Is America a racist nation?

[PizzaSnake]

I'm no scholar on this topic, but I don't recall reading of a pre-war movement of Japanese sympathizers. On the other hand, a whole lot of Nazi sympathizers, quite prominently so.

And yet, we interned the Japanese Americans...yes, we moved some Germans and a few Italians back from east coast, but no internment.

The decisions on if & how to do the internment was based on the relative potential threats posed & the number of potential internees.

In the wake of Pearl Harbor, there was a real fear of an attack on the US W coast by the Japanese. They did attack in the Aleutians, where they occupied Attu & Kiska islands which were potential air bases from which to attack our W coast.

There was no realistic threat of such an attack on the US E coast by the Germans &/or Italians.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombardment_of_Ellwood

ok, obviously, I mean obviously, the Germans couldn't hit us...they only had u-boats off our shores multiple times.
Off Delaware, off North Carolina, Caribbean etc.

What a bunch of baloney.

The explanation that is usually given is that the German and Italian populations were 'too large' to round up and that it would be 'too disruptive' economically.

Again, a bunch of baloney.

The fact is that there were lots of Nazi sympathizers, beyond German or Italian descent, and there was simply not the same racial identity available to discern who was who.

German American Bund?

https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2017/ ... nd/529185/


https://www.politico.com/magazine/story ... en-215522/


https://www.haaretz.com/amp/us-news/.pr ... -1.5480868

Preston Bush, GW Bush’s grandfather? Henry Ford?

https://www.digitaljournal.com/world/bu ... cle/424715

[Typical Lax Dad]

I'm no scholar on this topic, but I don't recall reading of a pre-war movement of Japanese sympathizers. On the other hand, a whole lot of Nazi sympathizers, quite prominently so.

And yet, we interned the Japanese Americans...yes, we moved some Germans and a few Italians back from east coast, but no internment.

The decisions on if & how to do the internment was based on the relative potential threats posed & the number of potential internees.

In the wake of Pearl Harbor, there was a real fear of an attack on the US W coast by the Japanese. They did attack in the Aleutians, where they occupied Attu & Kiska islands which were potential air bases from which to attack our W coast.

There was no realistic threat of such an attack on the US E coast by the Germans &/or Italians.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombardment_of_Ellwood

ok, obviously, I mean obviously, the Germans couldn't hit us...they only had u-boats off our shores multiple times.
Off Delaware, off North Carolina, Caribbean etc.

What a bunch of baloney.

The explanation that is usually given is that the German and Italian populations were 'too large' to round up and that it would be 'too disruptive' economically.

Again, a bunch of baloney.

The fact is that there were lots of Nazi sympathizers, beyond German or Italian descent, and there was simply not the same racial identity available to discern who was who.

German American Bund?

https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2017/ ... nd/529185/


https://www.politico.com/magazine/story ... en-215522/


https://www.haaretz.com/amp/us-news/.pr ... -1.5480868

Preston Bush, GW Bush’s grandfather? Henry Ford?

https://www.digitaljournal.com/world/bu ... cle/424715

They don’t look like the Japanese.

[DMac]

MDlaxfan76 wrote
It's the requirement for total capitulation, and the second bomb drop, that seem to me to be determined by the racism and desire for revenge.

JMHO but I think it has everything to do with revenge and little to do with racism. This was an enemy of vicious fighters who had killed a lot of Americans, I think that is the main reason most Americans were fine with dropping a couple of mega bombs on their country, just as it would have been had they been Caucasian Germans. These decisions were also made by people in a war state of mind, no doubt many knew a bunch of folks who had been killed by these people so the decision is easily justifiable in their minds, unlike those who question the decision today from their comfy couches.

It is hard to deconvolve the causes, there were many facts / motivations when the decisions were made. Race was certainly in the room, but not clear it was determinative. Fortunately (or un) we know the answer to the question of racism directed at Asians and it has nothing to do with the war. Asians in the US had been subject to racism since mid 19th century, at least.

It took two decades after the war for there to be serious / widespread questioning of the necessity of the bombs. What I know for certain is it would not have taken nearly as long if those had been German cities. There was no one of Japanese ancestry in the room when the decisions were made. Pretty certain that was and would have been the case in regards to German descendants.

Being Japan, made it easier to make the decisions we did.

That is sort of my take. We wipe people off this continent and justified it by dehumanizing them. Not sure why anyone would be it’s beyond questioning in the case of Japan. The war was against Germany, not Germans. We were fighting the Japanese, not Japan. Our actions here at home point to that.

My dad fought against the Germans on the Italian front. Never had the hatred for the Germans he had for the Japanese, not even close. I don't think in his entire life he ever met someone from Japan or even of Japanese descent. Knew lots of Americans of German descent and after the war met a few German immigrants. He railed against the Japanese his entire life.

You used to hear more of these stories. My dad and two other high school buddies from Wayne County WV joined the Marines after Pearl Harbor and after high school graduation. He ended up in Okinawa. I never knew of his experiences, but it definitely wasn’t as a typist. After the surrender he spent time in China processing Japanese prisoners. I did learn from him that they basically had the Japanese guard themselves as the Chinese, given arms, would have certainly killed the Japanese prisoners. I never heard my dad speak poorly of the Japanese.

Several years later in 1979 while my folks were living in Los Angeles, their local school district were hosting Japanese students and teachers from Tokyo. My parents volunteered to host teachers Mr Kicuchi and Mr Kadama for a week. They also hosted a big pool party at their house. I had just moved out to LA myself a few months earlier and got to experience it all. It was a great time and they were exemplary guests. My dad had great respect for the Japanese people and their culture. They stayed in contact with Mr Kicuchi until they expired and me and my mom had the opportunity to dine with him again in Philadelphia in 2002.

Interesting stuff. I hope you taught those Japanese folk a little something about fine dining and the art of scrupulous preparation of the meal du jour.
My father didn't fight the Japanese either, he actually ended up being stationed there from '50 or '51 (after a short stint in Korea where he got shot...again) to '53 or '54. He didn't hate them either but that's not to say 72's dad didn't have a whole lot of like thinkers, wasn't uncommon at all. Gotta hand it to my dad, he didn't seem to carry any hatred toward previous enemies after the wars. He married a German girl (did fight those guys...more getting shot), liked the country, culture and people, learned the language (got a little help from his wife) and got along fine there, had many German friends. Did the same in Japan (minus learning the language), he was good about jumping into the cultures and mingling with the locals.
Here's a picture of me and my brother hangin' with the Asian kids in '53. My old man wasn't telling us to hit those kids with our little baseball bats or anything, it was all good.
(Blond hair was a huge deal there...I used to get mobbed by the locals, so says my mom.)

