Is America a racist nation?

[Typical Lax Dad]

In 1945, not many Americans seemed to be thinking things through. Those cold statistics and that war-time hatred made using the bomb easy to rationalize. Leo Szilard was one of those few, when he worried that using it without any warning would hurt America’s moral standing in the world. In the years that followed, some Americans who were intimately involved with the atomic bombs did start to think things through. Admiral Leahy, President Roosevelt’s Chief of Staff, wrote in his memoir:
It is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender… My own feeling was that in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make wars in that fashion, and that wars cannot be won by destroying women and children.

Even some of those who participated in the mission had regrets. Captain Robert A. Lewis, co-pilot on the Enola Gay’s mission over Hiroshima, wrote in his log as the bomb exploded, “My god, what have we done?” In 1955 he participated in an episode of the television show This is Your Life that featured a Hiroshima survivor. Lewis donated money on behalf of his employer for operations to help remove the scar tissue of young Japanese women horribly disfigured by the bomb ten years earlier.
America supposedly places a high value on life. To a significant portion of the country, protecting a fertilized human egg is so important; they are willing to base their vote on this one issue alone. And humaneness extends to the animal world as well. People go to prison for being cruel to their pets. In a society that places so much value on life, how can the immense death and suffering of non-combatants caused by the atomic bombs be justified? Opponents of President Truman’s decision to use those weapons argue simply that it cannot.

[old salt]

Hate America First.

Far fewer Japanese died from the 2 bombs than had the B-29 fire bombing continued.

Look, we have seen anti-Asian racism from multiple people on our own forum here in the 21st century.

Are you suggesting that anti-Asian racism played no role in how we conducted the war against Japan or how the United States treated its own Japanese American citizens?

DocBarrister

Good night Tokyo Rose.

[old salt]

I think the point was that had we agreed earlier that the Emperor could remain, the nuclear option would not have been required. But instead we kept demanding "unconditional" surrender. And they kept saying 'no'. In the end, we didn't really need "unconditional".

I can't fathom why the second bomb was necessary...they certainly needed time to process what had happened, and we were in no greater risk had we simply waited for that to occur.

It is so ez to 2nd guess with the benefit of hindsight. Things were much more complex than you presume.
-- we needed unconditional surrender to occupy the country, disarm the military, punish war criminals & to govern the country.
-- the allies did not agree on the future of the Emperor. They could not guarantee he'd stay.
-- they did not know if they could count on the Emperor, or if he would survive. There was an attempted coup after he agreed to surrender.
-- the Soviet invasion was more of an influence on the Japanese than on the Allies. After the 1st bomb, the cabinet was anxious to surrender before the Soviets could get there & occupy. The military were committed to fight to the last.
-- even after the 2nd bomb, the hard core military holdouts would not agree to occupation & other conditions, & yet there was still a coup attempt.
-- the Emperor survived the coup & the senior military leaders finally accepted the inevitable.
-- only then, after the Emperor survived the coup, agreed to unconditional surrender, & demonstrated control of the cabinet & military, could the Allies be assured & agree that he could stay.
obtw -- the Allies were the victors. They set the terms.

Regarding "time to process", consider all the "processing" that took place between bomb #1 & surrender.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surrender_of_Japan
The Potsdam Declaration
It was decided to issue a statement, the Potsdam Declaration, defining "Unconditional Surrender" and clarifying what it meant for the position of the emperor and for Hirohito personally. The American and British governments strongly disagreed on this point—the United States wanted to abolish the position and possibly try him as a war criminal, while the British wanted to retain the position, perhaps with Hirohito still reigning. Furthermore, although it would not initially be a party to the declaration, the Soviet government also had to be consulted since it would be expected to endorse it upon entering the war. The Potsdam Declaration went through many drafts until a version acceptable to all was found.[74]

On July 26, the United States, Britain and China released the Potsdam Declaration announcing the terms for Japan's surrender, with the warning, "We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay."

For Japan, the terms of the declaration specified:
the elimination "for all time [of] the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest"

The only use of the term "unconditional surrender" came at the end of the declaration:
"We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction."
Contrary to what had been intended at its conception, the Declaration made no mention of the Emperor at all. Allied intentions on issues of utmost importance to the Japanese, including whether Hirohito was to be regarded as one of those who had "misled the people of Japan" or even a war criminal, or alternatively, whether the Emperor might become part of a "peacefully inclined and responsible government" were thus left unstated.

The "prompt and utter destruction" clause has been interpreted as a veiled warning about American possession of the atomic bomb (which had been tested successfully on the first day of the conference).

Japanese reaction
On July 27, the Japanese government considered how to respond to the Declaration. The four military members of the Big Six wanted to reject it, but Tōgō, acting under the mistaken impression that the Soviet government had no prior knowledge of its contents, persuaded the cabinet not to do so until he could get a reaction from Moscow. In a telegram, Shun'ichi Kase, Japan's ambassador to Switzerland, observed that "unconditional surrender" applied only to the military and not to the government or the people, and he pleaded that it should be understood that the careful language of Potsdam appeared "to have occasioned a great deal of thought" on the part of the signatory governments—"they seem to have taken pains to save face for us on various points."[76] The next day, Japanese newspapers reported that the Declaration, the text of which had been broadcast and dropped by leaflet into Japan, had been rejected. In an attempt to manage public perception, Prime Minister Suzuki met with the press, and stated:

I consider the Joint Proclamation a rehash of the Declaration at the Cairo Conference. As for the Government, it does not attach any important value to it at all. The only thing to do is just kill it with silence (mokusatsu). We will do nothing but press on to the bitter end to bring about a successful completion of the war.[77]

Hiroshima, Manchuria, and Nagasaki
August 6: Hiroshima

On August 6 at 8:15 AM local time, the Enola Gay, a Boeing B-29 Superfortress piloted by Colonel Paul Tibbets, dropped an atomic bomb (code-named Little Boy by the U.S.) on the city of Hiroshima in southwest Honshū.[82] Throughout the day, confused reports reached Tokyo that Hiroshima had been the target of an air raid, which had leveled the city with a "blinding flash and violent blast". Later that day, they received U.S. President Truman's broadcast announcing the first use of an atomic bomb, and promising:

We are now prepared to obliterate more rapidly and completely every productive enterprise the Japanese have above ground in any city. We shall destroy their docks, their factories, and their communications. Let there be no mistake; we shall completely destroy Japan's power to make war. It was to spare the Japanese people from utter destruction that the ultimatum of July 26 was issued at Potsdam. Their leaders promptly rejected that ultimatum. If they do not now accept our terms they may expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been seen on this earth ...[83]

The Japanese Army and Navy had their own independent atomic-bomb programs and therefore the Japanese understood enough to know how very difficult building it would be. Therefore, many Japanese and in particular the military members of the government refused to believe the United States had built an atomic bomb, and the Japanese military ordered their own independent tests to determine the cause of Hiroshima's destruction.[84] Admiral Soemu Toyoda, the Chief of the Naval General Staff, argued that even if the United States had made one, they could not have many more.[85] American strategists, having anticipated a reaction like Toyoda's, planned to drop a second bomb shortly after the first, to convince the Japanese that the U.S. had a large supply.[61][86]

August 9: Soviet invasion and Nagasaki

Atomic bombing of Nagasaki
At 04:00 on August 9 word reached Tokyo that the Soviet Union had broken the Neutrality Pact,[87][88][89] declared war on Japan,[90] subscribed to the Potsdam Declaration and launched an invasion of Manchuria.[91]

When the Russians invaded Manchuria, they sliced through what had once been an elite army and many Russian units only stopped when they ran out of gas. Japanese intelligence was predicting that U.S. forces might not invade for months. Soviet forces, on the other hand, could be in Japan proper in as little as 10 days.

The Soviet invasion made a decision on ending the war extremely time sensitive.
These "twin shocks"—the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and the Soviet entry—had immediate profound effects on Prime Minister Kantarō Suzuki and Foreign Minister Shigenori Tōgō, who concurred that the government must end the war at once.[93] However, the senior leadership of the Japanese Army took the news in stride, grossly underestimating the scale of the attack. With the support of Minister of War Anami, they started preparing to impose martial law on the nation, to stop anyone attempting to make peace.[94] Hirohito told Kido to "quickly control the situation" because "the Soviet Union has declared war and today began hostilities against us."

The Supreme Council met at 10:30. Suzuki, who had just come from a meeting with the Emperor, said it was impossible to continue the war. Tōgō said that they could accept the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, but they needed a guarantee of the Emperor's position. Navy Minister Yonai said that they had to make some diplomatic proposal—they could no longer afford to wait for better circumstances.

In the middle of the meeting, shortly after 11:00, news arrived that Nagasaki, on the west coast of Kyūshū, had been hit by a second atomic bomb (called "Fat Man" by the United States). By the time the meeting ended, the Big Six had split 3–3. Suzuki, Tōgō, and Admiral Yonai favored Tōgō's one additional condition to Potsdam, while General Anami, General Umezu, and Admiral Toyoda insisted on three further terms that modified Potsdam: that Japan handle their own disarmament, that Japan deal with any Japanese war criminals, and that there be no occupation of Japan.[96]

Following the atomic bombing of Nagasaki, Truman issued another statement:

The British, Chinese, and United States Governments have given the Japanese people adequate warning of what is in store for them. We have laid down the general terms on which they can surrender. Our warning went unheeded; our terms were rejected. Since then the Japanese have seen what our atomic bomb can do. They can foresee what it will do in the future.

The world will note that the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, a military base. That was because we wished in this first attack to avoid, insofar as possible, the killing of civilians. But that attack is only a warning of things to come. If Japan does not surrender, bombs will have to be dropped on her war industries and, unfortunately, thousands of civilian lives will be lost. I urge Japanese civilians to leave industrial cities immediately, and save themselves from destruction.

I realize the tragic significance of the atomic bomb.
Its production and its use were not lightly undertaken by this Government. But we knew that our enemies were on the search for it. We know now how close they were to finding it. And we knew the disaster which would come to this Nation, and to all peace-loving nations, to all civilization, if they had found it first.
That is why we felt compelled to undertake the long and uncertain and costly labor of discovery and production.
We won the race of discovery against the Germans.
Having found the bomb we have used it. We have used it against those who attacked us without warning at Pearl Harbor, against those who have starved and beaten and executed American prisoners of war, against those who have abandoned all pretense of obeying international laws of warfare. We have used it in order to shorten the agony of war, in order to save the lives of thousands and thousands of young Americans.
We shall continue to use it until we completely destroy Japan's power to make war. Only a Japanese surrender will stop us.[97]

Discussions of surrender

War Minister Korechika Anami
The full Japanese cabinet met at 14:30 on August 9, and spent most of the day debating surrender. As the Big Six had done, the cabinet split, with neither Tōgō's position nor Anami's attracting a majority.[98] Anami told the other cabinet ministers that under torture a captured American P-51 Mustang fighter pilot, Marcus McDilda, had told his interrogators that the United States possessed a stockpile of 100 atom bombs and that Tokyo and Kyoto would be destroyed "in the next few days".[99]

In reality the United States would not have had a third bomb ready for use until around August 19, and a fourth in September.[100] However the Japanese leadership had no way to know the size of the United States' stockpile, and feared the United States might have the capacity not just to devastate individual cities, but to wipe out the Japanese people as a race and nation. Indeed, in the morning meeting Anami had already expressed a desire for this outcome rather than surrender, stating "Would it not be wondrous for this whole nation to be destroyed like a beautiful flower?"

