considering gun regulations that spanned the 19th century. 597 U. S., at 50–70. I expressed reservations about the scope of that inquiry but concluded that the timing question did not matter to Bruen’s holding. Id., at 81–83 (concurring opinion). It bears emphasis, however, that my questions were about the time period relevant to discerning the Second Amendment’s original meaning—for instance, what is the post-1791 cutoff for discerning how the Second Amendment was originally understood? Id., at 82 (“How long after ratification may subsequent practice illuminate original public meaning?”). My doubts were not about whether “tradition,” standing alone, is dispositive. Id., at 83 (“[T]oday’s decision should not be understood to endorse freewheeling reliance on historical practice from the mid-to-late 19th century to establish the original meaning of the Bill of Rights”). As I have explained elsewhere, evidence of “tradition” unmoored from original meaning is not binding law. Vidal, 602 U. S., at ___–___ (BARRETT, J., concurring in part) (slip op., at 13–15). And scattered cases or regulations pulled from history may have little bearing on the meaning of the text. Samia v. United States, 599 U. S. 635, 656–657 (2023) (BARRETT, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).

“Original history”—i.e., the generally dispositive kind— plays two roles in the Second Amendment context. It elucidates how contemporaries understood the text—for example, the meaning of the phrase “bear Arms.” See Heller, 554 U. S., at 582–592. It also plays the more complicated role of determining the scope of the pre-existing right that the people enshrined in our fundamental law.* In Rahimi’s case, the Court uses history in this latter way. Call this “original contours” history: It looks at historical gun regulations to identify the contours of the right.

Courts have struggled with this use of history in the wake of Bruen. One difficulty is a level of generality problem: Must the government produce a founding-era relative of the challenged regulation—if not a twin, a cousin? Or do founding-era gun regulations yield concrete principles that mark the borders of the right?

Many courts, including the Fifth Circuit, have understood Bruen to require the former, narrower approach. But Bruen emphasized that “analogical reasoning” is not a “regulatory straightjacket.” 597 U. S., at 30. To be consistent with historical limits, a challenged regulation need not be an updated model of a historical counterpart. Besides, imposing a test that demands overly specific analogues has serious problems. To name two: It forces 21st-century regulations to follow late-18th-century policy choices, giving us “a law trapped in amber.” Ante, at 7. And it assumes that founding-era legislatures maximally exercised their power to regulate, thereby adopting a “use it or lose it” view of legislative authority. Such assumptions are flawed, and originalism does not require them.

“Analogical reasoning” under Bruen demands a wider lens: Historical regulations reveal a principle, not a mold. See, e.g., 597 U. S., at 28–29 (explaining that the Amendment does not apply only to the catalogue of arms that existed in the 18th century, but rather to all weapons satisfying the “general definition” of “bearable arms” (emphasis added)); id., at 30–31 (discussing the “‘sensitive places’” principle that limits the right to public carry); cf. Vidal, 602 U. S., at ___–___ (BARRETT, J., concurring in part) (slip op., at 7–9); Whittington 386 (“The insight to be gleaned is not the authoritative status of the expected application, but the apparent rule at play given that such an application is expected to follow from it”).

To be sure, a court must be careful not to read a principle at such a high level of generality that it waters down the right. Pulling principle from precedent, whether case law or history, is a standard feature of legal reasoning, and reasonable minds sometimes disagree about how broad or narrow the controlling principle should be. Here, though, the Court settles on just the right level of generality: “Since the founding, our Nation’s firearm laws have included provisions preventing individuals who threaten physical harm to others from misusing firearms.” Ante, at 5; see also Kanter v. Barr, 919 F. 3d 437, 451, 464– 465 (CA7 2019) (Barrett, J., dissenting) (“History is consistent with common sense: it demonstrates that legislatures have the power to prohibit dangerous people from possessing guns”). Section 922(g)(8)(C)(i) fits well within that principle; therefore, Rahimi’s facial challenge fails. Harder level-of-generality problems can await another day."
Back up the legal bus counselor. I thought Barrett was one of the bad justices? Your not implying here that she used judicial prudence are you? I'm guessing the even the blind squirrel finds an acorn now and again rule comes into play.
I posted Barrett's concurring opinion because it's interesting -- not because I agree with her on most things -- and a big issue with her, one on which she has invested a lot of time and thinking.