[old salt]

I'm no scholar on this topic, but I don't recall reading of a pre-war movement of Japanese sympathizers. On the other hand, a whole lot of Nazi sympathizers, quite prominently so.

And yet, we interned the Japanese Americans...yes, we moved some Germans and a few Italians back from east coast, but no internment.

The decisions on if & how to do the internment was based on the relative potential threats posed & the number of potential internees.

In the wake of Pearl Harbor, there was a real fear of an attack on the US W coast by the Japanese. They did attack in the Aleutians, where they occupied Attu & Kiska islands which were potential air bases from which to attack our W coast.

There was no realistic threat of such an attack on the US E coast by the Germans &/or Italians.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombardment_of_Ellwood

ok, obviously, I mean obviously, the Germans couldn't hit us...they only had u-boats off our shores multiple times.
Off Delaware, off North Carolina, Caribbean etc.

What a bunch of baloney.

The explanation that is usually given is that the German and Italian populations were 'too large' to round up and that it would be 'too disruptive' economically.

Again, a bunch of baloney.

The fact is that there were lots of Nazi sympathizers, beyond German or Italian descent, and there was simply not the same racial identity available to discern who was who.

Everything to you is ONLY about race. There was a real fear of a Japanese attack on our W coast. As demonstrated by the public reaction to the sub shelling I linked.

How did Japan attack Pearl Harbor ? (hint : submarines were not decisive)
How did German u-boats " hit us " ? They disrupted shipping. They were not a threat to the mainland. A few spies were captured after they came ashore. How was Germany going to attack the US mainland ?
We scrambled to take back Attu & Kiska as fast as possible before Japan could build air bases from which to bomb our Pacific NW.
Japan's navy gave them the reach to conquer the entire W Pac & reach as far as HI & AK to attack US territory. Germany did not have that capability.
THAT is why there was a panic after Pearl Harbor. It wasn't because of u-boats off the E coast.

[old salt]

I'm not sure it was racism that put people's minds at ease about dropping bombs on Japanese civilians.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing_o ... rld_War_II

Thanks. Seemed like a proportional response. I don’t believe the USA dropped those two bombs based on racism. I have wondered if dehumanizing the enemy (may have been deservedly so) made it easier to sell. I am not sure how anyone could dismiss that as crazy talk. It remains a question. Doubt anyone will ever have a clear answer. Building a case based on the historical record is the best we can do. Dehumanizing people has always made it easier to abuse them. Part of human nature that’s why it’s effective.

Pre-bombing there was no selling the action to the populace. The only consideration of the populace I have ever herd of was the 1) the bogus billions of GIs who would die otherwise and 2) Truman and his advisors concerned about showing the American people what they got for their money, preempting potential congressional investigations after the war. No one asked JQP, it was assumed they were all in, which was probably a correct assessment.

Of course the Russian entry into the war was a consideration. Some think the second bomb was a statement made to the Russians.

Not selling the populace in the bombing, but selling them on the dehumanizing of the Japanese people.

I'm not sure they considered much in the way of public outcry. Their assumption was likely that most of the population agreed with them on how to best and most quickly end the war with Japan while minimizing US casualties.

I think cradle's arguments are accurately reflective of most Americans' point of view at the time. Simply stated most Americans believed that the Japanese deserved anything and everything we could conceivably do to them. There was no limit.

The "dehumanizing" had long happened, the racism that played into it was easy at the time, and there was certainly plenty of justification for anger and desire for revenge.

The notion that this didn't play a role seems rather silly to me. If we hadn't had the nuclear weapons, we'd have rained down as much damage as we could possibly do with conventional bombing until we'd achieved total capitulation. It would have taken longer, but we'd have not restrained any aspect at that point.

It's the requirement for total capitulation, and the second bomb drop, that seem to me to be determined by the racism and desire for revenge. There was an option to allow the Emperor to stay on, thus saving some small face, that we would not consider. Likewise, the quick drop of the second weapon was definitely not necessary to be so swift. Not if it was simply about saving American lives.

I read the deployment of the second bomb was sooner than planned. May have had some back channel communication that they were in the verge of surrender so we upped the timetable.

... there was definitely concern that the Russians were trying to weasel in on the post victory settlement.

The threat of a Soviet invasion of the Japanese mainland was more influential in getting the Japanese to surrender to the US than it was in influencing the US decision to drop the 1st or 2nd bomb.

At Potsdam, it was agreed that the Soviets could occupy Japanese held territory in NE Asia & disputed islands, so long as the 4 large "mainland" Japanese islands were not invaded by the Soviets & left for the US to occupy. The Soviets were not capable of invading the Japanese mainland by themselves. The occupation of the NE Asian territories stretched their capabilities. They had great difficulty retaking the disputed islands.

The Japanese cabinet & Imperial family preferred occupation by the US rather than the Russians.

It may well have been important to the Japanese, but they refused unconditional surrender prior to the bombs.
As I said -- they thought the Soviets were negotiating an armistice on their behalf until the Soviets declared war on them -- the same day we dropped the first bomb.
And I'm not sure you can say with certainty that we weren't motivated to force surrender before the Soviets got more involved. Seems likely it was part of the discussion for bomb one. We bombed as soon as we could. Why delay further ?

May also have been part of the impatience with letting Japan surrender after one, and thus two was dropped so quickly...were the Soviets really in a position to get into it more had we waited a couple of weeks? Read up on the Yalta & Potsdam agreements & the Soviet-Japanese war.

[Kismet]

https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/educati ... tclips/010

"Did Nuclear Weapons Cause Japan to Surrender?

Nuclear weapons shocked Japan into surrendering at the end of World War II—except they didn’t. Japan surrendered because the Soviet Union entered the war. Japanese leaders said the bomb forced them to surrender because it was less embarrassing to say they had been defeated by a miracle weapon. Americans wanted to believe it, and the myth of nuclear weapons was born.