The cabinet meeting adjourned at 17:30 with no consensus. A second meeting lasting from 18:00 to 22:00 also ended with no consensus. Following this second meeting, Suzuki and Tōgō met the Emperor, and Suzuki proposed an impromptu Imperial conference, which started just before midnight on the night of August 9–10.[102] Suzuki presented Anami's four-condition proposal as the consensus position of the Supreme Council. The other members of the Supreme Council spoke, as did Kiichirō Hiranuma, the President of the Privy Council, who outlined Japan's inability to defend itself and also described the country's domestic problems, such as the shortage of food. The cabinet debated, but again no consensus emerged. At around 02:00 (August 10), Suzuki finally addressed Emperor Hirohito, asking him to decide between the two positions. The participants later recollected that the Emperor stated:

I have given serious thought to the situation prevailing at home and abroad and have concluded that continuing the war can only mean destruction for the nation and prolongation of bloodshed and cruelty in the world. I cannot bear to see my innocent people suffer any longer. ...

I was told by those advocating a continuation of hostilities that by June new divisions would be in place in fortified positions [at Kujūkuri Beach, east of Tokyo] ready for the invader when he sought to land. It is now August and the fortifications still have not been completed. ...

There are those who say the key to national survival lies in a decisive battle in the homeland. The experiences of the past, however, show that there has always been a discrepancy between plans and performance. I do not believe that the discrepancy in the case of Kujūkuri can be rectified. Since this is also the shape of things, how can we repel the invaders? [He then made some specific reference to the increased destructiveness of the atomic bomb.]

It goes without saying that it is unbearable for me to see the brave and loyal fighting men of Japan disarmed. It is equally unbearable that others who have rendered me devoted service should now be punished as instigators of the war. Nevertheless, the time has come to bear the unbearable. ...

I swallow my tears and give my sanction to the proposal to accept the Allied proclamation on the basis outlined by [Tōgō,] the Foreign Minister.[103]

According to General Sumihisa Ikeda and Admiral Zenshirō Hoshina, Privy Council President Hiranuma then turned to the Emperor and asked him: "Your majesty, you also bear responsibility (sekinin) for this defeat. What apology are you going to make to the heroic spirits of the imperial founder of your house and your other imperial ancestors?"[104]

Once the Emperor had left, Suzuki pushed the cabinet to accept the Emperor's will, which it did. Early that morning (August 10), the Foreign Ministry sent telegrams to the Allies (by way of Max Grässli at the Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs ) announcing that Japan would accept the Potsdam Declaration, but would not accept any peace conditions that would "prejudice the prerogatives" of the Emperor. That effectively meant no change in Japan's form of government—that the Emperor of Japan would remain a position of real power.[105]

August 12
The Allied response to Japan's qualified acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration was written by James F. Byrnes and approved by the British, Chinese, and Soviet governments, although the Soviets agreed only reluctantly. The Allies sent their response (via the Swiss Foreign Affairs Department) on August 12. On the status of the Emperor it said:

From the moment of surrender the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the surrender terms. ... The ultimate form of government of Japan shall, in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.[106]

President Truman issued instructions that no further atomic weapons were to be dropped on Japan without presidential orders,[107] but allowed military operations (including the B-29 firebombings) to continue until official word of Japanese surrender was received. However, news correspondents incorrectly interpreted a comment by General Carl Spaatz, commander of the U.S. Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific, that the B-29s were not flying on August 11 (because of bad weather) as a statement that a ceasefire was in effect. To avoid giving the Japanese the impression that the Allies had abandoned peace efforts and resumed bombing, Truman then ordered a halt to all further bombings.[108][109]

The Japanese cabinet considered the Allied response, and Suzuki argued that they must reject it and insist on an explicit guarantee for the imperial system. Anami returned to his position that there be no occupation of Japan. Afterward, Tōgō told Suzuki that there was no hope of getting better terms, and Kido conveyed the Emperor's will that Japan surrender. In a meeting with the Emperor, Yonai spoke of his concerns about growing civil unrest:

I think the term is inappropriate, but the atomic bombs and the Soviet entry into the war are, in a sense, divine gifts. This way we don't have to say that we have quit the war because of domestic circumstances.[110]

That day, Hirohito informed the imperial family of his decision to surrender. One of his uncles, Prince Asaka, then asked whether the war would be continued if the kokutai (imperial sovereignty) could not be preserved. The Emperor simply replied "of course."[111][112]

August 13–14
At the suggestion of American psychological operations experts, B-29s spent August 13 dropping leaflets over Japan, describing the Japanese offer of surrender and the Allied response.[113] The leaflets, some of which fell upon the Imperial Palace as the Emperor and his advisors met, had a profound effect on the Japanese decision-making process. It had become clear that a complete and total acceptance of Allied terms, even if it meant the dissolution of the Japanese government as it then existed, was the only possible way to secure peace.[113] The Big Six and the cabinet debated their reply to the Allied response late into the night, but remained deadlocked. Meanwhile, the Allies grew doubtful, waiting for the Japanese to respond. The Japanese had been instructed that they could transmit an unqualified acceptance in the clear, but instead they sent out coded messages on matters unrelated to the surrender parlay. The Allies took this coded response as non-acceptance of the terms.[113]

A leaflet dropped on Japan after the bombing of Hiroshima. The leaflet says, in part: The Japanese people are facing an extremely important autumn. Your military leaders were presented with thirteen articles for surrender by our three-country alliance to put an end to this unprofitable war. This proposal was ignored by your army leaders... [T]he United States has developed an atom bomb, which had not been done by any nation before. It has been determined to employ this frightening bomb. One atom bomb has the destructive power of 2000 B-29s.
Via Ultra intercepts, the Allies also detected increased diplomatic and military traffic, which was taken as evidence that the Japanese were preparing an "all-out banzai attack."[113] President Truman ordered a resumption of attacks against Japan at maximum intensity "so as to impress Japanese officials that we mean business and are serious in getting them to accept our peace proposals without delay."[113] In the largest and longest bombing raid of the Pacific War, more than 400 B-29s attacked Japan during daylight on August 14, and more than 300 that night.[114][115] A total of 1,014 aircraft were used with no losses.[116] B-29s from the 315 Bombardment Wing flew 6,100 km (3,800 mi) to destroy the Nippon Oil Company refinery at Tsuchizaki on the northern tip of Honshū. This was the last operational refinery in the Japanese Home Islands, and it produced 67% of their oil.[117] The attacks would continue right through the announcement of the Japanese surrender, and indeed for some time afterwards.[118]

