All Things Russia & Ukraine

[seacoaster]

Times interview with Fiona Hill:

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/18/us/p ... raine.html

"Winston Churchill once described Russia as “a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma.” It’s a phrase that could equally apply to Vladimir Putin, the Kremlin’s leader, as the world awaits his next move on Ukraine.

To better understand him, we reached out to Fiona Hill, one of Washington’s foremost experts on the Russian president. Hill has served in multiple U.S. administrations as an intelligence officer and policy adviser, most recently as senior director for Europe and Russia on the National Security Council under Donald Trump.

She spoke with us about Putin’s longtime obsession with annexing Ukraine, her worries about how he’s closed himself off from outside information and his private boasts about his ability to “buy anyone” in the United States and Europe.

The following excerpts have been edited for length and clarity:

How would you evaluate the administration’s handling of this crisis so far? What’s worked and what hasn’t?

I think they’re handling it as well as they can be, given the circumstances. Writ large, what the administration is doing right now is certainly what I would recommend doing. But I don’t know whether we can say if it’s going to work or not. The real test is going to be over a long period of time. I don’t think this is going to be a short, sharp crisis.

What do you mean?

Putin’s been trying to get a grip on Ukraine for years now. They cut off the gas to Ukraine in 2006. He’s been in power for 22 years, and the whole of that time, he’s had Ukraine in the cross hairs one way or another, and it’s intensified over time. Putin wants to be the person who, on his watch, in his presidency, pulls Ukraine back into Russia’s orbit. And he could be president until 2036, in terms of what’s possible for him.

Is this fundamentally ideological for him, or geopolitical?

It’s about him personally — his legacy, his view of himself, his view of Russian history. Putin clearly sees himself as a protagonist in Russian history, and is putting himself in the place of previous Russian leaders who’ve tried to gather in what he sees as the Russian land. Ukraine is the outlier, the one that got away that he’s got to bring back.

And does that mean that he’s behaving irrationally here?

No, I don’t think he’s being irrational at all, from his perspective. He’s in a different frame from where we are. He’s living in history and his narrative of history. He also is part of a larger group of security people in Russia who have been opposed to NATO expansion; they want the U.S. out of Europe.

But it seems like he’s made his security situation worse.

That’s from our perspective, on the outside. We don’t know exactly what he’s saying internally. From his point of view right now, he’s put the squeeze on Ukraine and the Ukrainian economy is getting crushed. He’s got all of our attention. We’re all running around doing nothing but talk about him. As he would say, he’s got us listening to him now. Whether we’re hearing him on the terms that he wants us to is another matter.

And you think he’s willing to pay a very high price to get Ukraine — that he’s willing to bear costs that we would see as exorbitant?

Putin thinks that he can be more aggressive and wait us out and take more pain than we can. His goal is to make us split apart, to basically capitulate without actually doing anything. So he’s going to keep the pressure up. I can’t say whether he’s going to invade. But he’s certainly going to give us every impression that he’s going to do it, and he wants to try to find operational surprise. He wants to catch us out.

When he looks at the West’s response, how do you think he is reading the signals?

I don’t know what signals he’s actually getting directly, beyond what they give him in media compilations, what he might be listening to. And that’s part of the problem. We don’t know how good his intel is. And in some cases, we think it might not be great, because he certainly hasn’t read the mood in Ukraine as well as you might have thought. He obviously thought that we’d all fall apart internationally. He didn’t probably anticipate the Western resolve that he’s got in the form of NATO and European unity, but we don’t know what people are telling him.

People may be spinning to him that he’s done a great job — you know, that we’re all capitulating. He’s got a parade of European leaders coming and he’s trying to test them and see what they have to say. He’s looking for daylight between them, and then he’s making his own assessment.

Do you think the United States needs to squeeze Putin harder? To impose punishments now rather than waiting for some trigger to set off another round of sanctions?

That would be a mistake, to trigger off right now. It doesn’t work with just such crude messaging. You have to be able to show the cause and effect of sanctions when you put them on and off. Otherwise, the view then becomes, well, there’s nothing we can do anyway. Because the Russian point of view is that all the U.S. does is put sanctions on countries irrespective of what they do. We would just feed that narrative.

And we already are doing plenty of things. But if we put unilateral sanctions on, in advance of more action from Russia, we’ll have lost the allies. And Putin probably is banking on some of that.

Last night, I was at dinner with a European foreign minister and one of their under secretaries. And they were relating discussions that they’ve had with the Russians, where Putin’s told them bluntly that they can buy anyone they like in the United States or in Europe.

The Russians think that they can just outmaneuver the United States and all of the allies on sanctions and everything else. And they’ve been very successful at that, because they have lobbyists within our own systems who lobby for them. You can go down a long list of people who are on the board of Russian companies or do consulting for Russian companies.

Clearly, it’s always been for political leverage. And Putin explicitly says: I can buy anyone. I don’t, by the way, believe that he can, because I do know people who work with the Russians and maintain their integrity. But from Putin’s point of view, that’s very strong signaling.

You’ve sat it on meetings with Putin. Does he just kind of rant about his view of history?

He has his own rationality, and, in the past, he’s been much more measured. But I know a lot of people who’ve been through Moscow recently, and they’re saying the guy seems even more closed off to the news. We’re not really sure what kind of information he’s getting, and he seems more embittered. And is it the effect of Covid? Is it because he’s been stewing in his own juices for too long? We can’t really be sure what exactly he is thinking right now. You’ve got to hope that some saner voices are forcing a recalculation."

[PizzaSnake]

Times interview with Fiona Hill:

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/18/us/p ... raine.html

"Winston Churchill once described Russia as “a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma.” It’s a phrase that could equally apply to Vladimir Putin, the Kremlin’s leader, as the world awaits his next move on Ukraine.

To better understand him, we reached out to Fiona Hill, one of Washington’s foremost experts on the Russian president. Hill has served in multiple U.S. administrations as an intelligence officer and policy adviser, most recently as senior director for Europe and Russia on the National Security Council under Donald Trump.