Look at the facts. The United States bombed 68 cities in the summer of 1945. If you graph the number of people killed in all 68 of those attacks, you imagine that Hiroshima is off the charts, because that’s the way it’s usually presented. In fact, Hiroshima is second. Tokyo, a conventional attack, is first in the number killed. If you graph the number of square miles destroyed, Hiroshima is sixth. If you graph the percentage of the city destroyed, Hiroshima is 17th.

Clearly, in terms of the end result—I’m not talking about the means, but in terms of the outcome of the attack—Hiroshima was not exceptional. It was not outside the parameters of attacks that had been going on all summer long. Hiroshima was not militarily decisive.

The Soviet Union’s declaration of war, on the other hand, fundamentally altered the strategic situation. Adding another great power to the war created insoluble military problems for Japan’s leaders. It might be possible to fight against one great power attacking from one direction, but anyone could see that Japan couldn’t defend against two great powers attacking from two different directions at once.

The Soviet declaration of war was decisive; Hiroshima was not.

After Hiroshima, soldiers were still dug in in the beaches. They were still ready to fight. They wanted to fight. There was one fewer city behind them, but they had been losing cities all summer long, at the rate of one every other day, on average. Hiroshima was not a decisive military event. The Soviet entry into the war was.

And they said this. Japan’s leaders identified the Soviet Union as the strategically decisive factor. In a meeting of the Supreme Council in June to discuss the war in general, policy, they said Soviet entry would determine the fate of the empire. Kawabe Toroshiro said, "The absolute maintenance of peace in our relations with the Soviet Union is one of the fundamental conditions for continuing the war."

Japan’s leaders said Hiroshima forced them to surrender because it made a terrific explanation for losing the war. But the facts show that Hiroshima did not force Japan to surrender.

If nuclear weapons are a religion, Hiroshima is the first miracle. What do we make of a religion when its miracles turn out to be false? Nuclear weapons shocked Japan into surrendering in World War II—except they didn’t."

Another view (and an interesting take and variation on OS postulations). Especially note the second to the last paragraph regarding Japan's cultural bias about using the bomb drops as an explanation for their surrender whilst minimizing their loss of face over it. The first two paragraphs reinforce this view (which was articulated by the Japanese themselves at the time). I find this compelling.

As I have said before, history is often complicated.

[MDlaxfan76]

I'm not sure it was racism that put people's minds at ease about dropping bombs on Japanese civilians.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing_o ... rld_War_II

Thanks. Seemed like a proportional response. I don’t believe the USA dropped those two bombs based on racism. I have wondered if dehumanizing the enemy (may have been deservedly so) made it easier to sell. I am not sure how anyone could dismiss that as crazy talk. It remains a question. Doubt anyone will ever have a clear answer. Building a case based on the historical record is the best we can do. Dehumanizing people has always made it easier to abuse them. Part of human nature that’s why it’s effective.

Pre-bombing there was no selling the action to the populace. The only consideration of the populace I have ever herd of was the 1) the bogus billions of GIs who would die otherwise and 2) Truman and his advisors concerned about showing the American people what they got for their money, preempting potential congressional investigations after the war. No one asked JQP, it was assumed they were all in, which was probably a correct assessment.

Of course the Russian entry into the war was a consideration. Some think the second bomb was a statement made to the Russians.

Not selling the populace in the bombing, but selling them on the dehumanizing of the Japanese people.

I'm not sure they considered much in the way of public outcry. Their assumption was likely that most of the population agreed with them on how to best and most quickly end the war with Japan while minimizing US casualties.

I think cradle's arguments are accurately reflective of most Americans' point of view at the time. Simply stated most Americans believed that the Japanese deserved anything and everything we could conceivably do to them. There was no limit.

The "dehumanizing" had long happened, the racism that played into it was easy at the time, and there was certainly plenty of justification for anger and desire for revenge.

The notion that this didn't play a role seems rather silly to me. If we hadn't had the nuclear weapons, we'd have rained down as much damage as we could possibly do with conventional bombing until we'd achieved total capitulation. It would have taken longer, but we'd have not restrained any aspect at that point.

It's the requirement for total capitulation, and the second bomb drop, that seem to me to be determined by the racism and desire for revenge. There was an option to allow the Emperor to stay on, thus saving some small face, that we would not consider. Likewise, the quick drop of the second weapon was definitely not necessary to be so swift. Not if it was simply about saving American lives.

I read the deployment of the second bomb was sooner than planned. May have had some back channel communication that they were in the verge of surrender so we upped the timetable.

... there was definitely concern that the Russians were trying to weasel in on the post victory settlement.

The threat of a Soviet invasion of the Japanese mainland was more influential in getting the Japanese to surrender to the US than it was in influencing the US decision to drop the 1st or 2nd bomb.

At Potsdam, it was agreed that the Soviets could occupy Japanese held territory in NE Asia & disputed islands, so long as the 4 large "mainland" Japanese islands were not invaded by the Soviets & left for the US to occupy. The Soviets were not capable of invading the Japanese mainland by themselves. The occupation of the NE Asian territories stretched their capabilities. They had great difficulty retaking the disputed islands.

The Japanese cabinet & Imperial family preferred occupation by the US rather than the Russians.

It may well have been important to the Japanese, but they refused unconditional surrender prior to the bombs.
As I said -- they thought the Soviets were negotiating an armistice on their behalf until the Soviets declared war on them -- the same day we dropped the first bomb.
And I'm not sure you can say with certainty that we weren't motivated to force surrender before the Soviets got more involved. Seems likely it was part of the discussion for bomb one. We bombed as soon as we could. Why delay further ?

May also have been part of the impatience with letting Japan surrender after one, and thus two was dropped so quickly...were the Soviets really in a position to get into it more had we waited a couple of weeks? Read up on the Yalta & Potsdam agreements & the Soviet-Japanese war.

I've read a lot of that history. Won't call myself an historian, but I've read enough to get a pretty darn clear impression.

What you're saying though, is that in your opinion (not factual) the Japanese would have surrendered because of the Soviet decision, and thus (IMO) neither of the bombs was necessary. Especially not the second.