Again, here she says: “Analogical reasoning” under Bruen demands a wider lens: Historical regulations reveal a principle, not a mold." She seems to me to be pulling the reins on the new regime's buggy (or Thomas's plush motorhome). If you read the concurrences of Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, and compare them with Thomas's dissent, it is pretty interesting. Seems to me that a lot of the gun regulation/gun rights issues are still to be hashed out.
Your probably correct. The issue I understand about bump stocks is they are an accessory and have nothing to do how the weapon was manufactured. A guy was just arrested where I live who was making this plastic adapter that allows full auto on many types of hand guns. He did so on a 3 D printer and sold hundreds of them before what he was doing was discovered. A brief blurb on last nights news says the ATF is still trying to figure out what to charge him with. The question I have is how many other people are using 3D printing technology in this same manner? It does create a problem that needs to be addressed. I sure as heck don't want a bunch of chuckle heads with hand guns that can fire full auto.
I use to be a people person until people ruined that for me.
Seacoaster(1)
Posts: 4749
Joined: Tue Mar 29, 2022 6:49 am

Re: Sensible Gun Safety

Post by Seacoaster(1) »

cradleandshoot wrote: Sat Jun 22, 2024 7:08 am
Seacoaster(1) wrote: Sat Jun 22, 2024 6:50 am
cradleandshoot wrote: Fri Jun 21, 2024 3:21 pm
Seacoaster(1) wrote: Fri Jun 21, 2024 1:28 pm Barrett, concurring, seems to be messaging to Thomas that the simplistic Bruen analysis he advocates in his dissent is not satisfactory to her:

"Despite its unqualified text, the Second Amendment is not absolute. It codified a pre-existing right, and preexisting limits on that right are part and parcel of it. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, 595, 627 (2008). Those limits define the scope of “the right to bear arms” as it was originally understood; to identify them, courts must examine our “historical tradition of firearm regulation.” New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U. S. 1, 17, 19 (2022). That evidence marks where the right stops and the State’s authority to regulate begins. A regulation is constitutional only if the government affirmatively proves that it is “consistent with the Second Amendment’s text and historical understanding.” Id., at 26. Because the Court has taken an originalist approach to the Second Amendment, it is worth pausing to identify the basic premises of originalism. The theory is built on two core principles: that the meaning of constitutional text is fixed at the time of its ratification and that the “discoverable historical meaning . . . has legal significance and is authoritative in most circumstances.” K. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82 Ford. L. Rev. 375, 378 (2013) (Whittington). Ratification is a democratic act that renders constitutional text part of our fundamental law, see Arts. V, VII, and that text “remains law until law-fully altered,” S. Sachs, Originalism: Standard and Procedure, 135 Harv. L. Rev. 777, 782 (2022). So for an originalist, the history that matters most is the history surrounding the ratification of the text; that backdrop illuminates the meaning of the enacted law. History (or tradition) that long postdates ratification does not serve that function. To be sure, postenactment history can be an important tool. For example, it can “reinforce our understanding of the Constitution’s original meaning”; “liquidate ambiguous constitutional provisions”; provide persuasive evidence of the original meaning; and, if stare decisis applies, control the outcome. See Vidal v. Elster, 602 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2024) (BARRETT, J., concurring in part) (slip op., at 13–14). But generally speaking, the use of postenactment history requires some justification other than originalism simpliciter.

In Bruen, the Court took history beyond the founding era, considering gun regulations that spanned the 19th century. 597 U. S., at 50–70. I expressed reservations about the scope of that inquiry but concluded that the timing question did not matter to Bruen’s holding. Id., at 81–83 (concurring opinion). It bears emphasis, however, that my questions were about the time period relevant to discerning the Second Amendment’s original meaning—for instance, what is the post-1791 cutoff for discerning how the Second Amendment was originally understood? Id., at 82 (“How long after ratification may subsequent practice illuminate original public meaning?”). My doubts were not about whether “tradition,” standing alone, is dispositive. Id., at 83 (“[T]oday’s decision should not be understood to endorse freewheeling reliance on historical practice from the mid-to-late 19th century to establish the original meaning of the Bill of Rights”). As I have explained elsewhere, evidence of “tradition” unmoored from original meaning is not binding law. Vidal, 602 U. S., at ___–___ (BARRETT, J., concurring in part) (slip op., at 13–15). And scattered cases or regulations pulled from history may have little bearing on the meaning of the text. Samia v. United States, 599 U. S. 635, 656–657 (2023) (BARRETT, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).

“Original history”—i.e., the generally dispositive kind— plays two roles in the Second Amendment context. It elucidates how contemporaries understood the text—for example, the meaning of the phrase “bear Arms.” See Heller, 554 U. S., at 582–592. It also plays the more complicated role of determining the scope of the pre-existing right that the people enshrined in our fundamental law.* In Rahimi’s case, the Court uses history in this latter way. Call this “original contours” history: It looks at historical gun regulations to identify the contours of the right.

