All Things Russia & Ukraine

[old salt]

As the wave of propaganda to transfer Poland's Migs continues to build, some valid questions need to be answered --

-- how many Ukrainian Mig 29's & SU-27's remain ?
-- how many have been destroyed ? In the air ? On the ground ?
-- how many Mig experienced pilots remain ?
-- are there bases where they won't be sitting ducks to cruise misslie's or air strikes ?
-- does Ukraine have the mechs, spare parts & weapons to effectively employ them ?

Has anyone seen reporting which answers any of these questions ? I saw one photo of 2 Migs damaged on the ground & 1 SU-27 diverting to Romania.

https://breakingdefense.com/2022/03/log ... hter-swap/

It can both be true that Poland has not decided at this time to send Ukraine fighters and that the US is in talks with Poland about a contingency option in case Warsaw does make that move.

It is also possible that sending fighter aircraft — let alone the idea of using NATO bases to launch missions — will likely be seen as a more provocative action in Russia than shipping the kind of lower-level equipment to Ukraine that the NATO nations have already provided. According to onet.pl, citing in anonymity high-rank Polish officer, Warsaw already has sent to Ukraine 100 Vympel R-73 (AA-11 Archer) short-range air-to-air missiles, while NATO members have shipped Stingers and Javelin weapons to Ukraine’s desperate defense.

However, the original Feb. 27 rumors may have simply never been realistic at face value. According to official sources, the Bulgarian Air Force has 15 MiG-29A and 3 MiG-29UB jets on hand, but only a few Fulcrums are airworthy and the remaining jets can be used as a spare parts source — at best. Of their 16 Su-25 Frogfoots, only half (6 Su-25K and a pair of Su-25UBK) are operational. The Slovak Air Force, meanwhile, has only 6 MiG-29AS and a sole MiG-29UBS on duty, less than the rumor suggested they could ship to Ukraine.

Of the three, Poland does seem the most capable of gifting planes to Ukraine. In the Polish Air Force inventory there are 22 MiG-29A and 6 MiG-29UB. Half of them were equipped with modern avionics and were refurbished and overhauled in 2013-2014 with service life of their airframe extended to 40 years or 4,000 flight hours and the addition of IFF Mark XIIA mod 5 systems. Last year, Poland announced its spare parts supply is sufficient to operate those MiG-29s for a further three to four years.

But while that all seems plausible on paper, there are very real logistics questions which would need to be addressed. First, it seems likely Poland would want to strip classified modern equipment off the jets before handing them over, especially given the risk of the fighters being captured by Russia. How quickly that could be done — and how plausible it is that the planes would be able to operate with those capabilities stripped out — is unknown.

Then there is the question of transport. Direct flights from Bulgaria, Poland or Slovakia to Ukraine would be the easiest and fastest way, but come with a high risk of being shot by Russians, especially if they know such a deal is in the works. Transport by land would require disassembling aircraft and then re-assembling and performing flight checks after delivery to the destination, both time-consuming and risky. And any convoy of trucks carrying aircraft is a sitting duck for enemy aviation.

And who will operate them? Just how many Ukrainian fighter pilots are available at this point is unclear, let alone where they are located and how many of them are trained up on the MiG-29s. Plus the requisite support staff would be needed. In theory, there may be foreign pilots who are willing to travel to Ukraine and fly these jets on behalf of the Ukrainian forces, but is it enough to make a difference?

Time is the final factor. Realistic assessments of how quickly an agreement could be made, how quickly those planes could be transferred to a new location and how quickly they could get into the air will have to be taken into account. If the answer is months, it simply may not make sense for Poland to invite the potential escalation of sending these jets to Ukraine when, despite the success the Ukrainians have had at resisting Russia so far, Moscow still seems militarily dominant in the long run.

A agreement may well be reached, especially if the US is willing to quickly move to backfill Poland’s air force with newer capabilities. But before any deal is done, expect the above factors to be weighed heavily in Warsaw, Washington and Brussels.

[DocBarrister]

The ruble has lost 90% of its value to the dollar since the conflict began.

We're paying more for gasoline.
If the dollar had had the same plunge that the ruble has had, we'd be paying $30-50 a gallon for gas right now.

But world markets see the US economy as very, very strong.
Russia very, very weak.

But our trolls on here think we should give up and let Putin have Russia under his thumb, commit whatever atrocities he wishes as a Stalin wannabe.

After all "white Christian values"...

Not certain who you’re referring to but it’s not me. I actually think the one way to get rid of Putin is to bog him down in Ukraine. My read is these Ukrainians just might beat the Russians.

I was off when I thought we should immediately go for a cease fire. Mea culpa. I thought the Ukrainians needed time to regroup. Like many, the Ukrainians have surprised me. I’d get them all the SAM’s, Javelins, UCAV’s, and basic equipment I could. Discreetly. I’d also quietly pay some Tatars to go mess up the Russian equipment in Crimea.

This could be the end of Putin if the West does their side effectively. Just don’t give Putin an excuse to launch the nukes.

I had relatives who owned a clothing store in North Philadelphia in the 1980s. They had some Ukrainian American customers and did business with some Ukrainian wholesalers in NYC. There’s no precise translation from Korean to English, but they used a term that roughly translates to “tough” in describing the Ukrainians and the basic message was simple:

“Don’t ever f*ck with the Ukrainians.”

DocBarrister

[Brooklyn]

My numbers are fine. I was talking pre-Covid, which is the reasonable metric.

Covid hasn't gone away. This makes Biden's numbers look even better.

[Peter Brown]

The ruble has lost 90% of its value to the dollar since the conflict began.

We're paying more for gasoline.
If the dollar had had the same plunge that the ruble has had, we'd be paying $30-50 a gallon for gas right now.

But world markets see the US economy as very, very strong.
Russia very, very weak.

But our trolls on here think we should give up and let Putin have Russia under his thumb, commit whatever atrocities he wishes as a Stalin wannabe.

After all "white Christian values"...

Not certain who you’re referring to but it’s not me. I actually think the one way to get rid of Putin is to bog him down in Ukraine. My read is these Ukrainians just might beat the Russians.

I was off when I thought we should immediately go for a cease fire. Mea culpa. I thought the Ukrainians needed time to regroup. Like many, the Ukrainians have surprised me. I’d get them all the SAM’s, Javelins, UCAV’s, and basic equipment I could. Discreetly. I’d also quietly pay some Tatars to go mess up the Russian equipment in Crimea.

This could be the end of Putin if the West does their side effectively. Just don’t give Putin an excuse to launch the nukes.

Sigh.

“The end of Putin” is the best reason he would possibly have to launch nukes.

Things tend to be dynamic in situations like an autocratic leader being deposed by his military. Someone on his staff just might fire a bullet in his head. You never know.

Also….One thing I have generally relied on for years is, our military likely has a bette relationship with their military than what you’re giving anyone credit for. And launching nukes isn’t as easy as flipping a switch. Multiple layers of protocol.

[Peter Brown]

My numbers are fine. I was talking pre-Covid, which is the reasonable metric.