Truman had ordered a halt to atomic bombings on August 10, upon receiving news that another bomb would be ready for use against Japan in about a week. He told his cabinet that he could not stand the thought of killing "all those kids."[107] By August 14, however, Truman remarked "sadly" to the British ambassador that "he now had no alternative but to order an atomic bomb dropped on Tokyo,"[119] as some of his military staff had been advocating.[120]

As August 14 dawned, Suzuki, Kido, and the Emperor realized the day would end with either an acceptance of the American terms or a military coup.[121] The Emperor met with the most senior Army and Navy officers. While several spoke in favor of fighting on, Field Marshal Shunroku Hata did not. As commander of the Second General Army, the headquarters of which had been in Hiroshima, Hata commanded all the troops defending southern Japan—the troops preparing to fight the "decisive battle". Hata said he had no confidence in defeating the invasion and did not dispute the Emperor's decision. The Emperor asked his military leaders to cooperate with him in ending the war.[121]

At a conference with the cabinet and other councilors, Anami, Toyoda, and Umezu again made their case for continuing to fight, after which the Emperor said:

I have listened carefully to each of the arguments presented in opposition to the view that Japan should accept the Allied reply as it stands and without further clarification or modification, but my own thoughts have not undergone any change. ... In order that the people may know my decision, I request you to prepare at once an imperial rescript so that I may broadcast to the nation. Finally, I call upon each and every one of you to exert himself to the utmost so that we may meet the trying days which lie ahead.[122]

The cabinet immediately convened and unanimously ratified the Emperor's wishes. They also decided to destroy vast amounts of material pertaining to war crimes and the war responsibility of the nation's highest leaders.[123] Immediately after the conference, the Foreign Ministry transmitted orders to its embassies in Switzerland and Sweden to accept the Allied terms of surrender. These orders were picked up and received in Washington at 02:49, August 14.[122]

Difficulty with senior commanders on the distant war fronts was anticipated. Three princes of the Imperial Family who held military commissions were dispatched on August 14 to deliver the news personally. Prince Tsuneyoshi Takeda went to Korea and Manchuria, Prince Yasuhiko Asaka to the China Expeditionary Army and China Fleet, and Prince Kan'in Haruhito to Shanghai, South China, Indochina and Singapore.[124][125]

The text of the Imperial Rescript on surrender was finalized by 19:00 August 14, transcribed by the official court calligrapher, and brought to the cabinet for their signatures. Around 23:00, the Emperor, with help from an NHK recording crew, made a gramophone record of himself reading it.[126] The record was given to court chamberlain Yoshihiro Tokugawa, who hid it in a locker in the office of Empress Kōjun's secretary.[127]

Attempted coup d'état (August 12–15)

Late on the night of August 12, 1945, Major Kenji Hatanaka, along with Lieutenant Colonels Masataka Ida, Masahiko Takeshita (Anami's brother-in-law), and Inaba Masao, and Colonel Okikatsu Arao, the Chief of the Military Affairs Section, spoke to War Minister Korechika Anami (the army minister and "most powerful figure in Japan besides the Emperor himself"),[128] and asked him to do whatever he could to prevent acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration. General Anami refused to say whether he would help the young officers in treason.[129] As much as they needed his support, Hatanaka and the other rebels decided they had no choice but to continue planning and to attempt a coup d'état on their own. Hatanaka spent much of August 13 and the morning of August 14 gathering allies, seeking support from the higher-ups in the Ministry, and perfecting his plot.[130]

Shortly after the conference on the night of August 13–14 at which the surrender finally was decided, a group of senior army officers including Anami gathered in a nearby room. All those present were concerned about the possibility of a coup d'état to prevent the surrender—some of those present may have even been considering launching one. After a silence, General Torashirō Kawabe proposed that all senior officers present sign an agreement to carry out the Emperor's order of surrender—"The Army will act in accordance with the Imperial Decision to the last." It was signed by all the high-ranking officers present, including Anami, Hajime Sugiyama, Yoshijirō Umezu, Kenji Doihara, Torashirō Kawabe, Masakazu Kawabe, and Tadaichi Wakamatsu. "This written accord by the most senior officers in the Army ... acted as a formidable firebreak against any attempt to incite a coup d'état in Tokyo."[131]

The coup collapsed after Shizuichi Tanaka convinced the rebellious officers to go home. Tanaka committed suicide nine days later.

Surrender
Emperor Hirohito gave different reasons to the public and the military for the surrender: When addressing the public, he said, "the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is, indeed, incalculable ... . Should we continue to fight, not only would it result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization."[148] When addressing the military, he did not mention the "new and most cruel bomb" but rather said that "the Soviet Union has entered the war against us, [and] to continue the war ... would [endanger] the very foundation of the Empire's existence."[148]

[Kismet]

[Well sure. But does a statue in NYC City Council accomplish any of that?

Perhaps as a reminder that without Jefferson and others there might not even be a NY City Council. Everything is relative in history and there are few absolutes.

[Kismet]

^^^ how 'bout a link to your source ?

Truth

C'mon TLD. Cite your source. Unless, of course, its your own view of events.

If your view, that the second bomb on Nagasaki was, indeed, a "field test" of the plutonium bomb on a living population that would be truly awful. Might also explain why Oppenheimer and some of the scientists who developed the bomb later regretted their activities as their bosses may have had different ideas on how to use what they created and how terrible it really was


Recall that Oppenheimer was later branded a communist sympathizer after his public regrets and views of further proliferation of nuclear weapons by many of the same people who supported its development and use.

Unlike my earlier reference to R.E. Lee in my HS AP History class - we had NADA on any of this situation even though it was hugely more relevant to our real lives at the time (as we sat under our desks for the air raid drill).

[Typical Lax Dad]

^^^ how 'bout a link to your source ?

Truth

C'mon TLD. Cite your source. Unless, of course, its your own view of events.