[Typical Lax Dad]

I'm not sure it was racism that put people's minds at ease about dropping bombs on Japanese civilians.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing_o ... rld_War_II

Thanks. Seemed like a proportional response. I don’t believe the USA dropped those two bombs based on racism. I have wondered if dehumanizing the enemy (may have been deservedly so) made it easier to sell. I am not sure how anyone could dismiss that as crazy talk. It remains a question. Doubt anyone will ever have a clear answer. Building a case based on the historical record is the best we can do. Dehumanizing people has always made it easier to abuse them. Part of human nature that’s why it’s effective.

Pre-bombing there was no selling the action to the populace. The only consideration of the populace I have ever herd of was the 1) the bogus billions of GIs who would die otherwise and 2) Truman and his advisors concerned about showing the American people what they got for their money, preempting potential congressional investigations after the war. No one asked JQP, it was assumed they were all in, which was probably a correct assessment.

Of course the Russian entry into the war was a consideration. Some think the second bomb was a statement made to the Russians.

Not selling the populace in the bombing, but selling them on the dehumanizing of the Japanese people.

I'm not sure they considered much in the way of public outcry. Their assumption was likely that most of the population agreed with them on how to best and most quickly end the war with Japan while minimizing US casualties.

I think cradle's arguments are accurately reflective of most Americans' point of view at the time. Simply stated most Americans believed that the Japanese deserved anything and everything we could conceivably do to them. There was no limit.

The "dehumanizing" had long happened, the racism that played into it was easy at the time, and there was certainly plenty of justification for anger and desire for revenge.

The notion that this didn't play a role seems rather silly to me. If we hadn't had the nuclear weapons, we'd have rained down as much damage as we could possibly do with conventional bombing until we'd achieved total capitulation. It would have taken longer, but we'd have not restrained any aspect at that point.

It's the requirement for total capitulation, and the second bomb drop, that seem to me to be determined by the racism and desire for revenge. There was an option to allow the Emperor to stay on, thus saving some small face, that we would not consider. Likewise, the quick drop of the second weapon was definitely not necessary to be so swift. Not if it was simply about saving American lives.

I read the deployment of the second bomb was sooner than planned. May have had some back channel communication that they were in the verge of surrender so we upped the timetable.

... there was definitely concern that the Russians were trying to weasel in on the post victory settlement.

The threat of a Soviet invasion of the Japanese mainland was more influential in getting the Japanese to surrender to the US than it was in influencing the US decision to drop the 1st or 2nd bomb.

At Potsdam, it was agreed that the Soviets could occupy Japanese held territory in NE Asia & disputed islands, so long as the 4 large "mainland" Japanese islands were not invaded by the Soviets & left for the US to occupy. The Soviets were not capable of invading the Japanese mainland by themselves. The occupation of the NE Asian territories stretched their capabilities. They had great difficulty retaking the disputed islands.

The Japanese cabinet & Imperial family preferred occupation by the US rather than the Russians.

It may well have been important to the Japanese, but they refused unconditional surrender prior to the bombs.
As I said -- they thought the Soviets were negotiating an armistice on their behalf until the Soviets declared war on them -- the same day we dropped the first bomb.
And I'm not sure you can say with certainty that we weren't motivated to force surrender before the Soviets got more involved. Seems likely it was part of the discussion for bomb one. We bombed as soon as we could. Why delay further ?

May also have been part of the impatience with letting Japan surrender after one, and thus two was dropped so quickly...were the Soviets really in a position to get into it more had we waited a couple of weeks? Read up on the Yalta & Potsdam agreements & the Soviet-Japanese war.

I've read a lot of that history. Won't call myself an historian, but I've read enough to get a pretty darn clear impression.

What you're saying though, is that in your opinion (not factual) the Japanese would have surrendered because of the Soviet decision, and thus (IMO) neither of the bombs was necessary. Especially not the second.

That’s the implication. Also seems to be supported by contemporaneous documents that indicated that Japan was on the verge of surrender. Old Salt is right.

[MDlaxfan76]

I'm no scholar on this topic, but I don't recall reading of a pre-war movement of Japanese sympathizers. On the other hand, a whole lot of Nazi sympathizers, quite prominently so.

And yet, we interned the Japanese Americans...yes, we moved some Germans and a few Italians back from east coast, but no internment.

The decisions on if & how to do the internment was based on the relative potential threats posed & the number of potential internees.

In the wake of Pearl Harbor, there was a real fear of an attack on the US W coast by the Japanese. They did attack in the Aleutians, where they occupied Attu & Kiska islands which were potential air bases from which to attack our W coast.

There was no realistic threat of such an attack on the US E coast by the Germans &/or Italians.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombardment_of_Ellwood

ok, obviously, I mean obviously, the Germans couldn't hit us...they only had u-boats off our shores multiple times.
Off Delaware, off North Carolina, Caribbean etc.

What a bunch of baloney.

The explanation that is usually given is that the German and Italian populations were 'too large' to round up and that it would be 'too disruptive' economically.

Again, a bunch of baloney.

The fact is that there were lots of Nazi sympathizers, beyond German or Italian descent, and there was simply not the same racial identity available to discern who was who.

Everything to you is ONLY about race. There was a real fear of a Japanese attack on our W coast. As demonstrated by the public reaction to the sub shelling I linked.

How did Japan attack Pearl Harbor ? (hint : submarines were not decisive)
How did German u-boats " hit us " ? They disrupted shipping. They were not a threat to the mainland. A few spies were captured after they came ashore. How was Germany going to attack the US mainland ?
We scrambled to take back Attu & Kiska as fast as possible before Japan could build air bases from which to bomb our Pacific NW.
Japan's navy gave them the reach to conquer the entire W Pac & reach as far as HI & AK to attack US territory. Germany did not have that capability.
THAT is why there was a panic after Pearl Harbor. It wasn't because of u-boats off the E coast.

I could say 100 times the exact opposite, and you would nevertheless think I "ONLY" consider race. Which is total BS and you actually know it.

I'm merely saying that it was a factor, an important factor, and potentially a decisive factor in some instances. Particularly the second bomb and certainly the internment.

But far from the "only" factor, indeed IMO it's fair to say that concern for American lives, "fear", anger, revenge were all critical factors as well.