Covid hasn't gone away. This makes Biden's numbers look even better.

You’ll defend the guy even after he loses 300+ seats in the House, which is about to happen this November.

Don’t worry man, the good news tonight is no one is gonna go on vacation this summer. The bad news for Joe, gas prices just hit an all time high…

https://www.gasbuddy.com/newsroom/pressrelease/1104

[seacoaster]

https://mobile.twitter.com/muellershewr ... 69540?s=10

[Brooklyn]

You’ll defend the guy even after he loses 300+ seats in the House, which is about to happen this November.

Don’t worry man, the good news tonight is no one is gonna go on vacation this summer. The bad news for Joe, gas prices just hit an all time high…

https://www.gasbuddy.com/newsroom/pressrelease/1104

As shown previously those gas prices were going up under your hero tRump. Back then you right wingers vigorously defended him on the grounds that the market, not the president, is responsible for those increases. Not surprisingly your outlook changed with election that brought in Biden. Same with the deficit.

But not with the employment numbers. In his time you happily said tRump was responsible for the job increases (but not for any such losses). Today you pretend Biden is not responsible for job increases. You can bet, however, that if those number go down, he will get blamed by your right wing delusionals.

[MDlaxfan76]

After all "white Christian values"...

Afghan & Haitian refugees are envious.

Fair argument. Glad to see you concerned about refugees who aren't white, Christian...

I thought the Ukrainian woman calling Putin the Antichrist and calling out those who've been wanting the Antichrist to appear was priceless.

https://www.cnbc.com/video/2022/03/07/p ... woman.html

Putin's been claiming that Russia is fighting for white, Christian values and that was eaten up for years by our own hard right "white christian" nutcases.

[MDlaxfan76]

My numbers are fine. I was talking pre-Covid, which is the reasonable metric.

Covid hasn't gone away. This makes Biden's numbers look even better.

You’ll defend the guy even after he loses 300+ seats in the House, which is about to happen this November.

Don’t worry man, the good news tonight is no one is gonna go on vacation this summer. The bad news for Joe, gas prices just hit an all time high…

https://www.gasbuddy.com/newsroom/pressrelease/1104

Is this really the place for this partisan crappola?

Heck of a prediction, Petey...let us know when you actually have one come true.

Here's a prediction, you ain't seen nuthin' yet on gas prices, but come 2 years from now, they'll be under $3.25 a gallon.

[MDlaxfan76]

The ruble has lost 90% of its value to the dollar since the conflict began.

We're paying more for gasoline.
If the dollar had had the same plunge that the ruble has had, we'd be paying $30-50 a gallon for gas right now.

But world markets see the US economy as very, very strong.
Russia very, very weak.

But our trolls on here think we should give up and let Putin have Russia under his thumb, commit whatever atrocities he wishes as a Stalin wannabe.

After all "white Christian values"...

Not certain who you’re referring to but it’s not me. I actually think the one way to get rid of Putin is to bog him down in Ukraine. My read is these Ukrainians just might beat the Russians.

I was off when I thought we should immediately go for a cease fire. Mea culpa. I thought the Ukrainians needed time to regroup. Like many, the Ukrainians have surprised me. I’d get them all the SAM’s, Javelins, UCAV’s, and basic equipment I could. Discreetly. I’d also quietly pay some Tatars to go mess up the Russian equipment in Crimea.

This could be the end of Putin if the West does their side effectively. Just don’t give Putin an excuse to launch the nukes.

Sigh.

“The end of Putin” is the best reason he would possibly have to launch nukes.

Things tend to be dynamic in situations like an autocratic leader being deposed by his military. Someone on his staff just might fire a bullet in his head. You never know.

Also….One thing I have generally relied on for years is, our military likely has a bette relationship with their military than what you’re giving anyone credit for. And launching nukes isn’t as easy as flipping a switch. Multiple layers of protocol.

Split personalities talking to one another...don't get confused...

[MDlaxfan76]

As the wave of propaganda to transfer Poland's Migs continues to build, some valid questions need to be answered --

-- how many Ukrainian Mig 29's & SU-27's remain ?
-- how many have been destroyed ? In the air ? On the ground ?
-- how many Mig experienced pilots remain ?
-- are there bases where they won't be sitting ducks to cruise misslie's or air strikes ?
-- does Ukraine have the mechs, spare parts & weapons to effectively employ them ?

Has anyone seen reporting which answers any of these questions ? I saw one photo of 2 Migs damaged on the ground & 1 SU-27 diverting to Romania.

https://breakingdefense.com/2022/03/log ... hter-swap/

It can both be true that Poland has not decided at this time to send Ukraine fighters and that the US is in talks with Poland about a contingency option in case Warsaw does make that move.

It is also possible that sending fighter aircraft — let alone the idea of using NATO bases to launch missions — will likely be seen as a more provocative action in Russia than shipping the kind of lower-level equipment to Ukraine that the NATO nations have already provided. According to onet.pl, citing in anonymity high-rank Polish officer, Warsaw already has sent to Ukraine 100 Vympel R-73 (AA-11 Archer) short-range air-to-air missiles, while NATO members have shipped Stingers and Javelin weapons to Ukraine’s desperate defense.

However, the original Feb. 27 rumors may have simply never been realistic at face value. According to official sources, the Bulgarian Air Force has 15 MiG-29A and 3 MiG-29UB jets on hand, but only a few Fulcrums are airworthy and the remaining jets can be used as a spare parts source — at best. Of their 16 Su-25 Frogfoots, only half (6 Su-25K and a pair of Su-25UBK) are operational. The Slovak Air Force, meanwhile, has only 6 MiG-29AS and a sole MiG-29UBS on duty, less than the rumor suggested they could ship to Ukraine.

Of the three, Poland does seem the most capable of gifting planes to Ukraine. In the Polish Air Force inventory there are 22 MiG-29A and 6 MiG-29UB. Half of them were equipped with modern avionics and were refurbished and overhauled in 2013-2014 with service life of their airframe extended to 40 years or 4,000 flight hours and the addition of IFF Mark XIIA mod 5 systems. Last year, Poland announced its spare parts supply is sufficient to operate those MiG-29s for a further three to four years.

But while that all seems plausible on paper, there are very real logistics questions which would need to be addressed. First, it seems likely Poland would want to strip classified modern equipment off the jets before handing them over, especially given the risk of the fighters being captured by Russia. How quickly that could be done — and how plausible it is that the planes would be able to operate with those capabilities stripped out — is unknown.

Then there is the question of transport. Direct flights from Bulgaria, Poland or Slovakia to Ukraine would be the easiest and fastest way, but come with a high risk of being shot by Russians, especially if they know such a deal is in the works. Transport by land would require disassembling aircraft and then re-assembling and performing flight checks after delivery to the destination, both time-consuming and risky. And any convoy of trucks carrying aircraft is a sitting duck for enemy aviation.