If your view, that the second bomb on Nagasaki was, indeed, a "field test" of the plutonium bomb on a living population that would be truly awful. Might also explain why Oppenheimer and some of the scientists who developed the bomb later regretted their activities as their bosses may have had different ideas on how to use what they created and how terrible it really was


Recall that Oppenheimer was later branded a communist sympathizer after his public regrets and views of further proliferation of nuclear weapons by many of the same people who supported its development and use.

Here you go: https://www.historyonthenet.com/reasons ... tomic-bomb

Seems like VDH’s opinion isn’t the only opinion.

[Kismet]

^^^ how 'bout a link to your source ?

Truth

C'mon TLD. Cite your source. Unless, of course, its your own view of events.

If your view, that the second bomb on Nagasaki was, indeed, a "field test" of the plutonium bomb on a living population that would be truly awful. Might also explain why Oppenheimer and some of the scientists who developed the bomb later regretted their activities as their bosses may have had different ideas on how to use what they created and how terrible it really was


Recall that Oppenheimer was later branded a communist sympathizer after his public regrets and views of further proliferation of nuclear weapons by many of the same people who supported its development and use.

Here you go: https://www.historyonthenet.com/reasons ... tomic-bomb

Thx. Same link I posted a few pages back in this thread as a primer on the issues surrounding the events.

[Typical Lax Dad]

^^^ how 'bout a link to your source ?

Truth

C'mon TLD. Cite your source. Unless, of course, its your own view of events.

If your view, that the second bomb on Nagasaki was, indeed, a "field test" of the plutonium bomb on a living population that would be truly awful. Might also explain why Oppenheimer and some of the scientists who developed the bomb later regretted their activities as their bosses may have had different ideas on how to use what they created and how terrible it really was


Recall that Oppenheimer was later branded a communist sympathizer after his public regrets and views of further proliferation of nuclear weapons by many of the same people who supported its development and use.

Here you go: https://www.historyonthenet.com/reasons ... tomic-bomb

Thx. Same link I posted a few pages back in this thread as a primer on the issues surrounding the events.

I thought I had seen it.

[Kismet]

^^^ how 'bout a link to your source ?

Truth

C'mon TLD. Cite your source. Unless, of course, its your own view of events.

If your view, that the second bomb on Nagasaki was, indeed, a "field test" of the plutonium bomb on a living population that would be truly awful. Might also explain why Oppenheimer and some of the scientists who developed the bomb later regretted their activities as their bosses may have had different ideas on how to use what they created and how terrible it really was


Recall that Oppenheimer was later branded a communist sympathizer after his public regrets and views of further proliferation of nuclear weapons by many of the same people who supported its development and use.

Here you go: https://www.historyonthenet.com/reasons ... tomic-bomb

Thx. Same link I posted a few pages back in this thread as a primer on the issues surrounding the events.

I thought I had seen it.

It only represents ONE side of the issues surrounding the events. There are other views representing the other side that are just as rational and compelling. ...at least for those making the decision at the time.

Frankly, I'd be appalled at my government/President if the primary reason they dropped the second bomb was to "live test" the plutonium bomb. They all knew how awful a weapon they had. Had FDR lived a few more months might have been a different outcome.

[MDlaxfan76]

^^^ how 'bout a link to your source ?

Truth

C'mon TLD. Cite your source. Unless, of course, its your own view of events.

If your view, that the second bomb on Nagasaki was, indeed, a "field test" of the plutonium bomb on a living population that would be truly awful. Might also explain why Oppenheimer and some of the scientists who developed the bomb later regretted their activities as their bosses may have had different ideas on how to use what they created and how terrible it really was


Recall that Oppenheimer was later branded a communist sympathizer after his public regrets and views of further proliferation of nuclear weapons by many of the same people who supported its development and use.

Here you go: https://www.historyonthenet.com/reasons ... tomic-bomb

Thx. Same link I posted a few pages back in this thread as a primer on the issues surrounding the events.

I thought I had seen it.

It only represents ONE side of the issues surrounding the events. There are other views representing the other side that are just as rational and compelling. ...at least for those making the decision at the time.

Frankly, I'd be appalled at my government/President if the primary reason they dropped the second bomb was to "live test" the plutonium bomb. They all knew how awful a weapon they had. Had FDR lived a few more months might have been a different outcome.

Actually, the advantage of that source is that they've collected the arguments and their rationales on what happened and why from different, opposing perspectives. You need to follow the links to the opposing points of view.

Salty likes to pretend that only he knows the "complexity" of the situation, while making absolutist judgments that reject that complexity, whereas most of us are saying that there were numerous factors, that should not be denied as real. What actually was in the key decision maker's minds, exactly how they weighed all the various factors, we can't know with 100% certainty, indeed even the participants had difficulty parsing out all those influences. But we do find more than sufficient evidence that supports each of the factors in turn as being part of the equation. What were the tipping elements is much more difficult, but at least to my view, without the racial animus piece, the second bomb would not have been dropped, and quite possibly neither would the first.

Where I have less difficulty identifying the importance of that racist animus is in the treatment of Japanese-Americans versus German and Italian Americans.

[Typical Lax Dad]

^^^ how 'bout a link to your source ?

Truth

C'mon TLD. Cite your source. Unless, of course, its your own view of events.

If your view, that the second bomb on Nagasaki was, indeed, a "field test" of the plutonium bomb on a living population that would be truly awful. Might also explain why Oppenheimer and some of the scientists who developed the bomb later regretted their activities as their bosses may have had different ideas on how to use what they created and how terrible it really was


Recall that Oppenheimer was later branded a communist sympathizer after his public regrets and views of further proliferation of nuclear weapons by many of the same people who supported its development and use.

Here you go: https://www.historyonthenet.com/reasons ... tomic-bomb

Thx. Same link I posted a few pages back in this thread as a primer on the issues surrounding the events.

I thought I had seen it.

It only represents ONE side of the issues surrounding the events. There are other views representing the other side that are just as rational and compelling. ...at least for those making the decision at the time.

Frankly, I'd be appalled at my government/President if the primary reason they dropped the second bomb was to "live test" the plutonium bomb. They all knew how awful a weapon they had. Had FDR lived a few more months might have been a different outcome.