But when you say "fear", I think you're ignoring that much of that "fear" was specifically constituted in racial stereotyping. A fear Americans did not have in remotely the same way about German or Italian ancestry or country of origin.

No, the differential was not rationally based. There's no doubt that the Germans were every bit as capable of an aggression via sea, and certainly the possibility of spies and sabotage of ports and rail etc were just as real, indeed arguably much more so, from German and Italian Americans. Indeed, Germans and Italians would have a much easier time of being nondescript in a sea of white Americans than would Japanese.

And yet, we made a very different call. And yes, that was about race. And "fear".

Indeed, the contemporaneous writings at the time made eminently clear the deep racial prejudices motivating those in charge as well as the American public. I suggest you do some homework on those writings; see LG Dewitt's, Western Defense Command in charge of the internment, testimony to Congress: "I don't want any of them [persons of Japanese ancestry] here. They are a dangerous element. There is no way to determine their loyalty... It makes no difference whether he is an American citizen, he is still a Japanese. American citizenship does not necessarily determine loyalty... But we must worry about the Japanese all the time until he is wiped off the map" and in many interviews: "A Jap's a Jap".

While most of the camps were closed in 1945 (long, long after the Japanese fleet had been decimated), the last of the camps was not closed until March 1946, a full 6 months after Japan's surrender.

And just as all sorts of other racially based "fears" have been used to justify all sorts of other actions throughout American history, this was as well.

I think what is consistent in our dialogue Salty is not that I think "ONLY about race", but rather that you are so adamantly in denial, on pretty much every example of where racial prejudices have been influential in our American history. Always an excuse.

What are you so afraid of?

[MDlaxfan76]

I'm not sure it was racism that put people's minds at ease about dropping bombs on Japanese civilians.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing_o ... rld_War_II

Thanks. Seemed like a proportional response. I don’t believe the USA dropped those two bombs based on racism. I have wondered if dehumanizing the enemy (may have been deservedly so) made it easier to sell. I am not sure how anyone could dismiss that as crazy talk. It remains a question. Doubt anyone will ever have a clear answer. Building a case based on the historical record is the best we can do. Dehumanizing people has always made it easier to abuse them. Part of human nature that’s why it’s effective.

Pre-bombing there was no selling the action to the populace. The only consideration of the populace I have ever herd of was the 1) the bogus billions of GIs who would die otherwise and 2) Truman and his advisors concerned about showing the American people what they got for their money, preempting potential congressional investigations after the war. No one asked JQP, it was assumed they were all in, which was probably a correct assessment.

Of course the Russian entry into the war was a consideration. Some think the second bomb was a statement made to the Russians.

Not selling the populace in the bombing, but selling them on the dehumanizing of the Japanese people.

I'm not sure they considered much in the way of public outcry. Their assumption was likely that most of the population agreed with them on how to best and most quickly end the war with Japan while minimizing US casualties.

I think cradle's arguments are accurately reflective of most Americans' point of view at the time. Simply stated most Americans believed that the Japanese deserved anything and everything we could conceivably do to them. There was no limit.

The "dehumanizing" had long happened, the racism that played into it was easy at the time, and there was certainly plenty of justification for anger and desire for revenge.

The notion that this didn't play a role seems rather silly to me. If we hadn't had the nuclear weapons, we'd have rained down as much damage as we could possibly do with conventional bombing until we'd achieved total capitulation. It would have taken longer, but we'd have not restrained any aspect at that point.

It's the requirement for total capitulation, and the second bomb drop, that seem to me to be determined by the racism and desire for revenge. There was an option to allow the Emperor to stay on, thus saving some small face, that we would not consider. Likewise, the quick drop of the second weapon was definitely not necessary to be so swift. Not if it was simply about saving American lives.

I read the deployment of the second bomb was sooner than planned. May have had some back channel communication that they were in the verge of surrender so we upped the timetable.

... there was definitely concern that the Russians were trying to weasel in on the post victory settlement.

The threat of a Soviet invasion of the Japanese mainland was more influential in getting the Japanese to surrender to the US than it was in influencing the US decision to drop the 1st or 2nd bomb.

At Potsdam, it was agreed that the Soviets could occupy Japanese held territory in NE Asia & disputed islands, so long as the 4 large "mainland" Japanese islands were not invaded by the Soviets & left for the US to occupy. The Soviets were not capable of invading the Japanese mainland by themselves. The occupation of the NE Asian territories stretched their capabilities. They had great difficulty retaking the disputed islands.

The Japanese cabinet & Imperial family preferred occupation by the US rather than the Russians.

It may well have been important to the Japanese, but they refused unconditional surrender prior to the bombs.
As I said -- they thought the Soviets were negotiating an armistice on their behalf until the Soviets declared war on them -- the same day we dropped the first bomb.
And I'm not sure you can say with certainty that we weren't motivated to force surrender before the Soviets got more involved. Seems likely it was part of the discussion for bomb one. We bombed as soon as we could. Why delay further ?

May also have been part of the impatience with letting Japan surrender after one, and thus two was dropped so quickly...were the Soviets really in a position to get into it more had we waited a couple of weeks? Read up on the Yalta & Potsdam agreements & the Soviet-Japanese war.

I've read a lot of that history. Won't call myself an historian, but I've read enough to get a pretty darn clear impression.

What you're saying though, is that in your opinion (not factual) the Japanese would have surrendered because of the Soviet decision, and thus (IMO) neither of the bombs was necessary. Especially not the second.

That’s the implication. Also seems to be supported by contemporaneous documents that indicated that Japan was on the verge of surrender. Old Salt is right.

Which would mean that neither weapon was necessary, much less the rapid drop of the second one.

Now, whether Salty is correct that the Japanese motivation was decisively based on fear of the Soviet occupation versus the US, I don't know, and I'm not sure we could ever know, but surely the implication of that contention is that our dropping of the bombs was unnecessary if so...and absolutely unnecessary to drop the second bomb with so little opportunity for Japan to surrender in the wake of the first.

[jhu72]

https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/educati ... tclips/010

"Did Nuclear Weapons Cause Japan to Surrender?