She spoke with us about Putin’s longtime obsession with annexing Ukraine, her worries about how he’s closed himself off from outside information and his private boasts about his ability to “buy anyone” in the United States and Europe.

The following excerpts have been edited for length and clarity:

How would you evaluate the administration’s handling of this crisis so far? What’s worked and what hasn’t?

I think they’re handling it as well as they can be, given the circumstances. Writ large, what the administration is doing right now is certainly what I would recommend doing. But I don’t know whether we can say if it’s going to work or not. The real test is going to be over a long period of time. I don’t think this is going to be a short, sharp crisis.

What do you mean?

Putin’s been trying to get a grip on Ukraine for years now. They cut off the gas to Ukraine in 2006. He’s been in power for 22 years, and the whole of that time, he’s had Ukraine in the cross hairs one way or another, and it’s intensified over time. Putin wants to be the person who, on his watch, in his presidency, pulls Ukraine back into Russia’s orbit. And he could be president until 2036, in terms of what’s possible for him.

Is this fundamentally ideological for him, or geopolitical?

It’s about him personally — his legacy, his view of himself, his view of Russian history. Putin clearly sees himself as a protagonist in Russian history, and is putting himself in the place of previous Russian leaders who’ve tried to gather in what he sees as the Russian land. Ukraine is the outlier, the one that got away that he’s got to bring back.

And does that mean that he’s behaving irrationally here?

No, I don’t think he’s being irrational at all, from his perspective. He’s in a different frame from where we are. He’s living in history and his narrative of history. He also is part of a larger group of security people in Russia who have been opposed to NATO expansion; they want the U.S. out of Europe.

But it seems like he’s made his security situation worse.

That’s from our perspective, on the outside. We don’t know exactly what he’s saying internally. From his point of view right now, he’s put the squeeze on Ukraine and the Ukrainian economy is getting crushed. He’s got all of our attention. We’re all running around doing nothing but talk about him. As he would say, he’s got us listening to him now. Whether we’re hearing him on the terms that he wants us to is another matter.

And you think he’s willing to pay a very high price to get Ukraine — that he’s willing to bear costs that we would see as exorbitant?

Putin thinks that he can be more aggressive and wait us out and take more pain than we can. His goal is to make us split apart, to basically capitulate without actually doing anything. So he’s going to keep the pressure up. I can’t say whether he’s going to invade. But he’s certainly going to give us every impression that he’s going to do it, and he wants to try to find operational surprise. He wants to catch us out.

When he looks at the West’s response, how do you think he is reading the signals?

I don’t know what signals he’s actually getting directly, beyond what they give him in media compilations, what he might be listening to. And that’s part of the problem. We don’t know how good his intel is. And in some cases, we think it might not be great, because he certainly hasn’t read the mood in Ukraine as well as you might have thought. He obviously thought that we’d all fall apart internationally. He didn’t probably anticipate the Western resolve that he’s got in the form of NATO and European unity, but we don’t know what people are telling him.

People may be spinning to him that he’s done a great job — you know, that we’re all capitulating. He’s got a parade of European leaders coming and he’s trying to test them and see what they have to say. He’s looking for daylight between them, and then he’s making his own assessment.

Do you think the United States needs to squeeze Putin harder? To impose punishments now rather than waiting for some trigger to set off another round of sanctions?

That would be a mistake, to trigger off right now. It doesn’t work with just such crude messaging. You have to be able to show the cause and effect of sanctions when you put them on and off. Otherwise, the view then becomes, well, there’s nothing we can do anyway. Because the Russian point of view is that all the U.S. does is put sanctions on countries irrespective of what they do. We would just feed that narrative.

And we already are doing plenty of things. But if we put unilateral sanctions on, in advance of more action from Russia, we’ll have lost the allies. And Putin probably is banking on some of that.

Last night, I was at dinner with a European foreign minister and one of their under secretaries. And they were relating discussions that they’ve had with the Russians, where Putin’s told them bluntly that they can buy anyone they like in the United States or in Europe.

The Russians think that they can just outmaneuver the United States and all of the allies on sanctions and everything else. And they’ve been very successful at that, because they have lobbyists within our own systems who lobby for them. You can go down a long list of people who are on the board of Russian companies or do consulting for Russian companies.

Clearly, it’s always been for political leverage. And Putin explicitly says: I can buy anyone. I don’t, by the way, believe that he can, because I do know people who work with the Russians and maintain their integrity. But from Putin’s point of view, that’s very strong signaling.

You’ve sat it on meetings with Putin. Does he just kind of rant about his view of history?

He has his own rationality, and, in the past, he’s been much more measured. But I know a lot of people who’ve been through Moscow recently, and they’re saying the guy seems even more closed off to the news. We’re not really sure what kind of information he’s getting, and he seems more embittered. And is it the effect of Covid? Is it because he’s been stewing in his own juices for too long? We can’t really be sure what exactly he is thinking right now. You’ve got to hope that some saner voices are forcing a recalculation."

" And Putin explicitly says: I can buy anyone. I don’t, by the way, believe that he can, because I do know people who work with the Russians and maintain their integrity."

He doesn't need all of them, just enough. Like say the Repub tools who went to Russia to "kiss the sphincter" on July 4th.

[old salt]

Times interview with Fiona Hill:

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/18/us/p ... raine.html

"Winston Churchill once described Russia as “a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma.” It’s a phrase that could equally apply to Vladimir Putin, the Kremlin’s leader, as the world awaits his next move on Ukraine.

To better understand him, we reached out to Fiona Hill...

You’ve sat it on meetings with Putin. Does he just kind of rant about his view of history?

He has his own rationality, and, in the past, he’s been much more measured. But I know a lot of people who’ve been through Moscow recently, and they’re saying the guy seems even more closed off to the news. We’re not really sure what kind of information he’s getting, and he seems more embittered. And is it the effect of Covid? Is it because he’s been stewing in his own juices for too long? We can’t really be sure what exactly he is thinking right now. You’ve got to hope that some saner voices are forcing a recalculation."

imho -- Putin is the most dangerous man in history since Adolf Hitler.
Maybe more so, given his nuclear arsenal & his relative level of rationality.