Actually, the advantage of that source is that they've collected the arguments and their rationales on what happened and why from different, opposing perspectives. You need to follow the links to the opposing points of view.

Salty likes to pretend that only he knows the "complexity" of the situation, while making absolutist judgments that reject that complexity, whereas most of us are saying that there were numerous factors, that should not be denied as real. What actually was in the key decision maker's minds, exactly how they weighed all the various factors, we can't know with 100% certainty, indeed even the participants had difficulty parsing out all those influences. But we do find more than sufficient evidence that supports each of the factors in turn as being part of the equation. What were the tipping elements is much more difficult, but at least to my view, without the racial animus piece, the second bomb would not have been dropped, and quite possibly neither would the first.

Where I have less difficulty identifying the importance of that racist animus is in the treatment of Japanese-Americans versus German and Italian Americans.

Yep.

[Kismet]

https://www.history.com/news/hiroshima- ... ender-wwii

"Hiroshima, Then Nagasaki: Why the US Deployed the Second A-Bomb
The explicit reason was to swiftly end the war with Japan. But it was also intended to send a message to the Soviets."

Makes much more sense than then "field test" theory. In fact, Gen. Lemay called it for what it was at the time. Interesting that Nagasaki was the secondary target as the primary Kokura (present-day Kitakyushu) was obscured by bad weather.

[Typical Lax Dad]

https://www.history.com/news/hiroshima- ... ender-wwii

"Hiroshima, Then Nagasaki: Why the US Deployed the Second A-Bomb
The explicit reason was to swiftly end the war with Japan. But it was also intended to send a message to the Soviets."

Makes much more sense than then "field test" theory. In fact, Gen. Lemay called it for what it was at the time. Interesting that Nagasaki was the secondary target as the primary Kokura (present-day Kitakyushu) was obscured by bad weather.

Yep. Also, makes me wonder if they weren’t “japs”, if we would have found another way to “send a message”.

[Kismet]

https://www.history.com/news/hiroshima- ... ender-wwii

"Hiroshima, Then Nagasaki: Why the US Deployed the Second A-Bomb
The explicit reason was to swiftly end the war with Japan. But it was also intended to send a message to the Soviets."

Makes much more sense than then "field test" theory. In fact, Gen. Lemay called it for what it was at the time. Interesting that Nagasaki was the secondary target as the primary Kokura (present-day Kitakyushu) was obscured by bad weather.

Yep. Also, makes me wonder if they weren’t “japs”, if we would have found another way to “send a message”.

Perhaps. But they were also the folks who attacked us without warning, routinely mis-treated POWs (Bataan death March as one horrific example) and committed a multitude of other war crimes and actions outside the Geneva Conventions including genocide.

[Typical Lax Dad]

https://www.history.com/news/hiroshima- ... ender-wwii

"Hiroshima, Then Nagasaki: Why the US Deployed the Second A-Bomb
The explicit reason was to swiftly end the war with Japan. But it was also intended to send a message to the Soviets."

Makes much more sense than then "field test" theory. In fact, Gen. Lemay called it for what it was at the time. Interesting that Nagasaki was the secondary target as the primary Kokura (present-day Kitakyushu) was obscured by bad weather.

Yep. Also, makes me wonder if they weren’t “japs”, if we would have found another way to “send a message”.

Perhaps. But they were also the folks who attacked us without warning, routinely mis-treated POWs (Bataan death March as one horrific example) and committed a multitude of other war crimes and actions outside the Geneva Conventions including genocide.

I don’t disagree. Dehumanizing people makes it easier to justify all sorts of things. Japanese people are no different in that regard. You read about the German Coast uprising? What kind of actions were those? I had never heard of it until recently.

EDIT: Just happened to see this when I revisited the topic after my post. That’s a very good site you referenced earlier, BTW.

https://ushistoryscene.com/article/germ ... -uprising/

[old salt]

Salty likes to pretend that only he knows the "complexity" of the situation, while making absolutist judgments that reject that complexity, whereas most of us are saying that there were numerous factors, that should not be denied as real. What actually was in the key decision maker's minds, exactly how they weighed all the various factors, we can't know with 100% certainty, indeed even the participants had difficulty parsing out all those influences. But we do find more than sufficient evidence that supports each of the factors in turn as being part of the equation. What were the tipping elements is much more difficult, but at least to my view, without the racial animus piece, the second bomb would not have been dropped, and quite possibly neither would the first.

Here is what you said, with which I took issue :

(1) I think the point was that had we agreed earlier that the Emperor could remain, the nuclear option would not have been required. But instead we kept demanding "unconditional" surrender. And they kept saying 'no'. In the end, we didn't really need "unconditional".

(2) I can't fathom why the second bomb was necessary...they certainly needed time to process what had happened, and we were in no greater risk had we simply waited for that to occur.

With just a minimum of research (like a wikisearch), it becomes obvious why (1) was not a realistic possibility when you see what was going on within the Japanese govt. Your "wish" was not possible.

Likewise, if you examine what was going on between bombs #1 & #2, it becomes obvious why #2 was necessary.
There was no reason to believe the militarists would ever relent & that the Emperor would survive & maintain control of his military.
That is why Truman was preparing to drop #3 on Tokyo as soon as it became available & he may well have done so during the delay in accepting the terms if he had a #3 ready.

[old salt]

Salty likes to pretend that only he knows the "complexity" of the situation, while making absolutist judgments that reject that complexity, whereas most of us are saying that there were numerous factors, that should not be denied as real. What actually was in the key decision maker's minds, exactly how they weighed all the various factors, we can't know with 100% certainty, indeed even the participants had difficulty parsing out all those influences. But we do find more than sufficient evidence that supports each of the factors in turn as being part of the equation. What were the tipping elements is much more difficult, but at least to my view, without the racial animus piece, the second bomb would not have been dropped, and quite possibly neither would the first.

Here is what you said, with which I took issue :

(1) I think the point was that had we agreed earlier that the Emperor could remain, the nuclear option would not have been required. But instead we kept demanding "unconditional" surrender. And they kept saying 'no'. In the end, we didn't really need "unconditional".