Nuclear weapons shocked Japan into surrendering at the end of World War II—except they didn’t. Japan surrendered because the Soviet Union entered the war. Japanese leaders said the bomb forced them to surrender because it was less embarrassing to say they had been defeated by a miracle weapon. Americans wanted to believe it, and the myth of nuclear weapons was born.

Look at the facts. The United States bombed 68 cities in the summer of 1945. If you graph the number of people killed in all 68 of those attacks, you imagine that Hiroshima is off the charts, because that’s the way it’s usually presented. In fact, Hiroshima is second. Tokyo, a conventional attack, is first in the number killed. If you graph the number of square miles destroyed, Hiroshima is sixth. If you graph the percentage of the city destroyed, Hiroshima is 17th.

Clearly, in terms of the end result—I’m not talking about the means, but in terms of the outcome of the attack—Hiroshima was not exceptional. It was not outside the parameters of attacks that had been going on all summer long. Hiroshima was not militarily decisive.

The Soviet Union’s declaration of war, on the other hand, fundamentally altered the strategic situation. Adding another great power to the war created insoluble military problems for Japan’s leaders. It might be possible to fight against one great power attacking from one direction, but anyone could see that Japan couldn’t defend against two great powers attacking from two different directions at once.

The Soviet declaration of war was decisive; Hiroshima was not.

After Hiroshima, soldiers were still dug in in the beaches. They were still ready to fight. They wanted to fight. There was one fewer city behind them, but they had been losing cities all summer long, at the rate of one every other day, on average. Hiroshima was not a decisive military event. The Soviet entry into the war was.

And they said this. Japan’s leaders identified the Soviet Union as the strategically decisive factor. In a meeting of the Supreme Council in June to discuss the war in general, policy, they said Soviet entry would determine the fate of the empire. Kawabe Toroshiro said, "The absolute maintenance of peace in our relations with the Soviet Union is one of the fundamental conditions for continuing the war."

Japan’s leaders said Hiroshima forced them to surrender because it made a terrific explanation for losing the war. But the facts show that Hiroshima did not force Japan to surrender.

If nuclear weapons are a religion, Hiroshima is the first miracle. What do we make of a religion when its miracles turn out to be false? Nuclear weapons shocked Japan into surrendering in World War II—except they didn’t."

Another view (and an interesting take and variation on OS postulations). Especially note the second to the last paragraph regarding Japan's cultural bias about using the bomb drops as an explanation for their surrender whilst minimizing their loss of face over it. The first two paragraphs reinforce this view (which was articulated by the Japanese themselves at the time). I find this compelling.

As I have said before, history is often complicated.

... nice find. So basically the bombs made no difference if you believe Japanese sources and Carnegie analysts.

This bothers me in that it requires us to believe the Japanese thought they could go on fighting the US and its allies, WHICH WAS CLEARLY NOT SOMETHING THAT WAS DOABLE. The end of the war was a matter of time, there was no longer any chance the Japanese could win. All they could do was delay. The next step after the bomb was clear and it was not hundreds of thousands of allied troops invading the home islands given the allied fears of the cost of such a campaign. I think either the Japanese were lying or making a very serious miscalculation.

They could not fight the US allies and the Russians, they admit this. But somehow they thought they could fight the US allies by themselves, allies which clearly would pound them into the ground killing millions more Japanese the longer the war went on and ultimately still end in their defeat and surrender. Makes no sense to me.

[Kismet]

https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/educati ... tclips/010

"Did Nuclear Weapons Cause Japan to Surrender?

Nuclear weapons shocked Japan into surrendering at the end of World War II—except they didn’t. Japan surrendered because the Soviet Union entered the war. Japanese leaders said the bomb forced them to surrender because it was less embarrassing to say they had been defeated by a miracle weapon. Americans wanted to believe it, and the myth of nuclear weapons was born.

Look at the facts. The United States bombed 68 cities in the summer of 1945. If you graph the number of people killed in all 68 of those attacks, you imagine that Hiroshima is off the charts, because that’s the way it’s usually presented. In fact, Hiroshima is second. Tokyo, a conventional attack, is first in the number killed. If you graph the number of square miles destroyed, Hiroshima is sixth. If you graph the percentage of the city destroyed, Hiroshima is 17th.

Clearly, in terms of the end result—I’m not talking about the means, but in terms of the outcome of the attack—Hiroshima was not exceptional. It was not outside the parameters of attacks that had been going on all summer long. Hiroshima was not militarily decisive.

The Soviet Union’s declaration of war, on the other hand, fundamentally altered the strategic situation. Adding another great power to the war created insoluble military problems for Japan’s leaders. It might be possible to fight against one great power attacking from one direction, but anyone could see that Japan couldn’t defend against two great powers attacking from two different directions at once.

The Soviet declaration of war was decisive; Hiroshima was not.

After Hiroshima, soldiers were still dug in in the beaches. They were still ready to fight. They wanted to fight. There was one fewer city behind them, but they had been losing cities all summer long, at the rate of one every other day, on average. Hiroshima was not a decisive military event. The Soviet entry into the war was.

And they said this. Japan’s leaders identified the Soviet Union as the strategically decisive factor. In a meeting of the Supreme Council in June to discuss the war in general, policy, they said Soviet entry would determine the fate of the empire. Kawabe Toroshiro said, "The absolute maintenance of peace in our relations with the Soviet Union is one of the fundamental conditions for continuing the war."

Japan’s leaders said Hiroshima forced them to surrender because it made a terrific explanation for losing the war. But the facts show that Hiroshima did not force Japan to surrender.

If nuclear weapons are a religion, Hiroshima is the first miracle. What do we make of a religion when its miracles turn out to be false? Nuclear weapons shocked Japan into surrendering in World War II—except they didn’t."

Another view (and an interesting take and variation on OS postulations). Especially note the second to the last paragraph regarding Japan's cultural bias about using the bomb drops as an explanation for their surrender whilst minimizing their loss of face over it. The first two paragraphs reinforce this view (which was articulated by the Japanese themselves at the time). I find this compelling.

As I have said before, history is often complicated.

... nice find. So basically the bombs made no difference if you believe Japanese sources and Carnegie analysts.

