HooDat wrote: ↑Tue Oct 04, 2022 5:54 pm
Seacoaster(1) wrote: ↑Tue Oct 04, 2022 5:40 pm
HooDat wrote: ↑Tue Oct 04, 2022 5:16 pm
Typical Lax Dad wrote: ↑Fri Sep 30, 2022 6:48 pm
a fan wrote: ↑Fri Sep 30, 2022 6:41 pm
Kismet wrote: ↑Thu Sep 29, 2022 7:32 am
Tucker claims USA committed "terrorist act" and is responsible for sabotage of pipelines.
BLAME AMERICA FIRST
Neat. Just how do you get to be this big of a POS. And why aren't patriotic FoxViewers calling for Tucker's head?
It’s America’s fault.
curious who you guys think did blow up the pipeline?
Of course, no idea. Seems like it has to be a state actor, and the most likely culprit is the RU. I think the pipeline was the Czar's way of sending a message that he can wreak havoc with Western energy functionality. The Czar's immediate public blaming of the West seems on brand, and suggestive that Russian actors are likely responsible. Carlson's decision to blame the US is likewise suggestive that the Russians did this.
https://www.theguardian.com/business/20 ... ve-un-told
It makes no sense to me why Putin would throw away his only point of negotiating leverage. I just don't buy that he would misplay his hand that badly. He gains NOTHING by blowing up the pipeline. He already controlled the import end - the part where he doesn't put any gas in.... As soon as the pipes were destroyed, his ability to offer up life saving nat gas (in January when people are actually freezing to death) in exchange for European pressure for Ukrainian concessions was destroyed with it.
More:
https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/88062
"The attack may, however, have signaling value. If so, that does change the strategic landscape in the energy war. If perpetrated by Russia, the signaling value toward the West—which would certainly know Russia is behind the explosions—may be a threat to the rest of the marine energy infrastructure. Back in 2021, Putin told a gathering of military leaders: " If our Western colleagues continue the obviously aggressive stance, we will take appropriate retaliatory military-technical measures and react harshly to unfriendly steps. I want to emphasize that we have every right to do so." Was the Nord Stream attack a hint that similar mishaps might happen to some or all of the seven major pipelines delivering Norwegian gas to the UK and continental Europe? The explosions coincided with the inauguration of the Baltic Pipe taking Norwegian gas to Poland, so this is hardly an academic hypothesis.
One irony of the attack is that Russia’s Gazprom potentially stands to benefit: it will no longer need to invent excuses not to supply Europe via Nord Stream 1. Now it can claim a force majeure, which will dramatically reduce the risk of compensation claims for non-delivered volumes. This logic, however, does not explain the damage caused to Nord Stream 2. On the other hand, the Nord Stream consortium companies and eventually Gazprom might even hope to collect some insurance for the damaged pipelines. Given that they already looked set to become a stranded asset, that would be far from the worst outcome for the giant company.
The elimination of Nord Stream’s gas supply capacity from the European energy equation also strengthens the Ukrainian hand. Ukraine’s fear ever since 2014 has been that if forced to choose between Russian gas and support for Ukraine, Europe might choose the former and abandon Ukraine, and as long as non-Ukrainian supply routes existed, Ukraine would not be able to stop Russia from supplying Europe. This was one of the reasons why Ukraine opposed the construction of Nord Stream 2.
The explosions have removed some optionality and thus changed the state of the board for some players. Russia has lost the opportunity to offer an easy restoration of gas supplies to Europe in exchange for concessions from the West. For the Europeans, there is no longer the risk that binding contracts to buy more expensive gas will become loss-making if Russia suddenly floods the market with cheap gas following some sort of de-escalation.
In theory, Russia still has the physical capacity to increase gas supplies to Europe. It could accomplish that by relying on another non-commissioned line of Nord Stream 2 that was spared the explosion (though there are reports that this last line might also have been damaged after all), or the Yamal-Europe pipeline. Together they have a capacity of 60 billion cubic meters per annum, or 40 percent of the pre-war supply volumes. However, with the Yamal-Europe pipeline controlled by Poland, a resolute ally of Ukraine, and Nord Stream 2 having yet to be launched, pulling any of this off would be a lot more difficult than simply switching back on the turbines on Nord Stream 1."