(2) I can't fathom why the second bomb was necessary...they certainly needed time to process what had happened, and we were in no greater risk had we simply waited for that to occur.

With just a minimum of research (like a wikisearch), it becomes obvious why (1) was not a realistic possibility when you see what was going on within the Japanese govt. Your "wish" was not possible.

Likewise, if you examine what was going on between bombs #1 & #2, it becomes obvious why #2 was necessary.
There was no reason to believe the militarists would ever relent & that the Emperor would survive & maintain control of his military.
That is why Truman was preparing to drop #3 on Tokyo as soon as it became available & he may well have done so during the delay in accepting the terms if he had a #3 ready.

...& here's the threat of Soviet invasion which was supposed to be a factor rushing Truman to drop the bomb.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposed_ ... f_Hokkaido

[PizzaSnake]

Salty likes to pretend that only he knows the "complexity" of the situation, while making absolutist judgments that reject that complexity, whereas most of us are saying that there were numerous factors, that should not be denied as real. What actually was in the key decision maker's minds, exactly how they weighed all the various factors, we can't know with 100% certainty, indeed even the participants had difficulty parsing out all those influences. But we do find more than sufficient evidence that supports each of the factors in turn as being part of the equation. What were the tipping elements is much more difficult, but at least to my view, without the racial animus piece, the second bomb would not have been dropped, and quite possibly neither would the first.

Here is what you said, with which I took issue :

(1) I think the point was that had we agreed earlier that the Emperor could remain, the nuclear option would not have been required. But instead we kept demanding "unconditional" surrender. And they kept saying 'no'. In the end, we didn't really need "unconditional".

(2) I can't fathom why the second bomb was necessary...they certainly needed time to process what had happened, and we were in no greater risk had we simply waited for that to occur.

With just a minimum of research (like a wikisearch), it becomes obvious why (1) was not a realistic possibility when you see what was going on within the Japanese govt. Your "wish" was not possible.

Likewise, if you examine what was going on between bombs #1 & #2, it becomes obvious why #2 was necessary.
There was no reason to believe the militarists would ever relent & that the Emperor would survive & maintain control of his military.
That is why Truman was preparing to drop #3 on Tokyo as soon as it became available & he may well have done so during the delay in accepting the terms if he had a #3 ready.

"That is why Truman was preparing to drop #3 on Tokyo as soon as it became available & he may well have done so during the delay in accepting the terms if he had a #3 ready."

So Operation Meetinghouse wasn't enough?

"The Operation Meetinghouse firebombing of Tokyo on the night of 9 March 1945 was the single deadliest air raid of World War II,[22] greater than Dresden,[23] Hamburg, Hiroshima, or Nagasaki as single events.[24][25]"

Speaking of charming, "The bombs were mostly the 500-pound (230 kg) E-46 cluster bomb which released 38 napalm-carrying M-69 incendiary bomblets at an altitude of 2,000–2,500 ft (610–760 m). The M-69s punched through thin roofing material or landed on the ground; in either case they ignited 3–5 seconds later, throwing out a jet of flaming napalm globs. A lesser number of M-47 incendiaries were also dropped: the M-47 was a 100-pound (45 kg) jelled-gasoline and white phosphorus bomb which ignited upon impact."

"White phosphorus is pyrophoric (self-ignites on contact with air), burns fiercely, and can ignite cloth, fuel, ammunition, and other combustibles."

"If on the other hand the toxic properties of white phosphorus are specifically intended to be used as a weapon, that, of course, is prohibited, because the way the convention is structured or applied, any chemicals used against humans or animals that cause harm or death through the toxic properties of the chemical are considered chemical weapons.[83]"

"Use of aerial incendiary bombs against civilian populations, including against military targets in civilian areas, was banned in the 1980 United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons Protocol III. However the United States reserved the right to use incendiary weapons against military objectives located in concentrations of civilians where it is judged that such use would cause fewer casualties and/or less collateral damage than alternative weapons.[4]"

So, who gets to make that judgement ? Sounds like debating how many pinheads can dance on the head of an angel...or maybe "military intelligence".

[old salt]

Salty likes to pretend that only he knows the "complexity" of the situation, while making absolutist judgments that reject that complexity, whereas most of us are saying that there were numerous factors, that should not be denied as real. What actually was in the key decision maker's minds, exactly how they weighed all the various factors, we can't know with 100% certainty, indeed even the participants had difficulty parsing out all those influences. But we do find more than sufficient evidence that supports each of the factors in turn as being part of the equation. What were the tipping elements is much more difficult, but at least to my view, without the racial animus piece, the second bomb would not have been dropped, and quite possibly neither would the first.

Here is what you said, with which I took issue :

(1) I think the point was that had we agreed earlier that the Emperor could remain, the nuclear option would not have been required. But instead we kept demanding "unconditional" surrender. And they kept saying 'no'. In the end, we didn't really need "unconditional".

(2) I can't fathom why the second bomb was necessary...they certainly needed time to process what had happened, and we were in no greater risk had we simply waited for that to occur.

With just a minimum of research (like a wikisearch), it becomes obvious why (1) was not a realistic possibility when you see what was going on within the Japanese govt. Your "wish" was not possible.

Likewise, if you examine what was going on between bombs #1 & #2, it becomes obvious why #2 was necessary.
There was no reason to believe the militarists would ever relent & that the Emperor would survive & maintain control of his military.
That is why Truman was preparing to drop #3 on Tokyo as soon as it became available & he may well have done so during the delay in accepting the terms if he had a #3 ready.

"That is why Truman was preparing to drop #3 on Tokyo as soon as it became available & he may well have done so during the delay in accepting the terms if he had a #3 ready."

So Operation Meetinghouse wasn't enough?