[PizzaSnake]

Times interview with Fiona Hill:

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/18/us/p ... raine.html

"Winston Churchill once described Russia as “a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma.” It’s a phrase that could equally apply to Vladimir Putin, the Kremlin’s leader, as the world awaits his next move on Ukraine.

To better understand him, we reached out to Fiona Hill...

You’ve sat it on meetings with Putin. Does he just kind of rant about his view of history?

He has his own rationality, and, in the past, he’s been much more measured. But I know a lot of people who’ve been through Moscow recently, and they’re saying the guy seems even more closed off to the news. We’re not really sure what kind of information he’s getting, and he seems more embittered. And is it the effect of Covid? Is it because he’s been stewing in his own juices for too long? We can’t really be sure what exactly he is thinking right now. You’ve got to hope that some saner voices are forcing a recalculation."

imho -- Putin is the most dangerous man in history since Adolf Hitler.
Maybe more so, given his nuclear arsenal & his relative level of rationality.

Maybe, but certainly not a friend to the US.

So why are certain Repubs lining up to kiss the “ring”? Stupid or corrupt?

[old salt]

So why are certain Repubs lining up to kiss the “ring”? Stupid or corrupt?

Irrelevant. Partisan white noise.
Do you consider all the EU-NATO leaders visiting & calling Putin to be "kissing his ring" ?

On the eve of a war which could easily escalate -- who cares what a CODEL said 4 years ago ?

The bipartisan US pushback against Putin is more powerful than the EU & the rest of NATO combined,
for what is first & foremost a European dispute.

FTR -- https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/395 ... -on-july-4
The lawmakers reportedly discussed Russian influence in U.S. elections during their meetings over the past week...
“I think it’s a given in the United States, in both parties, that Russia tried to meddle and probably did meddle in the election,” Shelby told the AP.
The lawmakers did not meet with Putin, but offered a warning for Russia against meddling in the 2018 U.S. elections.
“We made the point that if Russia persists in trying to influence our elections, it's going to be very difficult, if not impossible, for us to establish a better relationship,” Kennedy said to NPR.
“We didn't come here to say, what you've been doing is great, and we're going to look the other way,” Shelby told NPR. “We came here to talk candidly and honestly. The Russians can earn a better relationship with the U.S. if they want to.”

[PizzaSnake]

So why are certain Repubs lining up to kiss the “ring”? Stupid or corrupt?

Irrelevant. Partisan white noise.
Do you consider all the EU-NATO leaders visiting & calling Putin to be "kissing his ring" ?

On the eve of a war which could easily escalate -- who cares what a CODEL said 4 years ago ?

The bipartisan US pushback against Putin is more powerful than the EU & the rest of NATO combined,
for what is first & foremost a European dispute.

FTR -- https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/395 ... -on-july-4
The lawmakers reportedly discussed Russian influence in U.S. elections during their meetings over the past week...
“I think it’s a given in the United States, in both parties, that Russia tried to meddle and probably did meddle in the election,” Shelby told the AP.
The lawmakers did not meet with Putin, but offered a warning for Russia against meddling in the 2018 U.S. elections.
“We made the point that if Russia persists in trying to influence our elections, it's going to be very difficult, if not impossible, for us to establish a better relationship,” Kennedy said to NPR.
“We didn't come here to say, what you've been doing is great, and we're going to look the other way,” Shelby told NPR. “We came here to talk candidly and honestly. The Russians can earn a better relationship with the U.S. if they want to.”

Bnllshit. Visiting Russia on the 4th of July?!

Don’t p$ss down my leg and tell me it’s raining.

[PizzaSnake]

Duplicate

[old salt]

So why are certain Repubs lining up to kiss the “ring”? Stupid or corrupt?

Irrelevant. Partisan white noise.
Do you consider all the EU-NATO leaders visiting & calling Putin to be "kissing his ring" ?

On the eve of a war which could easily escalate -- who cares what a CODEL said 4 years ago ?

The bipartisan US pushback against Putin is more powerful than the EU & the rest of NATO combined,
for what is first & foremost a European dispute.

FTR -- https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/395 ... -on-july-4
The lawmakers reportedly discussed Russian influence in U.S. elections during their meetings over the past week...
“I think it’s a given in the United States, in both parties, that Russia tried to meddle and probably did meddle in the election,” Shelby told the AP.
The lawmakers did not meet with Putin, but offered a warning for Russia against meddling in the 2018 U.S. elections.
“We made the point that if Russia persists in trying to influence our elections, it's going to be very difficult, if not impossible, for us to establish a better relationship,” Kennedy said to NPR.
“We didn't come here to say, what you've been doing is great, and we're going to look the other way,” Shelby told NPR. “We came here to talk candidly and honestly. The Russians can earn a better relationship with the U.S. if they want to.”

Bnllshit. Visiting Russia on the 4th of July?!

Don’t p$ss down my leg and tell me it’s raining.

Get a grip on reality. CODELs go when Congress is in recess. They were there for a week. They did not meet with Putin. They celebrated July 4 with US Embassy staff.

Do you get upset when politicians & USO entertainers visit US troops overseas ?

[PizzaSnake]

So why are certain Repubs lining up to kiss the “ring”? Stupid or corrupt?

Irrelevant. Partisan white noise.
Do you consider all the EU-NATO leaders visiting & calling Putin to be "kissing his ring" ?

On the eve of a war which could easily escalate -- who cares what a CODEL said 4 years ago ?

The bipartisan US pushback against Putin is more powerful than the EU & the rest of NATO combined,
for what is first & foremost a European dispute.

FTR -- https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/395 ... -on-july-4
The lawmakers reportedly discussed Russian influence in U.S. elections during their meetings over the past week...
“I think it’s a given in the United States, in both parties, that Russia tried to meddle and probably did meddle in the election,” Shelby told the AP.
The lawmakers did not meet with Putin, but offered a warning for Russia against meddling in the 2018 U.S. elections.
“We made the point that if Russia persists in trying to influence our elections, it's going to be very difficult, if not impossible, for us to establish a better relationship,” Kennedy said to NPR.
“We didn't come here to say, what you've been doing is great, and we're going to look the other way,” Shelby told NPR. “We came here to talk candidly and honestly. The Russians can earn a better relationship with the U.S. if they want to.”