This bothers me in that it requires us to believe the Japanese thought they could go on fighting the US and its allies, WHICH WAS CLEARLY NOT SOMETHING THAT WAS DOABLE. The end of the war was a matter of time, there was no longer any chance the Japanese could win. All they could do was delay. The next step after the bomb was clear and it was not hundreds of thousands of allied troops invading the home islands given the allied fears of the cost of such a campaign. I think either the Japanese were lying or making a very serious miscalculation.

They could not fight the US allies and the Russians, they admit this. But somehow they thought they could fight the US allies by themselves, allies which clearly would pound them into the ground killing millions more Japanese the longer the war went on and ultimately still end in their defeat and surrender. Makes no sense to me.

As I said, history IS OFTEN complicated. This theory might be partially true. I'm sure Hiroshima got the Japanese government's attention in some fashion although this piece posits that the massive incendiary bombing campaign that proceeded it was vastly more damaging and deadly. The theory is that they were much more worried about the Soviets occupying territory than the Americans which is many ways does make some sense. The authors maintain that the deployment of the two nuclear bombs gave the Japanese leaders the cover to surrender as they did to insure an American vs. Soviet occupation. They seemingly found a cultural face-saving rationale in surrendering unconditionally using the atomic bombs as a reason to give up. It's just one opinion but it rings true and some level. The reality may be somewhere in between it and other theories on the reasoning for the dual atomic bombings in such close proximity timewise. Parts of the theory seem plausible. Then again, perhaps it was all coincidental, I suppose.

[Andersen]

According to the terrific historian David Kennedy at Stanford, the Japanese would not have surrendered and would have continued to, (irrationally), fight on, to the very bitter end, if we had not agreed to allow Emperor Hirohito to stay on the throne. When we agreed to that, they surrendered.

[old salt]

No, the differential was not rationally based. There's no doubt that the Germans were every bit as capable of an aggression via sea, and certainly the possibility of spies and sabotage of ports and rail etc were just as real, indeed arguably much more so, from German and Italian Americans. Indeed, Germans and Italians would have a much easier time of being nondescript in a sea of white Americans than would Japanese.

That is just absurd. You're racial paranoia now extends back into history. The Axis powers had spies in the US, some even came ashore from u-boats. How many ports or rail lines were sabotaged ?

In contrast to Japan, the Germans & Italians did not have adequate seapower or reach to threaten the US mainland. They had no aircraft carriers, limited short range amphib & logistics capabilities. They were bottled up in home waters by the Royal Navy. The Graf Spee & the Bismark broke out. How did they fare ?

At the start of the War, Japan had naval superiority & used it to good effect.
The early fears of a seaborne attack on our W coast were reasonable & rational.

[old salt]

https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/educati ... tclips/010

"Did Nuclear Weapons Cause Japan to Surrender?

Another view (and an interesting take and variation on OS postulations). Especially note the second to the last paragraph regarding Japan's cultural bias about using the bomb drops as an explanation for their surrender whilst minimizing their loss of face over it. The first two paragraphs reinforce this view (which was articulated by the Japanese themselves at the time). I find this compelling.

As I have said before, history is often complicated.

... nice find. So basically the bombs made no difference if you believe Japanese sources and Carnegie analysts.

This bothers me in that it requires us to believe the Japanese thought they could go on fighting the US and its allies, WHICH WAS CLEARLY NOT SOMETHING THAT WAS DOABLE. The end of the war was a matter of time, there was no longer any chance the Japanese could win. All they could do was delay. The next step after the bomb was clear and it was not hundreds of thousands of allied troops invading the home islands given the allied fears of the cost of such a campaign. I think either the Japanese were lying or making a very serious miscalculation.

They could not fight the US allies and the Russians, they admit this. But somehow they thought they could fight the US allies by themselves, allies which clearly would pound them into the ground killing millions more Japanese the longer the war went on and ultimately still end in their defeat and surrender. Makes no sense to me.

As I said, history IS OFTEN complicated. This theory might be partially true. I'm sure Hiroshima got the Japanese government's attention in some fashion although this piece posits that the massive incendiary bombing campaign that proceeded it was vastly more damaging and deadly. The theory is that they were much more worried about the Soviets occupying territory than the Americans which is many ways does make some sense. The authors maintain that the deployment of the two nuclear bombs gave the Japanese leaders the cover to surrender as they did to insure an American vs. Soviet occupation. They seemingly found a cultural face-saving rationale in surrendering unconditionally using the atomic bombs as a reason to give up. It's just one opinion but it rings true and some level. The reality may be somewhere in between it and other theories on the reasoning for the dual atomic bombings in such close proximity timewise. Parts of the theory seem plausible. Then again, perhaps it was all coincidental, I suppose.

jhu72 - To leap to the conclusion that the use of nuclear weapons did not matter is just absurd. That's not what that article said. It was pointing out other factors & the timing that factored into the decision to surrender. Before the bomb AND the Soviet entry (on the same day) they hoped for a negotiated peace.

This is why these self-loathing, race based, guilt driven revisions of history are a waste of time.
We are now supposed to feel guilty for using the bomb, for using 2 bombs, & for doing it for racist reasons.
We have lost our minds.

[cradleandshoot]

Seems winning a war, now has to have an argumenta asterisks and it can not merely be winning for the sake of winning.

This is interesting, echoing TLD, thanks.

I still think like in a fight, if you have to do it you do it to win definitively and if that means biting nuts then so be it. The point if you get into it is to end it as fast as possible.

https://www.armscontrol.org/pressroom/2 ... a-nagasaki

Seems like many were of the opinion that the war was over. We make fun of lacrosse teams up 20-5 in lacrosse and then leaving all the starters in to run up the score….but that’s a sport.

Three days later, U.S. leaders ordered “Fat Man,” a plutonium-based bomb with an explosive yield of 21 kilotons, dropped on Nagasaki, home to over 260,000 people.

The attack occurred two days earlier than planned, 10 hours after the Soviets entered the war against Japan, and as Japanese leaders were contemplating surrender.

The Japanese should have contemplated their situation much quicker. It should have taken about 10 seconds after Hiroshima to understand it was game over. The emperor was the person who made the final decision to surrender. The Japanese military would have fought the war until the last Japanese capable of firing a weapon was dead.

That’s the conclusion you and the other historians drew?