And who will operate them? Just how many Ukrainian fighter pilots are available at this point is unclear, let alone where they are located and how many of them are trained up on the MiG-29s. Plus the requisite support staff would be needed. In theory, there may be foreign pilots who are willing to travel to Ukraine and fly these jets on behalf of the Ukrainian forces, but is it enough to make a difference?

Time is the final factor. Realistic assessments of how quickly an agreement could be made, how quickly those planes could be transferred to a new location and how quickly they could get into the air will have to be taken into account. If the answer is months, it simply may not make sense for Poland to invite the potential escalation of sending these jets to Ukraine when, despite the success the Ukrainians have had at resisting Russia so far, Moscow still seems militarily dominant in the long run.

A agreement may well be reached, especially if the US is willing to quickly move to backfill Poland’s air force with newer capabilities. But before any deal is done, expect the above factors to be weighed heavily in Warsaw, Washington and Brussels.

"wave of propaganda"??? propaganda?

Clearly they are negotiating to get this done. But of course the Poles are anxious as all get out about being ill equipped for retaliation from Russia. Yes, gotta make sure they are fully reassured on that...should be doable.

Move some of our air capabilities to bases there, train the Poles for better aircraft as eventual replacements and do a lend-lease to get it done.

[old salt]

https://chicagoboyz.net/archives/67331.html

Day Eight of the Russian Column Held Hostage (by the usual Russian incompetence)
March 5, 2022 by Trent Telenko

Welcome to the third installment of the Russian invasion of Ukraine series. Since Napoleon stated that the moral is to the physical what ten is to one.

I have posted on twitter about the Russian Army columns North of Kyiv decaying into immobile blobs due to the Rasputitsa, poorly maintained Chinese truck tires and shear “follow the plan” Russian incompetence.

The head and first dozen or so kilometers of the southernmost column north of Kiev have been stuck there for EIGHT DAYS. The Russians have since rammed more and more vehicles into this monster traffic jam (idiotically “following the plan” Soviet-style) so the whole thing is now 65-70 kilometers long (almost 40 miles).

And, because the trucks can’t go off-road due to the Rasputitsa mud and tire problems, they’re stuck on the roads and the roads’ shoulders three vehicles wide for the whole @40 miles. That means fuel and resupply trucks can’t move on or off road to deliver anything to anybody.

So all the columns’ heads are now out of fuel and battery power. They can’t move north, south or sideways, and everything behind them is stuck because of the mud, and rapidly running out of fuel and vehicle battery charge too (assuming they haven’t already). Nor can any of those columns defend themselves because they’re too densely packed. They’re just targets waiting for the Ukrainians to destroy them.

Only the Ukrainians had something better to do. They opened the floodgates of reservoirs around those columns to flood them and turn the surrounding areas into impassable quagmires for months – probably until July or August. (See photo below) Probably several thousand Russian vehicles in those columns will be irrecoverable losses. Hundreds of Russian soldiers might have drowned.

This was not just a debacle, but an EPIC one. About 1/5th of the Russian force in Ukraine is now flooded or trapped, and are definitely out of the war for good.

To start with, the Russian Army’s logistics are just hosed. The Ukrainians destroyed or still have possession of (in their cities) all the Russian/Ukrainian railheads, save for Kherson and Berdyansk, since the first day of the war. So Russian rail logistics are not possible into Ukraine without either/both a major battlefield success and a major rail engineering effort the Russians did not think was necessary.

The Ukrainians have been slamming every fuel truck they can find with every method available to them, which is big trouble for the Russians as they didn’t have many of those to begin with, and brought only the ammunition & food for a three-day operation.

The Russians have ditched their original 3-day “special operation” plan and have definitely shifted to “set-piece” battles requiring significant preparation, as those are better suited to their poorly trained troops.

The weak link is in doing that is the Russians plain lack the force density in the Ukraine to defend their rear areas, and in particular the bridges over the Ukraine’s many rivers and streams.

The Russian inability to suppress Ukrainian’s integrated air defense system stems in part due to the pathetically poor planning of missile launches which have mostly expended their pre-war inventory of Iskander & Kaliber Ground/Sea/Air launched cruise missiles plus the 500km ranged Iskander ballistic missiles for limited results.

It is also due to the (unknowable before combat) collapse of Russian emitter locating systems for hunting SAMs, intensely used by the Soviets, and Support Jamming capability, also heavily used by the Soviets.

And finally, the tenth day of combat has been showing the vast under-performance of radar threat warning receivers, defensive jammers and infrared missile warning systems on the latest Russian jets. All these deficiencies were visible before this campaign (since 2015) but their severity was difficult to assess before combat operations started over Ukraine.

Planning for RuAF suppression of air Ukrainian defense was keyed to human agents with cell phones and visual/radio beacons to locate UAF mobile SAM batteries pre-war for attack. A few batteries were hit but most seem to have survived. Ukrainian ground forces know of this trick now and it will not be repeated.

The slowness with which the Russian Air Force (RuAF) are showing in deconflicting their aircraft and their mobile integrated air defense system, after losing by capture several intact (with their codes and IFF) Pantsir-S1 and Tor short range missile complexes means the Russians lack air reconnaissance coverage of their rear areas in the Ukraine west of the Dnieper.

This means the Ukrainians can slip company-sized mobile raiding forces into the Russians’ rear areas and take out the bridges required to supply the Russian set-piece attacks being prepared. And they are doing so.

This doesn’t stop Russian set-piece attacks, but it increases their preparation time and, in particular, upsets their timing so the set-piece attacks cannot be coordinated for mutual support. Each will be a one-off.

I.e., the Russian advance has been slowed down in a major way. This buys the Ukrainians time to do other things to defeat the Russians. The most important thing the Ukrainians need is time. They have to take it from the Russians with ground operations & airstrikes.

For various reasons, I have the distinct impression that the Russians are now operating on a three-day decision-reaction cycle. If a major attack being planned is suddenly down to one key bridge connecting its assembly area to supply bases in Russia. It takes three days for the Russians to send a ground combat battalion to defend that bridge.

That is more than enough time for the Ukrainians to move one of their raiding companies there to destroy the bridge. I.e., the Ukrainians are clearly operating inside the Russians’ Observe, Orient, Decide, Act [OODA loop] a la USAF air strategist John Boyd. [More on this when I get to the counter factuals.]

The RuAF simply no longer has, for whatever reason, the air superiority it needed and had to stop Ukrainian mobile forces from counter attacking in the 1st three days of the war.

There seem to be no rear area security forces behind lead Russian columns anywhere save close to Crimea in the south. But even there the lead Russian columns heading for Odessa just got annihilated in a kettle battle. Mykolaiv was reported cleared of remaining Russian troops, with a large haul of captured Russian equipment trophied at Kubalkino AB near the city.

Elsewhere in the Russian occupied Kherson and Berdyansk cities, we saw major public protests with flags and Ukrainian anthem being sung, ruining Russian planned propaganda spectacles. The sieges of Mariupol and Volnovakha continue with Russians violating agreed ceasefires by moving ammo in ambulances.