Bnllshit. Visiting Russia on the 4th of July?!

Don’t p$ss down my leg and tell me it’s raining.

Get a grip on reality. CODELs go when Congress is in recess. They were there for a week. They did not meet with Putin. They celebrated July 4 with US Embassy staff.

Do you get upset when politicians & USO entertainers visit US troops overseas ?

I’d get off that thin ice you’re skating on. So they were visiting the US Embassy staff in a USO-like “homestyle” visit? You should try basketball, because you have an amazing reach…

[old salt]

So why are certain Repubs lining up to kiss the “ring”? Stupid or corrupt?

Irrelevant. Partisan white noise.
Do you consider all the EU-NATO leaders visiting & calling Putin to be "kissing his ring" ?

On the eve of a war which could easily escalate -- who cares what a CODEL said 4 years ago ?

The bipartisan US pushback against Putin is more powerful than the EU & the rest of NATO combined,
for what is first & foremost a European dispute.

FTR -- https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/395 ... -on-july-4
The lawmakers reportedly discussed Russian influence in U.S. elections during their meetings over the past week...
“I think it’s a given in the United States, in both parties, that Russia tried to meddle and probably did meddle in the election,” Shelby told the AP.
The lawmakers did not meet with Putin, but offered a warning for Russia against meddling in the 2018 U.S. elections.
“We made the point that if Russia persists in trying to influence our elections, it's going to be very difficult, if not impossible, for us to establish a better relationship,” Kennedy said to NPR.
“We didn't come here to say, what you've been doing is great, and we're going to look the other way,” Shelby told NPR. “We came here to talk candidly and honestly. The Russians can earn a better relationship with the U.S. if they want to.”

Bnllshit. Visiting Russia on the 4th of July?!

Don’t p$ss down my leg and tell me it’s raining.

Get a grip on reality. CODELs go when Congress is in recess. They were there for a week. They did not meet with Putin. They celebrated July 4 with US Embassy staff.

Do you get upset when politicians & USO entertainers visit US troops overseas ?

I’d get off that thin ice you’re skating on. So they were visiting the US Embassy staff in a USO-like “homestyle” visit? You should try basketball, because you have an amazing reach…

Do you get all worked up when Gen Milley has phone comms with his Russian counterpart too ?

[PizzaSnake]

So why are certain Repubs lining up to kiss the “ring”? Stupid or corrupt?

Irrelevant. Partisan white noise.
Do you consider all the EU-NATO leaders visiting & calling Putin to be "kissing his ring" ?

On the eve of a war which could easily escalate -- who cares what a CODEL said 4 years ago ?

The bipartisan US pushback against Putin is more powerful than the EU & the rest of NATO combined,
for what is first & foremost a European dispute.

FTR -- https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/395 ... -on-july-4
The lawmakers reportedly discussed Russian influence in U.S. elections during their meetings over the past week...
“I think it’s a given in the United States, in both parties, that Russia tried to meddle and probably did meddle in the election,” Shelby told the AP.
The lawmakers did not meet with Putin, but offered a warning for Russia against meddling in the 2018 U.S. elections.
“We made the point that if Russia persists in trying to influence our elections, it's going to be very difficult, if not impossible, for us to establish a better relationship,” Kennedy said to NPR.
“We didn't come here to say, what you've been doing is great, and we're going to look the other way,” Shelby told NPR. “We came here to talk candidly and honestly. The Russians can earn a better relationship with the U.S. if they want to.”

Bnllshit. Visiting Russia on the 4th of July?!

Don’t p$ss down my leg and tell me it’s raining.

Get a grip on reality. CODELs go when Congress is in recess. They were there for a week. They did not meet with Putin. They celebrated July 4 with US Embassy staff.

Do you get upset when politicians & USO entertainers visit US troops overseas ?

I’d get off that thin ice you’re skating on. So they were visiting the US Embassy staff in a USO-like “homestyle” visit? You should try basketball, because you have an amazing reach…

Do you get all worked up when Gen Milley has phone comms with his Russian counterpart too ?

Hopeless.

[old salt]

Russia just lost the Olympic Hockey Gold Medal game to Finland. Putin can invade now.

On DW, Pres George W Bush's senior NSC advisor on Russia proposed a 20 - 25 year moratorium on eastward expansion of NATO.

https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/ ... n-security

Jan 20, 2022. Last week’s intense talks between Russia and the West over European security seemed to end in failure. Moscow heard nothing to convince it that the West was prepared to address seriously its principal demand that NATO halt further expansion eastward. The United States and its NATO allies continued to insist that NATO’s door is open to former Soviet states and that membership is a matter for the alliance and the applicant alone, over which Russia has no say. Instead, the West offered Moscow some confidence-building and arms control measures to ease its concerns, which Moscow found interesting but of secondary importance.

Meanwhile, the march continues toward a new war in Ukraine, which both sides say they want to avert, while elaborating narratives to put the blame for the outbreak of conflict on the other. Is war thus imminent, as many in the West seem to believe? Is there indeed no diplomatic way to break the impasse? U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken is meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on Jan. 21 in Geneva to find out. That meeting too will end in failure, however, unless the two sides are prepared to recognize hard truths and introduce flexibility into rigid positions. If they do, the exit from the crisis could come in the form of a U.S.-Russian agreement to a moratorium on NATO’s eastward expansion.

Serious security negotiations have to be grounded in the realities of power. And the reality is that the United States and Russia alone have the military might to alter the balance of power in Europe. They alone can cut the difficult deals to reach an enduring settlement, even if they must then bring their allies and partners along. That was the way security agreements were negotiated during the Cold War. It is the way they will have to be reached today, when adversarial relations are scraping depths reminiscent of that dark period.

To be sure, Washington needs to consult its European allies and partners closely. Western unity is critical to successful negotiations. But it is simply not serious for Washington to insist that it will not discuss Europe or Ukraine with Russia without Europeans and Ukrainians in the room. As last week demonstrated, large multilateral formats allow for exchanges of views but not the tough give-and-take that negotiations over grave security matters demand. Indeed, they enable the most recalcitrant to slow, if not veto, progress. Washington knows that. Now is the time to abandon the pretense and talk to Moscow directly about European and Ukrainian matters.