Courts have struggled with this use of history in the wake of Bruen. One difficulty is a level of generality problem: Must the government produce a founding-era relative of the challenged regulation—if not a twin, a cousin? Or do founding-era gun regulations yield concrete principles that mark the borders of the right?

Many courts, including the Fifth Circuit, have understood Bruen to require the former, narrower approach. But Bruen emphasized that “analogical reasoning” is not a “regulatory straightjacket.” 597 U. S., at 30. To be consistent with historical limits, a challenged regulation need not be an updated model of a historical counterpart. Besides, imposing a test that demands overly specific analogues has serious problems. To name two: It forces 21st-century regulations to follow late-18th-century policy choices, giving us “a law trapped in amber.” Ante, at 7. And it assumes that founding-era legislatures maximally exercised their power to regulate, thereby adopting a “use it or lose it” view of legislative authority. Such assumptions are flawed, and originalism does not require them.

“Analogical reasoning” under Bruen demands a wider lens: Historical regulations reveal a principle, not a mold. See, e.g., 597 U. S., at 28–29 (explaining that the Amendment does not apply only to the catalogue of arms that existed in the 18th century, but rather to all weapons satisfying the “general definition” of “bearable arms” (emphasis added)); id., at 30–31 (discussing the “‘sensitive places’” principle that limits the right to public carry); cf. Vidal, 602 U. S., at ___–___ (BARRETT, J., concurring in part) (slip op., at 7–9); Whittington 386 (“The insight to be gleaned is not the authoritative status of the expected application, but the apparent rule at play given that such an application is expected to follow from it”).

To be sure, a court must be careful not to read a principle at such a high level of generality that it waters down the right. Pulling principle from precedent, whether case law or history, is a standard feature of legal reasoning, and reasonable minds sometimes disagree about how broad or narrow the controlling principle should be. Here, though, the Court settles on just the right level of generality: “Since the founding, our Nation’s firearm laws have included provisions preventing individuals who threaten physical harm to others from misusing firearms.” Ante, at 5; see also Kanter v. Barr, 919 F. 3d 437, 451, 464– 465 (CA7 2019) (Barrett, J., dissenting) (“History is consistent with common sense: it demonstrates that legislatures have the power to prohibit dangerous people from possessing guns”). Section 922(g)(8)(C)(i) fits well within that principle; therefore, Rahimi’s facial challenge fails. Harder level-of-generality problems can await another day."
Back up the legal bus counselor. I thought Barrett was one of the bad justices? Your not implying here that she used judicial prudence are you? I'm guessing the even the blind squirrel finds an acorn now and again rule comes into play.
I posted Barrett's concurring opinion because it's interesting -- not because I agree with her on most things -- and a big issue with her, one on which she has invested a lot of time and thinking.

Again, here she says: “Analogical reasoning” under Bruen demands a wider lens: Historical regulations reveal a principle, not a mold." She seems to me to be pulling the reins on the new regime's buggy (or Thomas's plush motorhome). If you read the concurrences of Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, and compare them with Thomas's dissent, it is pretty interesting. Seems to me that a lot of the gun regulation/gun rights issues are still to be hashed out.
Your probably correct. The issue I understand about bump stocks is they are an accessory and have nothing to do how the weapon was manufactured. A guy was just arrested where I live who was making this plastic adapter that allows full auto on many types of hand guns. He did so on a 3 D printer and sold hundreds of them before what he was doing was discovered. A brief blurb on last nights news says the ATF is still trying to figure out what to charge him with. The question I have is how many other people are using 3D printing technology in this same manner? It does create a problem that needs to be addressed. I sure as heck don't want a bunch of chuckle heads with hand guns that can fire full auto.
I think that Barrett and others are putting down some paving stones for those sorts of (inevitable) cases. For example, she may be signaling that she is open to evaluating red flag laws in a way that doesn't merely ask, "Well, were these sorts of laws or some clear analogue around and understood in 1772?" Which is functionally Thomas's "analysis" in Bruen. Three-D printing and other homegrown technologies may be in the offing for review too.

Roberts's opinion for the Court notes this too: "For its part, the Fifth Circuit made two errors. First, like [Thomas], it read Bruen to require a “historical twin” rather than a “historical analogue.” I just think the Court is having an intellectual wrestling match in slow motion on these Second Amendment issues, and that is pretty interesting to me.
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