Intensive combat was reported both NE and NW of Kyiv as the forces going around the two Russian armored column “Schwerpunkts” attempt breakthroughs, with engagements reported at Irpen as ongoing, and a defeat of the Russians in Chernihiv to the NE.

An attempted Eastern thrust from occupied Luhansk to envelop Kharkiv was reported to have failed today.

The 2nd Russian strategic echelon and the Belarusian Army cannot come from the north and Russia doesn’t have either rails or the truck park in the west or south to sustain anything trying to reach the out-of-supply forward columns because Ukraine owns the skies west of the Dnieper.

We are in an attrition phase, the outcome is still in doubt, and Russia still has an eight times bigger army.

Examining the Counterfactuals

I am seeing a number of people I formally trusted as military experts go sideways, hard, in Ukraine.

Bluntly, these “Experts” simply cannot get their group mind around the implications of the rotted tires of the Russian army’s truck fleet nor the fact that the Russians only control the ground they are actually standing on. These facts are utterly decisive for mechanized combat in Ukraine.

The key thing about the Russian truck fleet’s ill-maintained Chinese manufactured tires is they are not on Ukrainian trucks.

Short form counterfactual: Ukrainian logistics have superior mobility during the Raputitsa (Mud Season) because their tires will not disintegrate in the mud!

This is a huge Ukrainian advantage in mechanized combat that stacks quite nicely with the second counterfactual.

When you look up the relevant data about how ground combat power degrades from casualties in places like Trevor N. Dupuy’s books “Numbers, Predictions, and War: Using History to Evaluate Combat Factors and Predict the Outcome of Battles”, you find that the vast majority of mechanized ground forces’ fighting power disappears with the vehicles and not the people.

Vehicles are combat power in mechanized war.

Those who suffer less vehicle force attrition than their enemy win battles, and win wars, despite being smaller.

There are safe rear areas for the Ukrainians in Ukraine while there none for the Russian.

The Ukrainians are only losing vehicles to combat and capture. Their operational losses are being repaired and returned to them.

Meanwhile all Russian operational losses wind up either permanent losses to Ukrainian Territorial “Road Burning Details” OR AS CAPTURED UKRAINIAN MECHANIZED POWER.

Ukraine is winning the war of mechanized ground vehicle attrition with Russia inside Ukraine.

And who the h–l would have thought that!

[old salt]

2017 propaganda precursor of what Putin would do & a map of what he might accept as an outcome.

https://www.geopolitica.ru/en/article/r ... ovorossiya

RUSSIA NEEDS NOVOROSSIYA
18.10.2017 Nicholas Nicholaides

Russia needs Novorossiya and Malorossiya - at least the part of Malorossiya that is east of the Dnepr river. These parts are not "ukrainian", they never were and they never will be! These parts are as genuinely russian as Moscow or St Peterburg but because of a historical mistake - the break-up of the Soviet Union in stead of the modernisation of it - these parts are now outside of mother Russia. That would not be a catastrophe if these lands were part of a democratic, pro-russian "Ukraine" or if they were a sovreign and pro-russian country like Belarus or Kazahstan. Then they would still be a part of the Russian World with very close ties to the Motherland. But now these lands are occupied by a nazi junta in Kiev, placed there by the USA after an armed coup against the legal governmment and president Yanukovich!

These russian lands are now filled with american, polish, baltic and other mercenaries and armed nazis that are repressing the russians and "anti-junta" ukrainians and killing anyone who openly protests! The worst part is that Russia has missed several legal opportunities to rectify this: just after the coup Russia had every right to re-instate the legal president and his government that were internationally recognized.

When the Kiev nazi junta started killing the people in Novorossiya and Donbass and after the Odessa massacre, again Russia had the right to intervene and stop the genocide.

And as long as the killings continue and the Kiev nazi junta does not fulfill the Minsk 2 agreement Russia still has the right to intervene and liberate all of Novorossiya from Charkov to Odessa and Malorossiya too. That way, by reaching Odessa, Russia would also save Transniestria which is another russian region that is besieged by the Kiev nazi junta and by Moldavia. Russia cannot afford to let these lands be forced into NATO and filled with american missiles aimed at Moscow and other russian cities! But this is what can happen if Russia does not act soon!

In stead of liberating Novorossiya, or helping the Army of Novorossiya to do the main part of the job, Russia has helped to save Syria. Now, that is of course good, but Russia should do in Novorossiya what she has done in Syria: help the majority of the people and the legal government to depose the terrorists - in this case the Kiev nazi junta! Fortunately the war in Syria has entered its final stages so we can hope to see a more active russian stance against the illegal regime in Kiev! This is not an "internal ukrainian problem" - it is a russian problem because the victims of the illegal Kiev nazi junta are ethnic russians and russian-speaking, anti-nazi ukrainians. Anyone that does not see this fact is either a fool or a traitor.

Anyway the "border" between Russia and former "Ukraine" has not been ratified by Russia after the break-up of the CCCP so in reality "Ukraine" does not have real established and ratified borders with Russia! This is a fact that should be used to either depose the Kiev nazi regime and make all of former "Ukraine" democratic, federated and pro-russian or to liberate the parts that are still not nazi-infected, that means Novorossiya and all lands east of the Dnepr river. When these lands are free from the nazis then there will be no american missiles there aiming at Moscow and no american navyships in Odessa harbor.

The future of Russia as an independent state and world leader in a multipolar world will be determined in Novorossiya.

The battle for Novorossiya (and eastern Malorossiya) will be determined in the Kreml. As soon as the russian leaders decide to liberate Novorossiya it will be so - and very much faster than the liberation of Syria. To detach the russian economy from the dollar, to start a russian bank-card, to replace SWIFT and to introduce a gold-based rouble (not gold-interexchangeable) are the first steps on this path - but they have to be followed by more steps, now!

[old salt]

As the wave of propaganda to transfer Poland's Migs continues to build, some valid questions need to be answered --

-- how many Ukrainian Mig 29's & SU-27's remain ?
-- how many have been destroyed ? In the air ? On the ground ?
-- how many Mig experienced pilots remain ?
-- are there bases where they won't be sitting ducks to cruise misslie's or air strikes ?
-- does Ukraine have the mechs, spare parts & weapons to effectively employ them ?

Has anyone seen reporting which answers any of these questions ? I saw one photo of 2 Migs damaged on the ground & 1 SU-27 diverting to Romania.

https://breakingdefense.com/2022/03/log ... hter-swap/

"wave of propaganda"??? propaganda?

Clearly they are negotiating to get this done. But of course the Poles are anxious as all get out about being ill equipped for retaliation from Russia. Yes, gotta make sure they are fully reassured on that...should be doable.

Move some of our air capabilities to bases there, train the Poles for better aircraft as eventual replacements and do a lend-lease to get it done.