Substantively, the United States and Russia need to put the full range of issues affecting European security on the table: military activity along the Russian-NATO frontier, NATO expansion and current and frozen conflicts. Both sides have already agreed that discussions of limitations on military activities are important, although Russia insists that its primary concern about NATO expansion has to be the first order of business. Despite its categorical refusal to address that matter last week, the United States will eventually have to relent, to avert a deepening crisis and possible war. It can do that without abandoning its principles.

The challenge is to square the circle of the West’s insistence on NATO’s open door to former Soviet states and Russia’s demand for a sphere of influence that includes them. The positions appear irreconcilable, but as a colleague and I have proposed, a moratorium on further NATO expansion into the former Soviet space for a period of 20-25 years could bridge the gap. It would formalize what any Western official would say in private—and some have said publicly—that no former Soviet state, including Ukraine, will be ready for membership for years to come.

The compromise would require the West and Russia to agree on a period for a moratorium. There is nothing magical about 20-25 years. The period only needs to be long enough for Russia to claim that it has blocked NATO’s eastward expansion for a time that could become forever—who knows how long NATO will last in any event?—but short enough for the West to credibly assert that it has not closed the open door. The two sides would also have to negotiate the terms of a moratorium, which would have to reconcile Moscow’s rejection of any Western security ties with Ukraine that could be construed as preparation for membership with the Western determination to provide Ukraine with the means to defend itself. Reaching agreement will require creative diplomacy, but it is not impossible if given enough time, as the Soviet Union and the West showed when they signed the 1975 Helsinki Accords.

As for the ongoing and frozen conflicts, the task is to develop an agreed set of procedures that would legitimize the separation of a certain territory from an existing state in the eyes of OSCE members. They would include some kind of vote to determine the will of the local population and some general rules to guide negotiations to resolve the technical issues involved in a peaceful political separation. Those procedures could be applied in a pro-forma fashion to the most troubling conflicts in Kosovo and Crimea to validate the hard truth that the former will remain an independent state and the latter a part of Russia. But they could produce surprising outcomes if applied faithfully to the Donbas and frozen conflicts in the former Soviet space, where the views of local populations under separatist leaders are difficult to ascertain.

Critics of compromise will inevitably shout appeasement. But this is hardly the case. In taking the steps outlined above, the West would not be eroding its principles or abandoning Ukraine. The proposed compromises are grounded in the assumption that Russia-West relations will remain adversarial for an extended period, that neither side is about to capitulate and neither has the wherewithal to compel the other’s surrender and, thus, that the competition over Ukraine’s future will continue. The compromises are intended to ensure that that contest is pursued in a framework that minimizes the risk of a catastrophic military conflict and focuses the two sides on accumulating incremental advantages over time. That kind of responsible rivalry is most assuredly in the West’s interest—and Russia’s.

AUTHOR
Thomas Graham, a distinguished fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, served as the senior director for Russia on the National Security Council staff during the George W. Bush administration.

[MDlaxfan76]

Russia just lost the Olympic Hockey Gold Medal game to Finland. Putin can invade now.

On DW, Pres George W Bush's senior NSC advisor on Russia proposed a 20 - 25 year moratorium on eastward expansion of NATO.

https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/ ... n-security

Jan 20, 2022. Last week’s intense talks between Russia and the West over European security seemed to end in failure. Moscow heard nothing to convince it that the West was prepared to address seriously its principal demand that NATO halt further expansion eastward. The United States and its NATO allies continued to insist that NATO’s door is open to former Soviet states and that membership is a matter for the alliance and the applicant alone, over which Russia has no say. Instead, the West offered Moscow some confidence-building and arms control measures to ease its concerns, which Moscow found interesting but of secondary importance.

Meanwhile, the march continues toward a new war in Ukraine, which both sides say they want to avert, while elaborating narratives to put the blame for the outbreak of conflict on the other. Is war thus imminent, as many in the West seem to believe? Is there indeed no diplomatic way to break the impasse? U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken is meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on Jan. 21 in Geneva to find out. That meeting too will end in failure, however, unless the two sides are prepared to recognize hard truths and introduce flexibility into rigid positions. If they do, the exit from the crisis could come in the form of a U.S.-Russian agreement to a moratorium on NATO’s eastward expansion.

Serious security negotiations have to be grounded in the realities of power. And the reality is that the United States and Russia alone have the military might to alter the balance of power in Europe. They alone can cut the difficult deals to reach an enduring settlement, even if they must then bring their allies and partners along. That was the way security agreements were negotiated during the Cold War. It is the way they will have to be reached today, when adversarial relations are scraping depths reminiscent of that dark period.

To be sure, Washington needs to consult its European allies and partners closely. Western unity is critical to successful negotiations. But it is simply not serious for Washington to insist that it will not discuss Europe or Ukraine with Russia without Europeans and Ukrainians in the room. As last week demonstrated, large multilateral formats allow for exchanges of views but not the tough give-and-take that negotiations over grave security matters demand. Indeed, they enable the most recalcitrant to slow, if not veto, progress. Washington knows that. Now is the time to abandon the pretense and talk to Moscow directly about European and Ukrainian matters.

Substantively, the United States and Russia need to put the full range of issues affecting European security on the table: military activity along the Russian-NATO frontier, NATO expansion and current and frozen conflicts. Both sides have already agreed that discussions of limitations on military activities are important, although Russia insists that its primary concern about NATO expansion has to be the first order of business. Despite its categorical refusal to address that matter last week, the United States will eventually have to relent, to avert a deepening crisis and possible war. It can do that without abandoning its principles.

The challenge is to square the circle of the West’s insistence on NATO’s open door to former Soviet states and Russia’s demand for a sphere of influence that includes them. The positions appear irreconcilable, but as a colleague and I have proposed, a moratorium on further NATO expansion into the former Soviet space for a period of 20-25 years could bridge the gap. It would formalize what any Western official would say in private—and some have said publicly—that no former Soviet state, including Ukraine, will be ready for membership for years to come.