"The Operation Meetinghouse firebombing of Tokyo on the night of 9 March 1945 was the single deadliest air raid of World War II,[22] greater than Dresden,[23] Hamburg, Hiroshima, or Nagasaki as single events.[24][25]"

Speaking of charming, "The bombs were mostly the 500-pound (230 kg) E-46 cluster bomb which released 38 napalm-carrying M-69 incendiary bomblets at an altitude of 2,000–2,500 ft (610–760 m). The M-69s punched through thin roofing material or landed on the ground; in either case they ignited 3–5 seconds later, throwing out a jet of flaming napalm globs. A lesser number of M-47 incendiaries were also dropped: the M-47 was a 100-pound (45 kg) jelled-gasoline and white phosphorus bomb which ignited upon impact."

"White phosphorus is pyrophoric (self-ignites on contact with air), burns fiercely, and can ignite cloth, fuel, ammunition, and other combustibles."

"If on the other hand the toxic properties of white phosphorus are specifically intended to be used as a weapon, that, of course, is prohibited, because the way the convention is structured or applied, any chemicals used against humans or animals that cause harm or death through the toxic properties of the chemical are considered chemical weapons.[83]"

"Use of aerial incendiary bombs against civilian populations, including against military targets in civilian areas, was banned in the 1980 United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons Protocol III. However the United States reserved the right to use incendiary weapons against military objectives located in concentrations of civilians where it is judged that such use would cause fewer casualties and/or less collateral damage than alternative weapons.[4]"

So, who gets to make that judgement ? Sounds like debating how many pinheads can dance on the head of an angel...or maybe "military intelligence".

On our side -- politically elected civilian leaders.

You are demonstrating that there were conventional strategic bombing options that were more deadly than the 2 primitive low yield atomic bombs which were used to induce surrender. That is the continued loss of life that was averted by the use of the 2 A-bombs we had.

Yes. WW II was brutality without precedent. Thankfully, lessons were learned. Conventional deterrence & MAD hold. Nuc nonproliferation efforts persist.

[old salt]

Salty likes to pretend that only he knows the "complexity" of the situation, while making absolutist judgments that reject that complexity, whereas most of us are saying that there were numerous factors, that should not be denied as real. What actually was in the key decision maker's minds, exactly how they weighed all the various factors, we can't know with 100% certainty, indeed even the participants had difficulty parsing out all those influences. But we do find more than sufficient evidence that supports each of the factors in turn as being part of the equation. What were the tipping elements is much more difficult, but at least to my view, without the racial animus piece, the second bomb would not have been dropped, and quite possibly neither would the first.

Here is what you said, with which I took issue :

(1) I think the point was that had we agreed earlier that the Emperor could remain, the nuclear option would not have been required. But instead we kept demanding "unconditional" surrender. And they kept saying 'no'. In the end, we didn't really need "unconditional".

(2) I can't fathom why the second bomb was necessary...they certainly needed time to process what had happened, and we were in no greater risk had we simply waited for that to occur.

With just a minimum of research (like a wikisearch), it becomes obvious why (1) was not a realistic possibility when you see what was going on within the Japanese govt. Your "wish" was not possible.

Likewise, if you examine what was going on between bombs #1 & #2, it becomes obvious why #2 was necessary.
There was no reason to believe the militarists would ever relent & that the Emperor would survive & maintain control of his military.
That is why Truman was preparing to drop #3 on Tokyo as soon as it became available & he may well have done so during the delay in accepting the terms if he had a #3 ready.

...& here's the threat of Soviet invasion which was supposed to be a factor rushing Truman to drop the bomb.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposed_ ... f_Hokkaido

...& here's a US govt document detailing what surrender conditions the Japanese were willing to accept.

https://www.osti.gov/opennet/manhattan- ... render.htm
Prior to the atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, elements existed within the Japanese government that were trying to find a way to end the war. In June and July 1945, Japan attempted to enlist the help of the Soviet Union to serve as an intermediary in negotiations. No direct communication occurred with the United States about peace talks, but American leaders knew of these maneuvers because the United States for a long time had been intercepting and decoding many internal Japanese diplomatic communications. From these intercepts, the United States learned that some within the Japanese government advocated outright surrender. A few diplomats overseas cabled home to urge just that.

From the replies these diplomats received from Tokyo, the United States learned that anything Japan might agree to would not be a surrender so much as a "negotiated peace" involving numerous conditions. These conditions probably would require, at a minimum, that the Japanese home islands remain unoccupied by foreign forces and even allow Japan to retain some of its wartime conquests in East Asia. Many within the Japanese government were extremely reluctant to discuss any concessions, which would mean that a "negotiated peace" to them would only amount to little more than a truce where the Allies agreed to stop attacking Japan. After twelve years of Japanese military aggression against China and over three and one-half years of war with the United States (begun with the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor), American leaders were reluctant to accept anything less than a complete Japanese surrender.

The one possible exception to this was the personal status of the emperor himself. Although the Allies had long been publicly demanding "unconditional surrender," in private there had been some discussion of exempting the emperor from war trials and allowing him to remain as ceremonial head of state. In the end, at Potsdam, the Allies (right) went with both a "carrot and a stick," trying to encourage those in Tokyo who advocated peace with assurances that Japan eventually would be allowed to form its own government, while combining these assurances with vague warnings of "prompt and utter destruction" if Japan did not surrender immediately. No explicit mention was made of the emperor possibly remaining as ceremonial head of state. Japan publicly rejected the Potsdam Declaration, and on July 25, 1945, President Harry S. Truman gave the order to commence atomic attacks on Japan as soon as possible.

Another Imperial Council was held the night of August 9-10, and this time the vote on surrender was a tie, 3-to-3. For the first time in a generation, the emperor (right) stepped forward from his normally ceremonial-only role and personally broke the tie, ordering Japan to surrender. On August 10, 1945, Japan offered to surrender to the Allies, the only condition being that the emperor be allowed to remain the nominal head of state.

On August 12, the United States announced that it would accept the Japanese surrender, making clear in its statement that the emperor could remain in a purely ceremonial capacity only. Debate raged within the Japanese government over whether to accept the American terms or fight on. Meanwhile, American leaders were growing impatient, and on August 13 conventional air raids resumed on Japan. Thousands more Japanese civilians died while their leaders delayed.