Yes propaganda. Ukrainian's on tv & US politicians pandering to their Ukrainian diaspora are dominating the debate on this issue.
Serious questions by former military "experts" are downplayed or ignored, as are the reservations of other NATO govts.
Blinken's blackmailing our NATO allies on tv before a consensus for such an escalation is achieved.
Weasel words won't alter the fact that this IS an escalation & much more provocative than the "defensive" aid provided to date.
It's Poland's unilateral decision but if it prompts an intercept or counterattack on or over Poland, it's NATO article 5 time.
Is it worth that risk ? Will it affect the final outcome ? Is it a game changer or a feel good video clip ?
Quietly rolling in mobile Soviet export S-300 SAMs from former Warsaw Pact NATO members seems safer & more effective.

It's a Risk v Reward decision. You addressed neither & ignored my ?'s.

Risk -- how will Russia react? Will they escalate against NATO ?
Do we have adequate forces in place (yet) to deter or effectively defend a conventional escalation ?

Reward -- I repeat my ???'s about Ukraine's ability to operate more jets & their survivability ?
Can we expect more than one mission/plane, or even get them into Ukraine & airborne on missions ?

There has been no analytical public debate on Risk v Reward.
It's been all emotion, rah rah, simplistic & best case wishful thinking.
It would be great if it works or another debacle if it does not.

https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/20 ... r-ukraine/

White House, DoD lower expectations of Polish warplanes for Ukraine
Mar 7, 06:00 PM

WASHINGTON ― The White House and Pentagon on Monday downplayed the likelihood of a three-way deal for Poland to give MiG-29 aircraft to Ukraine and for the U.S. to backfill the Polish fleet with American F-16 fighters.

The cautious remarks from U.S. officials on Monday, with signals from Warsaw there would be no deal, are a blow to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenksky, who pleaded with U.S. lawmakers in a Zoom call Saturday for more military planes and support as his country fights a Russian invasion.

White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki told reporters Monday the administration is not opposing such a deal, but said there are significant logistical challenges.
“It is not as easy as just moving planes around,” Psaki said.

Pentagon spokesman John Kirby sought to temper expectations as well, telling reporters “we’re very early on in a discussion here about what the possibility could” and it’s “not a done deal at this point.” It’s unclear how many U.S. aircraft would be involved or how they would be transported, he said.
“It’s just a discussion about the possibility of should there be a nation that would want to give aircraft and would ask for a backfill from the United States,” Kirby said in describing the talks. “Should that happen, what would that look like, how would we do that? We don’t have all the answers right now.”

On Saturday, the Polish government labeled claims it had or will provide its MiGs to Ukraine as “fake news.” A Polish Armed Forces General Command tweet replied to one claim, saying, “All the Polish Air Force #MiG29 aircraft remain at their home bases.”
The chancellery of the Polish prime minister said in a tweet: “Poland won’t send its fighter jets to #Ukraine as well as allow [it] to use its airports. We significantly help in many other areas.”

No, EU countries aren’t sending fighter jets to Ukraine
"NATO is not to be part of the conflict,” Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said Tuesday.

Earlier in the day, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said the U.S. would give “the green light” to NATO countries if they choose to provide fighter jets to Ukraine. He noted talks with Poland were underway.

Multiple U.S. lawmakers have pressed the administration to facilitate the aircraft deal, with Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Robert Menendez, D-N.J., saying he would “support efforts in the Senate to implement measures to compensate our allies that provide their aircraft for Ukraine’s defense.
“I understand this is not an easy decision for these countries to make,” Menendez said in a statement. “Asking them to provide their own aircraft, especially as Russia’s military aggression edges closer to their own borders, would be unthinkable except in the direst circumstances. Unfortunately, that is the situation the world faces. Extraordinary times require extraordinary measures and sacrifices.”

Poland’s 94 combat-capable aircraft include 48 F-16 fighters it began to acquire from the U.S. in 2006 and 28 MiG-29s it acquired earlier that are decades older. How ready the Polish MiG-29s are at present could impact a potential deal, said aviation expert Richard Aboulafia, the managing director of AeroDynamic Advisory.

“Those are very old planes, and the Polish air force has been prioritizing F-16s for years,” Aboulafia said.

Beyond the question of whether Poland’s older MiG-29s need fixing, it could take time to strip sensitive NATO-linked electronics and avionics from them, if they’re to be transferred to Ukraine, said William Alberque, a former NATO arms control official now with the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

“You’re either taking a fighter they don’t need and doing an overhaul, which takes time and replacement of parts, or you’re taking a frontline aircraft that’s needed for different purposes,” Alberque said. “No Polish military or politician will want to say ‘We’re giving a bunch of planes to Ukraine and we’re a little less safe now,’ but if they can leverage it, I’d rather have a refurbished F-16 than a MiG-29 any day of the week.”

[CU88]

https://chicagoboyz.net/archives/67331.html

Day Eight of the Russian Column Held Hostage (by the usual Russian incompetence)
March 5, 2022 by Trent Telenko

Welcome to the third installment of the Russian invasion of Ukraine series. Since Napoleon stated that the moral is to the physical what ten is to one.

I have posted on twitter about the Russian Army columns North of Kyiv decaying into immobile blobs due to the Rasputitsa, poorly maintained Chinese truck tires and shear “follow the plan” Russian incompetence.

The head and first dozen or so kilometers of the southernmost column north of Kiev have been stuck there for EIGHT DAYS. The Russians have since rammed more and more vehicles into this monster traffic jam (idiotically “following the plan” Soviet-style) so the whole thing is now 65-70 kilometers long (almost 40 miles).

And, because the trucks can’t go off-road due to the Rasputitsa mud and tire problems, they’re stuck on the roads and the roads’ shoulders three vehicles wide for the whole @40 miles. That means fuel and resupply trucks can’t move on or off road to deliver anything to anybody.

So all the columns’ heads are now out of fuel and battery power. They can’t move north, south or sideways, and everything behind them is stuck because of the mud, and rapidly running out of fuel and vehicle battery charge too (assuming they haven’t already). Nor can any of those columns defend themselves because they’re too densely packed. They’re just targets waiting for the Ukrainians to destroy them.

Only the Ukrainians had something better to do. They opened the floodgates of reservoirs around those columns to flood them and turn the surrounding areas into impassable quagmires for months – probably until July or August. (See photo below) Probably several thousand Russian vehicles in those columns will be irrecoverable losses. Hundreds of Russian soldiers might have drowned.

This was not just a debacle, but an EPIC one. About 1/5th of the Russian force in Ukraine is now flooded or trapped, and are definitely out of the war for good.

To start with, the Russian Army’s logistics are just hosed. The Ukrainians destroyed or still have possession of (in their cities) all the Russian/Ukrainian railheads, save for Kherson and Berdyansk, since the first day of the war. So Russian rail logistics are not possible into Ukraine without either/both a major battlefield success and a major rail engineering effort the Russians did not think was necessary.

The Ukrainians have been slamming every fuel truck they can find with every method available to them, which is big trouble for the Russians as they didn’t have many of those to begin with, and brought only the ammunition & food for a three-day operation.

The Russians have ditched their original 3-day “special operation” plan and have definitely shifted to “set-piece” battles requiring significant preparation, as those are better suited to their poorly trained troops.

The weak link is in doing that is the Russians plain lack the force density in the Ukraine to defend their rear areas, and in particular the bridges over the Ukraine’s many rivers and streams.