That is the conclusion I drew. In what parralel universe could the Japanese not know it was game over? The very nature of the Japanese empire looks at surrender as the ultimate humiliation. They sort of proved that determination through the entire island hopping campaign in the South Pacific. Failure was never an option but it was an inevitability.

[cradleandshoot]

https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/educati ... tclips/010

"Did Nuclear Weapons Cause Japan to Surrender?

Another view (and an interesting take and variation on OS postulations). Especially note the second to the last paragraph regarding Japan's cultural bias about using the bomb drops as an explanation for their surrender whilst minimizing their loss of face over it. The first two paragraphs reinforce this view (which was articulated by the Japanese themselves at the time). I find this compelling.

As I have said before, history is often complicated.

... nice find. So basically the bombs made no difference if you believe Japanese sources and Carnegie analysts.

This bothers me in that it requires us to believe the Japanese thought they could go on fighting the US and its allies, WHICH WAS CLEARLY NOT SOMETHING THAT WAS DOABLE. The end of the war was a matter of time, there was no longer any chance the Japanese could win. All they could do was delay. The next step after the bomb was clear and it was not hundreds of thousands of allied troops invading the home islands given the allied fears of the cost of such a campaign. I think either the Japanese were lying or making a very serious miscalculation.

They could not fight the US allies and the Russians, they admit this. But somehow they thought they could fight the US allies by themselves, allies which clearly would pound them into the ground killing millions more Japanese the longer the war went on and ultimately still end in their defeat and surrender. Makes no sense to me.

As I said, history IS OFTEN complicated. This theory might be partially true. I'm sure Hiroshima got the Japanese government's attention in some fashion although this piece posits that the massive incendiary bombing campaign that proceeded it was vastly more damaging and deadly. The theory is that they were much more worried about the Soviets occupying territory than the Americans which is many ways does make some sense. The authors maintain that the deployment of the two nuclear bombs gave the Japanese leaders the cover to surrender as they did to insure an American vs. Soviet occupation. They seemingly found a cultural face-saving rationale in surrendering unconditionally using the atomic bombs as a reason to give up. It's just one opinion but it rings true and some level. The reality may be somewhere in between it and other theories on the reasoning for the dual atomic bombings in such close proximity timewise. Parts of the theory seem plausible. Then again, perhaps it was all coincidental, I suppose.

jhu72 - To leap to the conclusion that the use of nuclear weapons did not matter is just absurd. That's not what that article said. It was pointing out other factors & the timing that factored into the decision to surrender.

This is why these self-loathing, race based, guilt driven revisions of history are a waste of time.
We are now supposed to feel guilty for using the bomb, for using 2 bombs, & for doing it for racist reasons.
We have lost our minds.

+1 I hope this attempt by some folks to redefine our nations decision to bomb these 2 cities is understood for exactly what it is...a lame if not determined effort to make the USA the bad guy.

[cradleandshoot]

JFTR how was the Soviets declaring war on Japan nothing more than a symbolic gesture? The Soviets had an impressive land army. I don't think they had any realistic possibility of transporting that army in any realistic time frame to ever make a difference.

[DMac]

I don't feel the least bit guilty. The world had lost ITS mind and was in a state of war with pretty much no holds barred.
It's more or less a w*t*f did you think was going to happen situation. We had the big hammer(s) and Japan was the perfect nail, and there was reasonable, or at least arguable, justification for using it. Made an awful lot of Marines real happy at the time as well as a whole bunch of others. Looking back and dissecting it today is for the historians, many of whom might see it differently than the boys in the fox holes did.
Go USA

[Kismet]

https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/educati ... tclips/010

"Did Nuclear Weapons Cause Japan to Surrender?

Another view (and an interesting take and variation on OS postulations). Especially note the second to the last paragraph regarding Japan's cultural bias about using the bomb drops as an explanation for their surrender whilst minimizing their loss of face over it. The first two paragraphs reinforce this view (which was articulated by the Japanese themselves at the time). I find this compelling.

As I have said before, history is often complicated.

... nice find. So basically the bombs made no difference if you believe Japanese sources and Carnegie analysts.

This bothers me in that it requires us to believe the Japanese thought they could go on fighting the US and its allies, WHICH WAS CLEARLY NOT SOMETHING THAT WAS DOABLE. The end of the war was a matter of time, there was no longer any chance the Japanese could win. All they could do was delay. The next step after the bomb was clear and it was not hundreds of thousands of allied troops invading the home islands given the allied fears of the cost of such a campaign. I think either the Japanese were lying or making a very serious miscalculation.

They could not fight the US allies and the Russians, they admit this. But somehow they thought they could fight the US allies by themselves, allies which clearly would pound them into the ground killing millions more Japanese the longer the war went on and ultimately still end in their defeat and surrender. Makes no sense to me.

As I said, history IS OFTEN complicated. This theory might be partially true. I'm sure Hiroshima got the Japanese government's attention in some fashion although this piece posits that the massive incendiary bombing campaign that proceeded it was vastly more damaging and deadly. The theory is that they were much more worried about the Soviets occupying territory than the Americans which is many ways does make some sense. The authors maintain that the deployment of the two nuclear bombs gave the Japanese leaders the cover to surrender as they did to insure an American vs. Soviet occupation. They seemingly found a cultural face-saving rationale in surrendering unconditionally using the atomic bombs as a reason to give up. It's just one opinion but it rings true and some level. The reality may be somewhere in between it and other theories on the reasoning for the dual atomic bombings in such close proximity timewise. Parts of the theory seem plausible. Then again, perhaps it was all coincidental, I suppose.

jhu72 - To leap to the conclusion that the use of nuclear weapons did not matter is just absurd. That's not what that article said. It was pointing out other factors & the timing that factored into the decision to surrender. Before the bomb AND the Soviet entry (on the same day) they hoped for a negotiated peace.

This is why these self-loathing, race based, guilt driven revisions of history are a waste of time.
We are now supposed to feel guilty for using the bomb, for using 2 bombs, & for doing it for racist reasons.
We have lost our minds.

Yep. I suspect our intelligence people did a whole lot of research on BUSHIDO when deciding whether to drop the bomb or how many to use in the context of the Soviet threat. Both FDR and Truman did not trust Stalin as far as they could throw him. Ditto Churchill and Atlee (who replaced Churchill as PM the month before we dropped the bombs).