old salt wrote: ↑Wed Nov 17, 2021 2:30 pm
MDlaxfan76 wrote: ↑Wed Nov 17, 2021 8:33 am
Salty likes to pretend that only he knows the "complexity" of the situation, while making absolutist judgments that reject that complexity, whereas most of us are saying that there were numerous factors, that should not be denied as real. What actually was in the key decision maker's minds, exactly how they weighed all the various factors, we can't know with 100% certainty, indeed even the participants had difficulty parsing out all those influences. But we do find more than sufficient evidence that supports each of the factors in turn as being part of the equation. What were the tipping elements is much more difficult, but at least to my view, without the racial animus piece, the second bomb would not have been dropped, and quite possibly neither would the first.
Here is what you said, with which I took issue :
(1) I think the point was that had we agreed earlier that the Emperor could remain, the nuclear option would not have been required. But instead we kept demanding "unconditional" surrender. And they kept saying 'no'. In the end, we didn't really need "unconditional".
(2) I can't fathom why the second bomb was necessary...they certainly needed time to process what had happened, and we were in no greater risk had we simply waited for that to occur.
With just a minimum of research (like a wikisearch), it becomes obvious why (1) was not a realistic possibility when you see what was going on within the Japanese govt. Your "wish" was not possible.
Likewise, if you examine what was going on between bombs #1 & #2, it becomes obvious why #2 was necessary.
There was no reason to believe the militarists would ever relent & that the Emperor would survive & maintain control of his military.
That is why Truman was preparing to drop #3 on Tokyo as soon as it became available & he may well have done so during the delay in accepting the terms if he had a #3 ready.
And you keep ignoring all the evidence that addresses your absolute certainty, indeed substantially refutes it.
But that's ok, because I definitely think there's countervailing 'evidence' both directions. We certainly didn't have surefire insight into what Japan would and would not do, once they understood the calamity they'd just suffered. But I read that lack of surefire insight as calling for a bit more patience, and the lack thereof as quite plausibly explained, at least in part, by the racial animus. A factor, not the sole factor.
But the racial animus was definitely real.