The Russian inability to suppress Ukrainian’s integrated air defense system stems in part due to the pathetically poor planning of missile launches which have mostly expended their pre-war inventory of Iskander & Kaliber Ground/Sea/Air launched cruise missiles plus the 500km ranged Iskander ballistic missiles for limited results.

It is also due to the (unknowable before combat) collapse of Russian emitter locating systems for hunting SAMs, intensely used by the Soviets, and Support Jamming capability, also heavily used by the Soviets.

And finally, the tenth day of combat has been showing the vast under-performance of radar threat warning receivers, defensive jammers and infrared missile warning systems on the latest Russian jets. All these deficiencies were visible before this campaign (since 2015) but their severity was difficult to assess before combat operations started over Ukraine.

Planning for RuAF suppression of air Ukrainian defense was keyed to human agents with cell phones and visual/radio beacons to locate UAF mobile SAM batteries pre-war for attack. A few batteries were hit but most seem to have survived. Ukrainian ground forces know of this trick now and it will not be repeated.

The slowness with which the Russian Air Force (RuAF) are showing in deconflicting their aircraft and their mobile integrated air defense system, after losing by capture several intact (with their codes and IFF) Pantsir-S1 and Tor short range missile complexes means the Russians lack air reconnaissance coverage of their rear areas in the Ukraine west of the Dnieper.

This means the Ukrainians can slip company-sized mobile raiding forces into the Russians’ rear areas and take out the bridges required to supply the Russian set-piece attacks being prepared. And they are doing so.

This doesn’t stop Russian set-piece attacks, but it increases their preparation time and, in particular, upsets their timing so the set-piece attacks cannot be coordinated for mutual support. Each will be a one-off.

I.e., the Russian advance has been slowed down in a major way. This buys the Ukrainians time to do other things to defeat the Russians. The most important thing the Ukrainians need is time. They have to take it from the Russians with ground operations & airstrikes.

For various reasons, I have the distinct impression that the Russians are now operating on a three-day decision-reaction cycle. If a major attack being planned is suddenly down to one key bridge connecting its assembly area to supply bases in Russia. It takes three days for the Russians to send a ground combat battalion to defend that bridge.

That is more than enough time for the Ukrainians to move one of their raiding companies there to destroy the bridge. I.e., the Ukrainians are clearly operating inside the Russians’ Observe, Orient, Decide, Act [OODA loop] a la USAF air strategist John Boyd. [More on this when I get to the counter factuals.]

The RuAF simply no longer has, for whatever reason, the air superiority it needed and had to stop Ukrainian mobile forces from counter attacking in the 1st three days of the war.

There seem to be no rear area security forces behind lead Russian columns anywhere save close to Crimea in the south. But even there the lead Russian columns heading for Odessa just got annihilated in a kettle battle. Mykolaiv was reported cleared of remaining Russian troops, with a large haul of captured Russian equipment trophied at Kubalkino AB near the city.

Elsewhere in the Russian occupied Kherson and Berdyansk cities, we saw major public protests with flags and Ukrainian anthem being sung, ruining Russian planned propaganda spectacles. The sieges of Mariupol and Volnovakha continue with Russians violating agreed ceasefires by moving ammo in ambulances.

Intensive combat was reported both NE and NW of Kyiv as the forces going around the two Russian armored column “Schwerpunkts” attempt breakthroughs, with engagements reported at Irpen as ongoing, and a defeat of the Russians in Chernihiv to the NE.

An attempted Eastern thrust from occupied Luhansk to envelop Kharkiv was reported to have failed today.

The 2nd Russian strategic echelon and the Belarusian Army cannot come from the north and Russia doesn’t have either rails or the truck park in the west or south to sustain anything trying to reach the out-of-supply forward columns because Ukraine owns the skies west of the Dnieper.

We are in an attrition phase, the outcome is still in doubt, and Russia still has an eight times bigger army.

Examining the Counterfactuals

I am seeing a number of people I formally trusted as military experts go sideways, hard, in Ukraine.

Bluntly, these “Experts” simply cannot get their group mind around the implications of the rotted tires of the Russian army’s truck fleet nor the fact that the Russians only control the ground they are actually standing on. These facts are utterly decisive for mechanized combat in Ukraine.

The key thing about the Russian truck fleet’s ill-maintained Chinese manufactured tires is they are not on Ukrainian trucks.

Short form counterfactual: Ukrainian logistics have superior mobility during the Raputitsa (Mud Season) because their tires will not disintegrate in the mud!

This is a huge Ukrainian advantage in mechanized combat that stacks quite nicely with the second counterfactual.

When you look up the relevant data about how ground combat power degrades from casualties in places like Trevor N. Dupuy’s books “Numbers, Predictions, and War: Using History to Evaluate Combat Factors and Predict the Outcome of Battles”, you find that the vast majority of mechanized ground forces’ fighting power disappears with the vehicles and not the people.

Vehicles are combat power in mechanized war.

Those who suffer less vehicle force attrition than their enemy win battles, and win wars, despite being smaller.

There are safe rear areas for the Ukrainians in Ukraine while there none for the Russian.

The Ukrainians are only losing vehicles to combat and capture. Their operational losses are being repaired and returned to them.

Meanwhile all Russian operational losses wind up either permanent losses to Ukrainian Territorial “Road Burning Details” OR AS CAPTURED UKRAINIAN MECHANIZED POWER.

Ukraine is winning the war of mechanized ground vehicle attrition with Russia inside Ukraine.

And who the h–l would have thought that!

Interesting opinion, lets hope some of it is true & possible.

[seacoaster]

From Tom Nichols, noting the difficulty the West has with staying power and staying the course when their neat and tidy lives are upset:

https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archi ... aign=share

"Night after night I find myself staring at the television, almost paralyzed with anger and grief. Russian President Vladimir Putin, after a catastrophic strategic miscalculation, is now embroiled in perhaps the greatest military blunder in modern European history. In his desperation, he is resorting to the classic Russian military playbook of indiscriminate and massive violence. His unprovoked war of aggression is rapidly escalating into war crimes.

It’s going to get worse. The images and sounds from these first few days are a mere prologue to what will come once Putin realizes that he is on track to lose this war, even if he somehow “wins” by flattening entire cities.

In my rage, I want someone somewhere to do something. I have taught military and national-security affairs for more than a quarter century, and I know what will happen when a 40-mile column of men and weapons encircles a city of outgunned defenders. I want all the might of the civilized world—a world of which Putin is no longer a part—to obliterate the invading forces and save the people of Ukraine.

Others share these impulses. In recent days, I’ve heard various proposals for Western intervention, including support for a no-fly zone over Ukraine from former NATO Supreme Allied Commander General Philip Breedlove and the Russian dissident Garry Kasparov, among others. Social media is aflame with calls to send in American troops against the invading Russians.

And yet, I still counsel caution and restraint, a position I know many Americans find impossible to understand. Every measure of our outrage is natural, as are the calls for action. But emotions should never dictate policy. As President Joe Biden emphasized in his State of the Union address, we must do all we can to aid the Ukrainian resistance and to fortify NATO, but we cannot become involved in military operations in Ukraine.