The compromise would require the West and Russia to agree on a period for a moratorium. There is nothing magical about 20-25 years. The period only needs to be long enough for Russia to claim that it has blocked NATO’s eastward expansion for a time that could become forever—who knows how long NATO will last in any event?—but short enough for the West to credibly assert that it has not closed the open door. The two sides would also have to negotiate the terms of a moratorium, which would have to reconcile Moscow’s rejection of any Western security ties with Ukraine that could be construed as preparation for membership with the Western determination to provide Ukraine with the means to defend itself. Reaching agreement will require creative diplomacy, but it is not impossible if given enough time, as the Soviet Union and the West showed when they signed the 1975 Helsinki Accords.

As for the ongoing and frozen conflicts, the task is to develop an agreed set of procedures that would legitimize the separation of a certain territory from an existing state in the eyes of OSCE members. They would include some kind of vote to determine the will of the local population and some general rules to guide negotiations to resolve the technical issues involved in a peaceful political separation. Those procedures could be applied in a pro-forma fashion to the most troubling conflicts in Kosovo and Crimea to validate the hard truth that the former will remain an independent state and the latter a part of Russia. But they could produce surprising outcomes if applied faithfully to the Donbas and frozen conflicts in the former Soviet space, where the views of local populations under separatist leaders are difficult to ascertain.

Critics of compromise will inevitably shout appeasement. But this is hardly the case. In taking the steps outlined above, the West would not be eroding its principles or abandoning Ukraine. The proposed compromises are grounded in the assumption that Russia-West relations will remain adversarial for an extended period, that neither side is about to capitulate and neither has the wherewithal to compel the other’s surrender and, thus, that the competition over Ukraine’s future will continue. The compromises are intended to ensure that that contest is pursued in a framework that minimizes the risk of a catastrophic military conflict and focuses the two sides on accumulating incremental advantages over time. That kind of responsible rivalry is most assuredly in the West’s interest—and Russia’s.

AUTHOR
Thomas Graham, a distinguished fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, served as the senior director for Russia on the National Security Council staff during the George W. Bush administration.

yup, independent countries are denied the right to affiliate with whom they want. Exactly as Putin wants.

But it would keep the oil flowing.

Anyone other than Salty think that appeasement would prevent Putin from ultimately annexing most of or all of Ukraine or destroying democratic rule and creating a puppet state?

[seacoaster]

More deep thoughts from JD Vance:

https://twitter.com/RonFilipkowski/stat ... 6952159233

[PizzaSnake]

More deep thoughts from JD Vance:

https://twitter.com/RonFilipkowski/stat ... 6952159233

More erudition from Repubs.

[old salt]

Russia just lost the Olympic Hockey Gold Medal game to Finland. Putin can invade now.

On DW, Pres George W Bush's senior NSC advisor on Russia proposed a 20 - 25 year moratorium on eastward expansion of NATO.

https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/ ... n-security

Jan 20, 2022. Last week’s intense talks between Russia and the West over European security seemed to end in failure. Moscow heard nothing to convince it that the West was prepared to address seriously its principal demand that NATO halt further expansion eastward. The United States and its NATO allies continued to insist that NATO’s door is open to former Soviet states and that membership is a matter for the alliance and the applicant alone, over which Russia has no say. Instead, the West offered Moscow some confidence-building and arms control measures to ease its concerns, which Moscow found interesting but of secondary importance.

Meanwhile, the march continues toward a new war in Ukraine, which both sides say they want to avert, while elaborating narratives to put the blame for the outbreak of conflict on the other. Is war thus imminent, as many in the West seem to believe? Is there indeed no diplomatic way to break the impasse? U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken is meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on Jan. 21 in Geneva to find out. That meeting too will end in failure, however, unless the two sides are prepared to recognize hard truths and introduce flexibility into rigid positions. If they do, the exit from the crisis could come in the form of a U.S.-Russian agreement to a moratorium on NATO’s eastward expansion.

Serious security negotiations have to be grounded in the realities of power. And the reality is that the United States and Russia alone have the military might to alter the balance of power in Europe. They alone can cut the difficult deals to reach an enduring settlement, even if they must then bring their allies and partners along. That was the way security agreements were negotiated during the Cold War. It is the way they will have to be reached today, when adversarial relations are scraping depths reminiscent of that dark period.

To be sure, Washington needs to consult its European allies and partners closely. Western unity is critical to successful negotiations. But it is simply not serious for Washington to insist that it will not discuss Europe or Ukraine with Russia without Europeans and Ukrainians in the room. As last week demonstrated, large multilateral formats allow for exchanges of views but not the tough give-and-take that negotiations over grave security matters demand. Indeed, they enable the most recalcitrant to slow, if not veto, progress. Washington knows that. Now is the time to abandon the pretense and talk to Moscow directly about European and Ukrainian matters.

Substantively, the United States and Russia need to put the full range of issues affecting European security on the table: military activity along the Russian-NATO frontier, NATO expansion and current and frozen conflicts. Both sides have already agreed that discussions of limitations on military activities are important, although Russia insists that its primary concern about NATO expansion has to be the first order of business. Despite its categorical refusal to address that matter last week, the United States will eventually have to relent, to avert a deepening crisis and possible war. It can do that without abandoning its principles.

The challenge is to square the circle of the West’s insistence on NATO’s open door to former Soviet states and Russia’s demand for a sphere of influence that includes them. The positions appear irreconcilable, but as a colleague and I have proposed, a moratorium on further NATO expansion into the former Soviet space for a period of 20-25 years could bridge the gap. It would formalize what any Western official would say in private—and some have said publicly—that no former Soviet state, including Ukraine, will be ready for membership for years to come.