I realize that this is easy for me to say. I am not in Kyiv, trying to spirit my child to safety. I am not watching the Russians approach my town. When I finish writing this, I will reassure my wife and sit down to share dinner with her in a quiet home on a peaceful street.

But public figures and ordinary voters who are advocating for intervention also do so from the comfort of offices and homes where they can sound resolute by employing clinical euphemisms such as no-fly zone when what they mean is “war.” For now, fidelity to history requires us to remember that this isn’t the first time we’ve had little choice but to stand by and watch a dictator murder innocents.

In some cases we were unwilling to bear the costs of intervention. In others, we were deterred by the immense risks of a nuclear confrontation. During the Cold War, we did not face down the Soviets in Hungary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1968. We did not send troops to drive them from Afghanistan after their 1979 invasion. (In Afghanistan, we provided material assistance to raise the cost of occupation, and we succeeded in helping the local population inflict serious wounds on the Soviet war machine, but hundreds of thousands of Afghans were dead and millions had fled as refugees by the time the Soviets threw in the towel.)

In the 1990s, we allowed war crimes and ethnic cleansing to reach horrific levels in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. More recently, America chose to stand aside as the Syrian regime used chemical weapons against civilians in a war that has taken well over half a million lives (a disaster that I have argued, repeatedly, justifies global military intervention). We pointedly avoided too much criticism of the Russian war in Chechnya and now do the same with regard to Chinese crimes against the Uyghurs.

I am recounting this litany of shame not as a device for consigning the Ukrainians to oblivion, but to remind us all that this is not the first humanitarian outrage we’ve seen. The day may come, and sooner than we expect, when we have to fight in Europe, with all the risks that entails. If we are to plunge into a global war between the Russians and the West, however, it needs to be based on a better calculus than pure rage. (It also will require a vote of assent from all 30 NATO nations, something that is not currently even a remote possibility.)

Also, let’s remember that America is, in fact, taking action to help Ukraine and oppose Russia. Western sanctions will not save Kyiv or other Ukrainian cities tomorrow, but they are crippling the Russian economy and undermining Putin’s ability both politically and materially to seek a larger war. We are working with the rest of the world to get military assistance to the Ukrainians, who will be fighting a resistance for as long as the Russians are in their country.

More important, we are sending more forces to our allies around Ukraine. If Putin reckoned on a quick victory and a dash to the West, that dream is over. He’ll win on the ground in the short run, but in the end he’ll be lucky to get out of Ukraine with his military intact—if he’s even still in power.

Indeed, one more reason not to let our emotions get the better of us is that the only way Putin can save himself from his own fiasco is to bait the West into an attack. Nothing would help him more, at home or abroad, than if the United States or any other NATO country were to enter direct hostilities with Russian forces. Putin would then use the conflict to rally his people and threaten conventional and nuclear attacks against NATO. He would become a hero at home, and Ukraine would be forgotten.

In thinking about all of this, I have been reliving a moment from 1991, when I was working on Capitol Hill as personal staff for foreign and defense affairs to the late Senator John Heinz of Pennsylvania. Saddam Hussein had invaded Kuwait and we were at war. The Iraqi dictator was launching Scud missiles into neighboring states, including Israel. One night, Heinz and I were walking along North Capitol Street on our way back to the office. It was a lovely evening, but we had just been told—erroneously—that Saddam had struck Tel Aviv with chemical weapons.

I was barely 30 years old. I had never been near a war. I had recently visited Israel, and I was practically shaking with rage. “Ever been to Tel Aviv, Senator? Nice city.” It was an utterly inane comment; of course the senator had been to Tel Aviv. I was just trying to make conversation, because I didn’t know what else to say while thinking about Israelis dying in the street.

Heinz paused. In a fatherly manner, he said: “Tom, I know that right now you’d like to rip Saddam Hussein apart with your bare hands. But this is when I need you to be calm and rational and helpful so that we can figure this thing out.”

It was a reproach, but a gentle one. I never forgot it, and now I always try to keep in mind that in moments of crisis, we must reflect deeply and dispassionately before daring to act.

I am as enraged today as I was on North Capitol Street more than 30 years ago. But I am trying to be calm and rational, and yes, helpful, as much as I can be. So should we all."

Meanwhile, Jim Jordan whines about the price of gas and legislates, for the umpteenth year, nothing....

[Farfromgeneva]

The ruble has lost 90% of its value to the dollar since the conflict began.

We're paying more for gasoline.
If the dollar had had the same plunge that the ruble has had, we'd be paying $30-50 a gallon for gas right now.

But world markets see the US economy as very, very strong.
Russia very, very weak.

But our trolls on here think we should give up and let Putin have Russia under his thumb, commit whatever atrocities he wishes as a Stalin wannabe.

After all "white Christian values"...

Not certain who you’re referring to but it’s not me. I actually think the one way to get rid of Putin is to bog him down in Ukraine. My read is these Ukrainians just might beat the Russians.

I was off when I thought we should immediately go for a cease fire. Mea culpa. I thought the Ukrainians needed time to regroup. Like many, the Ukrainians have surprised me. I’d get them all the SAM’s, Javelins, UCAV’s, and basic equipment I could. Discreetly. I’d also quietly pay some Tatars to go mess up the Russian equipment in Crimea.

This could be the end of Putin if the West does their side effectively. Just don’t give Putin an excuse to launch the nukes.

Sigh.

“The end of Putin” is the best reason he would possibly have to launch nukes.

Things tend to be dynamic in situations like an autocratic leader being deposed by his military. Someone on his staff just might fire a bullet in his head. You never know.

Also….One thing I have generally relied on for years is, our military likely has a bette relationship with their military than what you’re giving anyone credit for. And launching nukes isn’t as easy as flipping a switch. Multiple layers of protocol.

Split personalities talking to one another...don't get confused...

There’s something very fake about at least one.

[cradleandshoot]

The ruble has lost 90% of its value to the dollar since the conflict began.

We're paying more for gasoline.
If the dollar had had the same plunge that the ruble has had, we'd be paying $30-50 a gallon for gas right now.

But world markets see the US economy as very, very strong.
Russia very, very weak.

But our trolls on here think we should give up and let Putin have Russia under his thumb, commit whatever atrocities he wishes as a Stalin wannabe.

After all "white Christian values"...

Not certain who you’re referring to but it’s not me. I actually think the one way to get rid of Putin is to bog him down in Ukraine. My read is these Ukrainians just might beat the Russians.

I was off when I thought we should immediately go for a cease fire. Mea culpa. I thought the Ukrainians needed time to regroup. Like many, the Ukrainians have surprised me. I’d get them all the SAM’s, Javelins, UCAV’s, and basic equipment I could. Discreetly. I’d also quietly pay some Tatars to go mess up the Russian equipment in Crimea.

This could be the end of Putin if the West does their side effectively. Just don’t give Putin an excuse to launch the nukes.