The compromise would require the West and Russia to agree on a period for a moratorium. There is nothing magical about 20-25 years. The period only needs to be long enough for Russia to claim that it has blocked NATO’s eastward expansion for a time that could become forever—who knows how long NATO will last in any event?—but short enough for the West to credibly assert that it has not closed the open door. The two sides would also have to negotiate the terms of a moratorium, which would have to reconcile Moscow’s rejection of any Western security ties with Ukraine that could be construed as preparation for membership with the Western determination to provide Ukraine with the means to defend itself. Reaching agreement will require creative diplomacy, but it is not impossible if given enough time, as the Soviet Union and the West showed when they signed the 1975 Helsinki Accords.

As for the ongoing and frozen conflicts, the task is to develop an agreed set of procedures that would legitimize the separation of a certain territory from an existing state in the eyes of OSCE members. They would include some kind of vote to determine the will of the local population and some general rules to guide negotiations to resolve the technical issues involved in a peaceful political separation. Those procedures could be applied in a pro-forma fashion to the most troubling conflicts in Kosovo and Crimea to validate the hard truth that the former will remain an independent state and the latter a part of Russia. But they could produce surprising outcomes if applied faithfully to the Donbas and frozen conflicts in the former Soviet space, where the views of local populations under separatist leaders are difficult to ascertain.

Critics of compromise will inevitably shout appeasement. But this is hardly the case. In taking the steps outlined above, the West would not be eroding its principles or abandoning Ukraine. The proposed compromises are grounded in the assumption that Russia-West relations will remain adversarial for an extended period, that neither side is about to capitulate and neither has the wherewithal to compel the other’s surrender and, thus, that the competition over Ukraine’s future will continue. The compromises are intended to ensure that that contest is pursued in a framework that minimizes the risk of a catastrophic military conflict and focuses the two sides on accumulating incremental advantages over time. That kind of responsible rivalry is most assuredly in the West’s interest—and Russia’s.

AUTHOR
Thomas Graham, a distinguished fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, served as the senior director for Russia on the National Security Council staff during the George W. Bush administration.

Anyone other than Salty think that appeasement would prevent Putin from ultimately annexing most of or all of Ukraine or destroying democratic rule and creating a puppet state?

Yeah. W's senior advisor on Russia, quoted above.
Remember W's position on NATO expansion => https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/ ... to.georgia

Do you regard Mr Graham's proposal which I quoted above to be "appeasement" ? Yes or No, without equivocation.

[MDlaxfan76]

Russia just lost the Olympic Hockey Gold Medal game to Finland. Putin can invade now.

On DW, Pres George W Bush's senior NSC advisor on Russia proposed a 20 - 25 year moratorium on eastward expansion of NATO.

https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/ ... n-security

Jan 20, 2022. Last week’s intense talks between Russia and the West over European security seemed to end in failure. Moscow heard nothing to convince it that the West was prepared to address seriously its principal demand that NATO halt further expansion eastward. The United States and its NATO allies continued to insist that NATO’s door is open to former Soviet states and that membership is a matter for the alliance and the applicant alone, over which Russia has no say. Instead, the West offered Moscow some confidence-building and arms control measures to ease its concerns, which Moscow found interesting but of secondary importance.

Meanwhile, the march continues toward a new war in Ukraine, which both sides say they want to avert, while elaborating narratives to put the blame for the outbreak of conflict on the other. Is war thus imminent, as many in the West seem to believe? Is there indeed no diplomatic way to break the impasse? U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken is meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on Jan. 21 in Geneva to find out. That meeting too will end in failure, however, unless the two sides are prepared to recognize hard truths and introduce flexibility into rigid positions. If they do, the exit from the crisis could come in the form of a U.S.-Russian agreement to a moratorium on NATO’s eastward expansion.

Serious security negotiations have to be grounded in the realities of power. And the reality is that the United States and Russia alone have the military might to alter the balance of power in Europe. They alone can cut the difficult deals to reach an enduring settlement, even if they must then bring their allies and partners along. That was the way security agreements were negotiated during the Cold War. It is the way they will have to be reached today, when adversarial relations are scraping depths reminiscent of that dark period.

To be sure, Washington needs to consult its European allies and partners closely. Western unity is critical to successful negotiations. But it is simply not serious for Washington to insist that it will not discuss Europe or Ukraine with Russia without Europeans and Ukrainians in the room. As last week demonstrated, large multilateral formats allow for exchanges of views but not the tough give-and-take that negotiations over grave security matters demand. Indeed, they enable the most recalcitrant to slow, if not veto, progress. Washington knows that. Now is the time to abandon the pretense and talk to Moscow directly about European and Ukrainian matters.

Substantively, the United States and Russia need to put the full range of issues affecting European security on the table: military activity along the Russian-NATO frontier, NATO expansion and current and frozen conflicts. Both sides have already agreed that discussions of limitations on military activities are important, although Russia insists that its primary concern about NATO expansion has to be the first order of business. Despite its categorical refusal to address that matter last week, the United States will eventually have to relent, to avert a deepening crisis and possible war. It can do that without abandoning its principles.

The challenge is to square the circle of the West’s insistence on NATO’s open door to former Soviet states and Russia’s demand for a sphere of influence that includes them. The positions appear irreconcilable, but as a colleague and I have proposed, a moratorium on further NATO expansion into the former Soviet space for a period of 20-25 years could bridge the gap. It would formalize what any Western official would say in private—and some have said publicly—that no former Soviet state, including Ukraine, will be ready for membership for years to come.

The compromise would require the West and Russia to agree on a period for a moratorium. There is nothing magical about 20-25 years. The period only needs to be long enough for Russia to claim that it has blocked NATO’s eastward expansion for a time that could become forever—who knows how long NATO will last in any event?—but short enough for the West to credibly assert that it has not closed the open door. The two sides would also have to negotiate the terms of a moratorium, which would have to reconcile Moscow’s rejection of any Western security ties with Ukraine that could be construed as preparation for membership with the Western determination to provide Ukraine with the means to defend itself. Reaching agreement will require creative diplomacy, but it is not impossible if given enough time, as the Soviet Union and the West showed when they signed the 1975 Helsinki Accords.

As for the ongoing and frozen conflicts, the task is to develop an agreed set of procedures that would legitimize the separation of a certain territory from an existing state in the eyes of OSCE members. They would include some kind of vote to determine the will of the local population and some general rules to guide negotiations to resolve the technical issues involved in a peaceful political separation. Those procedures could be applied in a pro-forma fashion to the most troubling conflicts in Kosovo and Crimea to validate the hard truth that the former will remain an independent state and the latter a part of Russia. But they could produce surprising outcomes if applied faithfully to the Donbas and frozen conflicts in the former Soviet space, where the views of local populations under separatist leaders are difficult to ascertain.

Critics of compromise will inevitably shout appeasement. But this is hardly the case. In taking the steps outlined above, the West would not be eroding its principles or abandoning Ukraine. The proposed compromises are grounded in the assumption that Russia-West relations will remain adversarial for an extended period, that neither side is about to capitulate and neither has the wherewithal to compel the other’s surrender and, thus, that the competition over Ukraine’s future will continue. The compromises are intended to ensure that that contest is pursued in a framework that minimizes the risk of a catastrophic military conflict and focuses the two sides on accumulating incremental advantages over time. That kind of responsible rivalry is most assuredly in the West’s interest—and Russia’s.

AUTHOR
Thomas Graham, a distinguished fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, served as the senior director for Russia on the National Security Council staff during the George W. Bush administration.

Anyone other than Salty think that appeasement would prevent Putin from ultimately annexing most of or all of Ukraine or destroying democratic rule and creating a puppet state?

Yeah. W's senior advisor on Russia, quoted above.
Remember W's position on NATO expansion => https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/ ... to.georgia

Do you regard Mr Graham's proposal which I quoted above to be "appeasement" ? Yes or No, without equivocation.

Yes, classic appeasement, no question or "equivocation" required.

Interestingly, he knows this, thus the need to try and say it isn't.

He wrongly claims that it would not require an "eroding" of "principles", which it most certainly does.

And he admits that the sole purpose of doing so is to avoid "catastrophic military conflict".

[old salt]

Anyone other than Salty think that appeasement would prevent Putin from ultimately annexing most of or all of Ukraine or destroying democratic rule and creating a puppet state?

Yeah. W's senior advisor on Russia, quoted above.
Remember W's position on NATO expansion => https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/ ... to.georgia

Do you regard Mr Graham's proposal which I quoted above to be "appeasement" ? Yes or No, without equivocation.

Yes, classic appeasement, no question or "equivocation" required.

Interestingly, he knows this, thus the need to try and say it isn't.

He wrongly claims that it would not require an "eroding" of "principles", which it most certainly does.

And he admits that the sole purpose of doing so is to avoid "catastrophic military conflict".

So you conclude that it would be worth a "catastrophic military conflict" to retain the option of NATO offering membership to NATO within the next 20-25 years ? Seriously ? Given Russia's willingness to resort to military action to prevent it, do you think the US public, or our other NATO allies will favor offering NATO membership to Ukraine, knowing that approval must be unanimous among all members.

[MDlaxfan76]

The way I see this horrible situation is that the Biden Admin is establishing solidarity and geopolitical positioning that has not been realized in many years.

We've acted consistently and persuasively with our NATO allies, while also making extremely clear that the US has "big dog" powers that we will exercise regardless of whether our allies prefer, and they need to get onboard as they'll not have any other choice. Eg Nord Stream will be dead if Putin moves, Germany has no veto over it.

And because we've been so transparent about warning about what Russia is doing, at a furious real-time pace, we've effectively combatted the Russian disinformation campaign. We've been assisted in this by a wide ranging volunteer cyber effort that began in reaction to the 2014 invasion, so the BS being spewed by the Russians is being debunked in near real time.

The world knows what is happening and who the aggressor is. And the Ukrainians are far more unified than they've ever been in their resistance to Russia's intimidation.

We've simultaneously been clear that Ukraine is not on the cusp of NATO membership, they remain years away, so the Russian excuse is known to be BS. And Ukraine is very clear that they want to continue to evolve westward and will not be told they can't do so.

We're also reminded that Ukraine was persuaded by the US and the West to give up its nuclear arsenal in exchange for our support and protection.

And yet, we've also made clear that NATO forces will not be directly involved, though we will heavily fund and provide materiel for Ukraine, including in any required insurgency.

And here's where it gets really interesting and important, the sanctions will flow through any bank doing business with Russia and their energy economy. That includes Chines banks, all of which are state owned.

We will enforce those sanctions, meaning those banks will be cut off from the international system should they choose not to comply.

The message that US will not accept the intimidation of a democracy with various alliances to us to be intimidated by force will be heard loudly by Xi.

Fortunately, Xi is surrounded by pragmatists and he himself is a pragmatist. His ambitions are very large, but his horizon is long, so confrontation with us over a clear aggression by Russia will not be worth it.

[MDlaxfan76]

Anyone other than Salty think that appeasement would prevent Putin from ultimately annexing most of or all of Ukraine or destroying democratic rule and creating a puppet state?

Yeah. W's senior advisor on Russia, quoted above.
Remember W's position on NATO expansion => https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/ ... to.georgia

Do you regard Mr Graham's proposal which I quoted above to be "appeasement" ? Yes or No, without equivocation.

Yes, classic appeasement, no question or "equivocation" required.

Interestingly, he knows this, thus the need to try and say it isn't.

He wrongly claims that it would not require an "eroding" of "principles", which it most certainly does.

And he admits that the sole purpose of doing so is to avoid "catastrophic military conflict".

So you conclude that it would be worth a "catastrophic military conflict" to retain the option of NATO offering membership to NATO within the next 20-25 years ? Seriously ? Given Russia's willingness to resort to military action to prevent it, do you think the US public, or our other NATO allies will favor offering NATO membership to Ukraine, knowing that approval must be unanimous among all members.

Where did I say that?

If Putin is going to attack Ukraine, we're not going to enter into it militarily. But we will reign down on Russia extreme pain for having made that choice. And NATO is allied in this, but even if they weren't the other members now know that the US has the capabilities to cut off all access to the international banking system of any company, individual or otherwise not complying with the sanctions. So, expect compliance.

We're also signaling that we will use offensive cyber if Putin uses cyber versus Ukraine or any NATO member. Expect their energy industry to be shut down.