Sigh.

“The end of Putin” is the best reason he would possibly have to launch nukes.

Things tend to be dynamic in situations like an autocratic leader being deposed by his military. Someone on his staff just might fire a bullet in his head. You never know.

Also….One thing I have generally relied on for years is, our military likely has a bette relationship with their military than what you’re giving anyone credit for. And launching nukes isn’t as easy as flipping a switch. Multiple layers of protocol.

Split personalities talking to one another...don't get confused...

There’s something very fake about at least one.

Then it is also true that EVERYTHING is fake when it comes to the opinions of the FLP members of this forum. I do know that back in the day, when Bill and Hillary were sucking up to the trumpster and happily accepting his money even the trump was a loyal, faithful democrat. You all can decide what is real, and what is an illusion. Is trump the lifelong democrat he always was or the republican he claims to be??? Since the debate has switched to what is fake??

[dislaxxic]

Orange Cheeto, 1998:



..

[Essexfenwick]

From Tom Nichols, noting the difficulty the West has with staying power and staying the course when their neat and tidy lives are upset:

https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archi ... aign=share

"Night after night I find myself staring at the television, almost paralyzed with anger and grief. Russian President Vladimir Putin, after a catastrophic strategic miscalculation, is now embroiled in perhaps the greatest military blunder in modern European history. In his desperation, he is resorting to the classic Russian military playbook of indiscriminate and massive violence. His unprovoked war of aggression is rapidly escalating into war crimes.

It’s going to get worse. The images and sounds from these first few days are a mere prologue to what will come once Putin realizes that he is on track to lose this war, even if he somehow “wins” by flattening entire cities.

In my rage, I want someone somewhere to do something. I have taught military and national-security affairs for more than a quarter century, and I know what will happen when a 40-mile column of men and weapons encircles a city of outgunned defenders. I want all the might of the civilized world—a world of which Putin is no longer a part—to obliterate the invading forces and save the people of Ukraine.

Others share these impulses. In recent days, I’ve heard various proposals for Western intervention, including support for a no-fly zone over Ukraine from former NATO Supreme Allied Commander General Philip Breedlove and the Russian dissident Garry Kasparov, among others. Social media is aflame with calls to send in American troops against the invading Russians.

And yet, I still counsel caution and restraint, a position I know many Americans find impossible to understand. Every measure of our outrage is natural, as are the calls for action. But emotions should never dictate policy. As President Joe Biden emphasized in his State of the Union address, we must do all we can to aid the Ukrainian resistance and to fortify NATO, but we cannot become involved in military operations in Ukraine.

I realize that this is easy for me to say. I am not in Kyiv, trying to spirit my child to safety. I am not watching the Russians approach my town. When I finish writing this, I will reassure my wife and sit down to share dinner with her in a quiet home on a peaceful street.

But public figures and ordinary voters who are advocating for intervention also do so from the comfort of offices and homes where they can sound resolute by employing clinical euphemisms such as no-fly zone when what they mean is “war.” For now, fidelity to history requires us to remember that this isn’t the first time we’ve had little choice but to stand by and watch a dictator murder innocents.

In some cases we were unwilling to bear the costs of intervention. In others, we were deterred by the immense risks of a nuclear confrontation. During the Cold War, we did not face down the Soviets in Hungary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1968. We did not send troops to drive them from Afghanistan after their 1979 invasion. (In Afghanistan, we provided material assistance to raise the cost of occupation, and we succeeded in helping the local population inflict serious wounds on the Soviet war machine, but hundreds of thousands of Afghans were dead and millions had fled as refugees by the time the Soviets threw in the towel.)

In the 1990s, we allowed war crimes and ethnic cleansing to reach horrific levels in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. More recently, America chose to stand aside as the Syrian regime used chemical weapons against civilians in a war that has taken well over half a million lives (a disaster that I have argued, repeatedly, justifies global military intervention). We pointedly avoided too much criticism of the Russian war in Chechnya and now do the same with regard to Chinese crimes against the Uyghurs.

I am recounting this litany of shame not as a device for consigning the Ukrainians to oblivion, but to remind us all that this is not the first humanitarian outrage we’ve seen. The day may come, and sooner than we expect, when we have to fight in Europe, with all the risks that entails. If we are to plunge into a global war between the Russians and the West, however, it needs to be based on a better calculus than pure rage. (It also will require a vote of assent from all 30 NATO nations, something that is not currently even a remote possibility.)

Also, let’s remember that America is, in fact, taking action to help Ukraine and oppose Russia. Western sanctions will not save Kyiv or other Ukrainian cities tomorrow, but they are crippling the Russian economy and undermining Putin’s ability both politically and materially to seek a larger war. We are working with the rest of the world to get military assistance to the Ukrainians, who will be fighting a resistance for as long as the Russians are in their country.

More important, we are sending more forces to our allies around Ukraine. If Putin reckoned on a quick victory and a dash to the West, that dream is over. He’ll win on the ground in the short run, but in the end he’ll be lucky to get out of Ukraine with his military intact—if he’s even still in power.

Indeed, one more reason not to let our emotions get the better of us is that the only way Putin can save himself from his own fiasco is to bait the West into an attack. Nothing would help him more, at home or abroad, than if the United States or any other NATO country were to enter direct hostilities with Russian forces. Putin would then use the conflict to rally his people and threaten conventional and nuclear attacks against NATO. He would become a hero at home, and Ukraine would be forgotten.

In thinking about all of this, I have been reliving a moment from 1991, when I was working on Capitol Hill as personal staff for foreign and defense affairs to the late Senator John Heinz of Pennsylvania. Saddam Hussein had invaded Kuwait and we were at war. The Iraqi dictator was launching Scud missiles into neighboring states, including Israel. One night, Heinz and I were walking along North Capitol Street on our way back to the office. It was a lovely evening, but we had just been told—erroneously—that Saddam had struck Tel Aviv with chemical weapons.

I was barely 30 years old. I had never been near a war. I had recently visited Israel, and I was practically shaking with rage. “Ever been to Tel Aviv, Senator? Nice city.” It was an utterly inane comment; of course the senator had been to Tel Aviv. I was just trying to make conversation, because I didn’t know what else to say while thinking about Israelis dying in the street.

Heinz paused. In a fatherly manner, he said: “Tom, I know that right now you’d like to rip Saddam Hussein apart with your bare hands. But this is when I need you to be calm and rational and helpful so that we can figure this thing out.”

It was a reproach, but a gentle one. I never forgot it, and now I always try to keep in mind that in moments of crisis, we must reflect deeply and dispassionately before daring to act.

I am as enraged today as I was on North Capitol Street more than 30 years ago. But I am trying to be calm and rational, and yes, helpful, as much as I can be. So should we all."

Meanwhile, Jim Jordan whines about the price of gas and legislates, for the umpteenth year, nothing....

JoeTard isn’t calm or rational. He’s a little calmer since dementia happened but still has Cornpop-esque outbursts. As long as nobody tells him Hunter is a crack addict he should be able to 50 percent control his bowels.